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Words and Deeds
Russian Foreign Policy and  Post-Soviet 
Secessionist Conﬂicts
[Abstract] The goal of this report is to examine Russia’s policy towards secessionist con-
ﬂicts in the post-Soviet space. In order to better understand Russia’s policy choices in that 
sphere, the report addresses three key issues: the internal Russian debate on separatism as a 
security challenge in the post-Soviet space; Moscow’s policies with regard to international in-
stitutions, regimes and frameworks; and the rising security agenda of international terrorism. 
      The report is divided into ﬁve sections. The ﬁrst chapter brieﬂy outlines the scope of 
the study. The second chapter presents a theoretical framework used to address the issue of 
Russian policy towards the secessionist conﬂicts. The third chapter contains a detailed case 
study of Russian policy towards the secessionist conﬂict between Moldova and Transdni-
ester. The fourth analyses Russia’s policy towards the conﬂicts between Abkhazia and Geor-
gia and South Ossetia and Georgia, while the ﬁfth chapter presents authors’ conclusions. 
The theoretical framework chosen by the authors of this study derives from two major 
schools in IR theory – the liberal-institutional one, and the constructivist one. On the one 
hand they raise the traditional neo-liberal question of the validity of institutions in interna-
tional relations; on the other hand they ask how the ability of institutional frameworks to 
address various problems is affected by the identities of the actors who interact in the institu-
tional arena. 
      The report addresses the issue of Russian policy towards the secessionist conﬂicts in the 
post-Soviet space designed and implemented by President Vladimir Putin’s administration. 
It departs from the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, where agreements on the withdrawal 
of Russian forces from both Moldova and Georgia were reached. According to the Istanbul 
Pact, Russia was to withdraw its forces from these two countries in line with the CFE Treaty. 
At the same time, however, Russia has been playing an active part in the international com-
munity’s attempt at ﬁnding a viable solution to secessionist conﬂicts in the same areas. The 
report analyses how the Putin administration has framed the issue of secessionist conﬂicts 
and separatism in statements and doctrines and how this has inﬂuenced Russia’s policy 
towards the conﬂicts themselves and towards the institutions that are actively involved in the 
work on conﬂict resolution. 
      In the authors view, Russia has since the early 1990s pursued an inconsistent and 
incoherent policy towards the separatist conﬂicts in the post-Soviet space. After having 
recognized the importance of separatism as a security challenge and threat within Russia and 
within the post-Soviet space, Russia has however chosen not to translate this approach into a 
viable and coherent policy towards these conﬂicts. Instead of pursuing a policy of unam-
biguous support for the territorial integrity of the states haunted by secessionist conﬂicts, 
Russia seems to have adopted a policy of playing the separatist card for its own purposes 
and has sought to maximize its geopolitical gains and retain some control in the areas that it 
deems important for the realization of its partly outdated geopolitical strategy. This policy 
may yield some short-term geopolitical gains, but in the longer term it may undermine Rus-
sia’s credibility as a predictable and serious international partner, as a ‘normal’ great power 
seeking its own new place on the recently redrawn global power map.
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1.0 Introduction1 
Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s policies toward secessionist conflicts have 
been highly ambivalent. Post-Soviet ‘frozen conflicts’ have offered numer-
ous challenges in regions seen as vital to Russia’s interests, attracting the 
attention of the UN and the OSCE, and producing many initiatives for their 
resolution. Yet, as of 2006, they are far from resolved. International conflict 
resolution schemes have not produced consensus, and warnings that the con-
flicts themselves might ‘unfreeze’ and become active have been heard with 
increasing frequency. In addition, Russia’s relations with the ‘host states’ of 
some of these conflicts have soured, after initial hopes that they would be-
come active participants in a revived CIS (Commonwealth of Independent 
States) cooperation.  
This report examines Russia’s policy in three conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space: Moldova–Transdniester, Abkhazia–Georgia and South Ossetia–
Georgia. These conflicts surfaced as a direct consequence of the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, and were to a certain extent defined by this event. Yet, 
in the course of the 1990s and the early 2000s, new and complex patterns 
have emerged, with Moscow back-pedalling on several issues linked to mili-
tary withdrawal and general attitudes to the conflicts themselves. We suggest 
that three important elements should be taken into account: the internal Rus-
sian debate on separatism as a security challenge in the post-Soviet space; 
Moscow’s back-pedalling policies with regard to international institutions, 
regimes and frameworks; and the rising security agenda of international ter-
rorism.   
We start out with a short discussion of the various schools in international 
relations, querying whether the constructivist school has ignored some of its 
implicit references to neo-liberal theories in international relations. We raise 
this question because reciprocity and trust seem to be on the decline between 
Russia and the major institutions brokering these conflicts. Second, a sepa-
rate chapter focuses on the institutional framework for addressing these con-
flicts – basically that of the Istanbul Pact of the OSCE. We analyse how the 
Putin administration has framed the issue of secessionist conflicts and sepa-
ratism in statements and doctrines. Thirdly, we offer two detailed case-
studies, from Moldova and Georgia, tracing Russia’s path from semi-
compliance toward a more unilateral and less ambiguous policy. Finally, our 
findings are summarized in the concluding chapter.  
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for financial support to this 
project. The views defended in this report are those of the authors and are not in any way an 
expression of the views of the MoD.  

2.0 Russia and Separatism: Theoretical Framework 
The theory basis of this study derives from two major schools in IR theory. 
On the one hand we raise the traditional neo-liberal question of the validity 
of institutions in international relations; on the other hand we ask how the 
ability of institutional frameworks to address various problems is affected by 
the identities of the actors who interact in the institutional arena.  
We have adopted the definition of institutions provided by Robert O. 
Keohane and modified by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. According to 
Keohane, institutions are ‘persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and 
informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape ex-
pectations’.2 March and Olsen define institutions as ‘a relatively enduring 
collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of mean-
ing and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of indi-
viduals and changing external circumstances’.3 They also add an identity 
dimension to institutions, treating them as ‘carriers of identities and roles’ 
and ‘markers of a polity’s character, history and visions.’4 However, institu-
tions also ‘fashion, enable and constrain political actors as they act within 
the logic of appropriate action.’5 Institutions exist to give order to social re-
lations, reduce flexibility and variability in behaviour, and restrict the possi-
bilities of the one-sided pursuit of self-interest or drives. The actors involved 
are expected to follow institutional rules – prescriptions based on the logic of 
appropriateness, and a sense of rights and obligations derived from identity 
and membership in a political community and the ethos, practices and expec-
tations of its institutions. According to this interpretation, actors follow the 
rules because the rules themselves are seen as natural, rightful, expected and 
legitimate.6 
However, as March and Olsen rightly point out, actors are influenced not 
only by their institutional identities, but also by various identities associated 
with different roles within the organization. They may act according to these 
identities, without paying much attention to the likely consequences of their 
behaviour.7 To this, however, it should be added that actors are influenced 
not only by their intra-institutional identities and roles, but to an even greater 
degree by their ‘extra-institutional identities’ – their own perceptions of their 
international roles. Actors’ behaviour within institutions is affected by how 
they perceive themselves, how they perceive their international surroundings 
and not least by how they perceive the institutions with which they decide to 
identify themselves. According to Alexander Wendt, the way in which states 
construct their international identities is a function of how the key structures 
                                                 
2 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’, International Journal, vol. 
45, no. 4 (Autumn) 1990, pp.731– 64.   
3 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen,‘Elaborating the New Institutionalism’, Arena Working 
Paper no. 11, 2005, Oslo, p. 4.  
4 Ibid., p.5. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p.8. 
7 Ibid., p.10. 
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in a state are inter-subjective, because state identities and interests are 
largely constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously 
to the system by human nature or domestic politics.8 To understand how 
states construct their international identities, we need to look at states’ dis-
courses on their own international role, because ‘social structures have an 
inherently discursive dimension in the sense that they are inseparable from 
the reasons and self-understandings that the agents bring to their actions.’9       
This study asks two basic questions. 
• Can institutions can serve as mediators or marketplaces for in-
ternational resolutions and replace old-style geopolitical condi-
tionality schemes with new concerted multilateral efforts? 
• How do actors’ identities, the way they interpret their interna-
tional surroundings, formulate their goals and decide to pursue 
them also in the institutional arena, serve to shape the interna-
tional environment and affect institutional modus operandi?  
Thus we are enquiring how Russia’s political identity, read through an in-
depth analysis of statements and discourses (words) and actions  (deeds), has 
manifested itself in policy on settling separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space, and what impact this identity has on the way Russia decides to ap-
proach these issues within a multilateral institutional framework, primarily 
within the OSCE. 
What then of the validity of making only two case-studies speak for the 
whole of Russia’s security outlook, and attributing its policy to a declining 
interest in multilateralism? In order to understand Moscow’s official policy 
towards the separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet space, these conflicts 
should be placed within the broader framework of Russia’s foreign, defence 
and security policy. Russian policies might be seen as a matryoshka-like 
construction, with the fear that separatist conflicts may multiply and spread 
in the post-Soviet space at the very core of this construction. And so we will 
have to open other ‘matryoshka dolls’, to see the content of official policy in 
other areas and the mutual impact of Russia’s policy towards the separatist 
conflicts and its policies in other fields.  
Firstly, if we view internal conflicts as lying at the very core of Russia’s 
foreign, defence and security policies, it becomes natural to see policy to-
wards the post-Soviet space in general as the next matryoshka layer. Policy 
on the separatist conflicts is clearly an important part of official policy to-
wards what has now become known as ‘the near abroad’. When separatist 
conflicts emerged as a consequence of the abrupt collapse of the USSR, Rus-
sia seemed totally unprepared, both politically and technically. The near 
abroad – including the conflicts that emerged in this area – was something 
completely new, and the Russian political class lacked experience in dealing 
with or understanding the nature of such conflicts. Russia’s policy towards 
separatist conflicts has become an important part of what could be seen as a 
                                                 
8 Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American 
Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2, 1994, p.385. 
9 Alexander Wendt, ‘The Agent-structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, Inter-
national Organization , vol. 4, no. 3, 1987, p.359. 
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policy concerning its post-imperial space. The question of organization and 
potential re-organization of post-imperial political space is thus a residual 
challenge of state collapse, but one intrinsically linked to developments 
within Russia itself.  
Second, the many problems of policy coordination in the new Russia 
have opened another residual challenge. Domestic turmoil in a country pre-
occupied with its own reforms produced a visible lack of ability to coordi-
nate the various spheres of policy, on the part of President Yeltsin and his 
entourage. Instead, these conflicts have been mostly dealt with by the mili-
tary establishment, thereby becoming part of a de facto heritage of Russia’s 
security and defence policy rather than stemming from any strategy in its 
foreign policy agenda. Even after 1993, when the most violent military phase 
of these three conflicts in focus here was over, it was the military that was to 
play the major role in the conflict areas. Russian military presence in the 
conflict areas was sanctioned either as Russian or international (CIS) peace-
keeping, or as Russian deployment based on bilateral agreements that the 
countries in question were coerced in accepting. As it was mostly the re-
sponsibility of the Russian military to handle these conflicts, and Russia’s 
‘opponents’ in these conflicts were either separatist quasi-states that sought 
Russian protection against their new post-Soviet nation-states, Russia could 
handle these conflicts in a purely realist way, with the use of coercive power 
– or threat of use of coercive power – as a major ingredient of its policy. But 
again, realism made this not so much a state strategy, but a de facto residual 
challenge. 
Third, as these conflicts were often seen as manifestations of interna-
tional anarchy and threats to the European stability and security, Russia was 
given a semi-official mandate to handle the situation in the conflict zones on 
its own. In that case Russia’s post-imperial interests – to retain at least some 
of the control over parts of the former empire and stabilize the situation 
around its new perimeter – overlapped with the interests of the main Western 
and European players who lacked the will and capability to intervene di-
rectly in the post-Soviet space. Russia was in a sense given the green light 
for such operations, especially those aimed at bringing back at least some 
apparent stability to the region. It was expected that the new Russia, having 
declared its return to the European fold and embarked on building a demo-
cratic system with a functional market economy, would soon become a nor-
mal European power – and would behave like one. Thus, Russia’s presence 
could also offer an opportunity for Western-style multilateralism.  
Although we may note three reasons why Russia would seek a role in 
multilateral contexts, we could also find reasons for Russia not to want this. 
The institutionalized logic of appropriateness does not always overlap with 
state priorities. To the extent that they do, we should at least introduce the 
following premise: If Russia wanted to cooperate with Western European 
institutions and retain its central place in the pan-European CSCE/OSCE 
network, the country would have to adjust its approach also to these separa-
tist conflicts and work together with other actors to find solutions. If, in the 
first phase of these conflicts, Russia could play a power game, claiming spe-
cial rights as the legal, political and power successor to the Soviet Union and 
acting as a ‘fireman’ obliged to intervene in conflict zones in order to stop 
Geir Flikke and Jakub M. Godzimirski 
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these conflicts from escalating, then in the long term Russia would have to 
change its logic. Russia would have to start playing by the European rules, 
playing a European game – a game with a clear liberal and institutional 
paradigmatic cut. If the European logic of appropriateness (and not the post-
Soviet one) were to be applied – and this was a precondition for being ac-
cepted as a member of the enlarged European family – Russia could no 
longer bully its smaller neighbours, but would have to act like the responsi-
ble and constructive European power it wished to be recognized as. Has it 
done so?  
This is the question that we seek to answer in these two cases, by testing 
the assumptions of neo-liberal theory. Neo-liberal security theory has long 
hinged on the ‘web of institutions’ argument, according to which the 
enlargement of the EU and NATO, supported by the OSCE, was to provide 
incentives for cooperation.10 This is again coupled to a ‘rationalist’ assump-
tion that states are more prone to comply with exogenous incentives, and that 
they will respond to these.11 In his study on the impact of international re-
gimes on Russia’s policy choices, Christer Pursiainen asked some important 
questions – such as whether institutions can enhance cooperation between 
states, whether international norms and rules do matter, and whether institu-
tions can prevent or contain Russia’s unilateral behaviour and make it be-
have in a cooperative and non-discordant way.12 This study will address a 
similar set of questions, but in another political context.  
Specifically, we will examine whether incentives and institutions have 
been effective in the cases studied. Judging from preliminary evidence of 
Russia’s ‘deeds’ in the international context, they have not. Russia has pro-
posed semi-domestic solutions to the conflicts, all the while neglecting – and 
even de facto torpedoing – multilateral efforts at conflict resolution. Eventu-
ally, a reversed conditionality scheme has been instrumental in prompting 
Russia to ‘drag its feet’ in terms of the withdrawal of Russian military hard-
ware and personnel.   
Is this because institutions have failed to provide sufficient incentives for 
cooperation? Russia’s inherent preference for bilateralism in international 
relations is well known, but how does this work in terms of formulating na-
tional interests in multilateral institutions – especially when these institutions 
are to deal with problems in areas that Russia defines as strategically impor-
tant, areas in which Russia seems to feel it has high stakes?13 In the OSCE 
                                                 
10 This theory is criticized in numerous articles, among others John Mearsheimer, ‘The False 
Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, 1995, pp. 5–49. 
11 For a discussion on rationalist theory and theories of collective action, see Alexander 
Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political Sci-
ence Review, vol. 88, no, 2, 1994, pp. 384–396. 
12 Christer Pursiainen, ‘The Impact of International Security Regimes on Russia’s Behavior’, 
in: Ted Hopf (ed.), Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy, Pennsylvania University 
Press, 1999, pp. 109–169, p. 110. Pursiainen’s case is explicitly designed toward understand-
ing Russian compliance and non-compliance with norms, institutions and rules in the case of 
Chechnya, where there are sovereignty issues involved, but also vital humanitarian issues. 
Pursiainen argues that the core is not incentives, but norm-containment. The incentive would 
be to be ‘normal’ and recognized as ‘legitimate’. This is a sore spot of constructivism, how-
ever, since legitimacy is believed to be a ‘social product’, and thus highly relative with regard 
to the institutionalized network of norms and behaviour.  
13 Pàl Dunay, ‘The OSCE in Crisis’, Chaillot Paper, no. 88, April, 2006, p. 17 
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literature, arguments on lack of compliance have ranged from ‘reluctance to 
inability’.14 But what does it mean that a state is ‘reluctant’ in meeting cer-
tain criteria, and what are the consequences of inability – as well as the rea-
sons for both?  
Constructivism argues that, in order to understand state behaviour, the fo-
cus should be redirected from incentives and exogenous factors, to internal 
(endogenous) sources and actors’ readings of the system within which they 
operate. ‘Constructivism’s empirical mission is to surface the background 
that makes uncertainty a variable to understand, rather than a constant to as-
sume.’15 In some cases, it would seem reasonable to assume that identities 
may have an effect on institutional settings. As Pursiainen argues, if ‘states 
suspect one another of cheating, they disagree over the best possible coop-
erative solution, if some of them are sure that they will benefit from public 
goods regardless of whether they cooperate, or if they are uncertain about 
one another’s preferences and rationality.’16The way actors relate to one an-
other has much to do with their mutual perceptions of each another, and 
these perceptions are in turn deeply rooted in their outlook on the world and 
in their mental ‘friend’ and ‘foe’ maps. To what extent actors feel uncertain 
when interacting with each other is thus pre-determined by how each reads 
the other and the other’s intentions. Bringing these uncertainties to the sur-
face – making sense of them – may be thus a major contribution of construc-
tivism in the study of conflict.  
The report links onto this by analysing Russian perceptions of these con-
flicts, limited here to official statements made by elites and Russian institu-
tions. This includes also the socialization process in international relations – 
the remoulding of interest through interaction.  
Hence the research question could be formulated as follows: what are the 
primary concerns of Russia, and how can these concerns be linked to read-
ings of post-Soviet security challenges and the overall attempt of Russia to 
solidify as an actor in the international system? Can we understand institu-
tional failure in terms of a lacking understanding of the rationality of a new 
actor? Our primary concern here will be the ‘words’ or terms applied to de-
scribe the lack of compliance with international conditionality schemes and 
the general perception or reading of security that informs and guides actions 
of non-compliance.  
Our primary corollary, however, is that the attempt to ‘surface’ intentions 
will often involve a tacit link to the neo-liberal assumption that institutions 
matter, and that they can in fact serve as ‘carrots’ for states to reformulate 
and reconsider national interests. Alexander Wendt has claimed that the neo-
realist criticism of neo-liberalism ‘reminds neo-liberalists and critical theo-
rists, normally locked in their own tug of war, that they have a common, 
non-realist interest in the institutional bases of international life’.17 More-
                                                 
14 Ibid. p. 25. 
15 Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, Interna-
tional Security, vol. 23, no. 1, 1998, pp. 171–200, p. 188. 
16 Pursiainen, pp. 119–120.  
17 Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, vol. 20, no. 
1, 1995, pp. 71–81, p. 71. 
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over, Christer Pursiainen argues that ‘constructivism offers conclusions that 
are complement of those of neo-liberalism.’18 Having a non-realist common 
interest is not sufficient, however. A theory has to be checked against institu-
tional evidence in order to assume validity. Are all ‘socialization’ processes 
designed to fit with institutional demands and incentives? When national 
interests are reformulated, are they always in compliance with international 
obligations? In other words: can there be ‘reciprocity’ without compliance?  
We believe that the constructivist link to the neo-liberal argument on in-
stitutions is overemphasized and lacks empirical foundations. At the theory 
level, a claim will be made that the active ‘construing’ of interests by a new 
actor can in fact harbour realist aims. That is to say, by paying too much 
heed to information about an actor (especially a state’s pronounced self-
image), the analysts can easily lose their grip on the deeds of that state. The 
process of ‘socialization’ of national interests may be more about securing 
influence and leverage through new legitimacy, but without discarding stan-
dard geopolitical scripts and neo-realist behaviour. States may literally pay 
lip-service to institutions by making certain statements, but at the same time 
act in ways not necessarily in accordance with their solemn proclamations. 
The major lesson to be drawn from the separatist deadlock is that the failure 
of institutions may prompt states to worry increasingly about the relative 
gains of others – and subsequently their own potential losses – and the ve-
hicle for voicing this may be a more troublesome insistence on some special 
and ‘privileged’ rights in international relations.  
The issue here is not the ‘clash’ of different civilizations in the sense that 
pre-fabricated ‘identities’ collide over irreconcilable claims. Identities are 
processed, shaped and reshaped through interaction, we argue, and are not 
preconceived. Hence, we agree with Peter J. Katzenstein: ‘state interests do 
not exist to be discovered by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are 
constructed through a process of social interaction.’19 We assume that so-
cialization is multi-levelled, however, and may follow standard geopolitical 
scripts, especially if these geopolitical scripts are important elements of po-
litical identity and widely used interpretative tools. Tracking constructivist 
processes may mean viewing the reshaping of identities and re-formulation 
of interests as several, perhaps competing processes. Socialization at one 
level may produce non-compliance at another; interaction does not necessar-
ily lead to internalization of the ideas of others, but may result in the rethink-
ing of one’s own ideas, including the reshaping of identity, the reformulation 
of interests and the modification of policies.  
It is the active formulation of interests that is of interest to us here – not 
any preconceived interest design leading to a necessary institutional dead-
lock. Hence, we would not wish to argue that institutions were doomed to 
                                                 
18 Pursiainen, p. 168. Clearly, the argument here has been that Russia – contrary to logic, as 
they say, opened up for an observer mission of the OSCE in the Chechen conflict after having 
opposed it during 1994–95. What it does not discuss is whether or not this has actually been a 
vehicle for securing Russian compliance with OSCE norms in the conduct of the second Che-
chen War. Moreover, it does not cover the closure of the observer mission in 2002.  
19 Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’, in Peter 
J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture Of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Poli-
tics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 1–32, p. 2. 
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fail because of some preconceived interest penetrating all levels of the Rus-
sian polity. In our view, studying the process itself may help us to under-
stand and reveal some Russian ‘uncertainties’ that in turn may explain how 
these conflicts became elevated to the level of ‘high politics’.  
The next chapter analyses Russia’s commitments from Istanbul 1999 
OSCE summit, and how Russia’s fulfilment of these commitments has be-
come an important ‘socialization’ gauge through which external actors have 
measured its foreign, defence and security policy in the conflict areas. We 
will also look at how Russia has sought to modify its approach towards these 
commitments after the new leadership decided to strengthen the country’s 
international position and counter what have been interpreted as negative 
developments in its international surroundings.  
2.1. The OSCE and Post-Soviet Conflicts: Istanbul 
The outbreak of political violence during the armed phase of the post-Soviet 
secessionist conflicts confronted the international community with a seem-
ingly unsolvable task. The very existence of the quasi-independent states on 
the territories of Moldova and Georgia, the inability of the local elites to find 
a working solution to these problems, and Russia’s prominent role in these 
conflicts stood out as central challenges for international organizations and 
regimes. Hence, already during the armed phase of the conflicts European 
and global multilateral organizations – the OSCE and the UN – decided to 
act in the region. OSCE established its mission to Georgia in 1992 and to 
Moldova in 1993. The main goal was to promote negotiations between the 
conflicting parties and support the UN-led peace negotiation process in the 
zone of the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict (1993).20   
Similarly, the UN brokered a ceasefire between Tbilisi and Sukhumi in 
1993. It established UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) ‘to verify 
compliance with the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Geor-
gia and the Abkhaz authorities’21 and help to set up the Coordinating Coun-
cil in 1997. In addition, since December 1993 a small group of nations – the 
so-called Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia, consisting 
of Germany, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA – has 
been assisting the UN in finding a solution to the conflict in Abkhazia.22 Af-
ter the armed and most violent phase of the conflicts was over, these multi-
lateral organizations have continued their engagement, paying considerable 
attention to the task of conflict resolution.  
It was the OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999 that really brought these con-
flicts to the attention of the international community. Despite the relatively 
broad agenda of the 1999 Istanbul, the joint declaration which it issued man-
                                                 
20 http://www.osce.org/georgia/13199.html  
21 For more on the UN’s activities and role in seeking a solution to the separatist conflicts in 
Georgia see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/index.html and the UNOMIG 
website at http://www.unomig.org/.  
22 For more on ‘Groups of Friends of the Secretary-General’ as a diplomatic toll see Jean E. 
Krasno’s article on this topic at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/ 
pubs/krasno/krfr.htm   
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aged to secure a common institutionalized approach to several post–Cold 
War issues. The setting was by no means ideal for addressing Russia’s con-
cerns. The effect of the Kosovo crisis on Russia’s integrationist aspirations 
was evident, and the crisis itself induced in policy documents and percep-
tions a careful revision of Russia’s earlier hopes that the OSCE might be-
come the cornerstone of European security. Even among Russian ‘Wester-
nizers’ there were widespread concerns that Russia had given away too 
much at Istanbul. The prevailing conviction in Russian politics was that the 
Istanbul document was ‘weak’, that it did not include incentives for Russia 
to comply, and that it lopsidedly imposed an alien security regime onto Rus-
sia. According to former US Ambassador Vladimir Lukin (Yabloko), the 
final document from Istanbul ‘contains a series of ambiguous and partially 
self-contradictory formulations that each party [to the Final Act] may inter-
pret as they like’. Subsequently, Russia should oppose the ‘attempts to rede-
fine the OSCE as an organization primarily for the post-Soviet space and the 
Balkans’.23 To the degree that there was a European vector in this, it con-
sisted in activating emerging high-level contacts between Russia and the EU 
on the basis that Russia should consider making ‘not NATO, but the EU its 
primary interlocutor in Europe’.24  
Since Kosovo, Russia had accustomed itself to viewing the role of OSCE 
through the prism of subsequent NATO intervention. Russia’s deep-rooted 
ambition of transforming the OSCE into a separate security organization that 
would regulate all inter-state relations in Europe (with Russia in a central 
role) was increasingly perceived as a cul-de-sac, and had prompted elites to 
re-think the ‘European’ vector in foreign policies altogether.25 This coin-
cided with an attempt to give the OSCE a new revival in the post-Soviet 
space. The major gain from the Istanbul OSCE conference was that the 
OSCE had at least proved itself capable of introducing some sort of condi-
tionality in the step-by-step approach to the former Soviet space. The Istan-
bul Pact made specific statements on all three cases examined in this study, 
drawing both on the negotiation processes within the OSCE and on the role 
played by the UN. Concerning the Transdniester conflict, the declaration 
stated that it recognized both the positive role of the ‘peacekeeping’ forces in 
the region, Russian–Ukrainian mediation as manifested in the document on 
normalization of Moldova–Transdniester relations from 16 July 1999,26 and 
the Oslo Ministerial meeting. The Istanbul declaration was clear when it 
came to defining the crux of the problem: 
However, there have been no tangible shifts on the major issue–defining the 
status of the Trans-Dniestrian region. We reaffirm that in the resolution of this 
problem the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova 
should be ensured. We stand for the continuation and deployment of the negotia-
tion process and call on all sides and in particular the Trans-Dniestrian authori-
                                                 
23 Vladimir Lukin, ‘God posle Stambula’, NeGa-Dipkur’er, 9 November 2000. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, ‘Evidence of Russia’s Bush Doctrine in the CIS’, Euro-
pean Security, no. 3, vol. 14, 2005, pp. 387–417, Wolfgang Zellner, ‘Russia and the OSCE: 
From High Hopes to Disillusionment’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, no. 3, vol. 
18, 2005, p. 393. 
26 http://www.osce.org/documents/mm/1999/07/458_en.pdf    
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ties to demonstrate the political will required to negotiate a peaceful and early 
elimination of the consequences of the conflict.27 
This statement could be understood as putting forth certain demands to the 
Transdniestrian authorities to comply and cooperate with the OSCE process 
and to take part in an active solution also to other questions – like federaliza-
tion and power-sharing. The principle of conditionality was also clearly laid 
out. The summit statement indirectly coupled two processes – the federaliza-
tion issue, and the continued and future withdrawal of Russian ‘peacekeep-
ing’ forces and ammunition depots.  
Recalling the decisions of the Budapest and Lisbon Summits and Oslo Ministe-
rial Meting, we reiterate our expectation of an early, orderly and complete with-
drawal of Russian troops from Moldova. In this context, we welcome the recent 
progress achieved in the removal and destruction of the Russian military equip-
ment stockpiled in the Trans-Dniestrian region of Moldova and the completion 
of the destruction of non-transportable ammunition. We welcome the commit-
ment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces 
from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002. We also welcome the willing-
ness of the Republic of Moldova and of the OSCE to facilitate this process, 
within their respective abilities, by the agreed deadline.28 
To follow up these processes, the Istanbul document signalled several ac-
tions to be taken. A special assessment mission would be dispatched to 
Moldova for observing the destruction process, and the Permanent Council 
would consider the prolongation of the OSCE mission to Moldova and the 
establishment of a voluntary financial fund to be administered by the OSCE.  
At the 1999 Istanbul Summit the OSCE also unanimously adopted a 
statement on the situation in Georgia. The organization reaffirmed its strong 
support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and stressed 
the need for solving the conflicts regarding the Tskhinvali region/South Os-
setia and Abkhazia/Georgia – particularly by defining the political status of 
these regions within Georgia.29 The solution should be based on respect for 
human rights and development of joint democratic institutions as well as the 
prompt, safe and unconditional return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons.30 The OSCE also welcomed the progress in negotiations on the re-
duction of Russian military equipment in Georgia reached at this summit, 
lauded the progress that had been made towards solving the conflict between 
South Ossetia and Georgia, expressed its support for the leading UN role in 
Abkhazia, condemned the acts of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, and branded 
the 1999 presidential elections and referendum in Abkhazia as ‘unacceptable 
and illegitimate’.31  
Again, the issue of the political status of the breakaway territories stood 
at the centre of attention in the summit declaration. As was the case for 
                                                 
27 OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, at: 
 http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_en.pdf.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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Moldova, the final statement explicitly stressed Georgian sovereignty as a 
core principle. According to the document: 
Reaffirming our strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Georgia, we stress the need for solving the conflicts with regard to the Tskhin-
vali region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia, particularly by defining the 
political status of these regions within Georgia.32 
While the OSCE was the umbrella for the Moldovan federalization process, 
the Istanbul declaration relied more on the work of the UN in facilitating 
discussions on solving the status of breakaway territories within Georgia. 
The UN was given a leading role in this process, while the OSCE was to part 
in a joint fact-finding mission with the UN on the process of ethnic cleansing 
of Georgians in Abkhazia. A similar conditionality process was sketched out 
by outlining a step-by-step process of federalization and repatriation of IDPs, 
while quasi-elections in breakaway territories such as Abkhazia were con-
demned:  
We continue to support the leading role of the United Nations in Abkhazia, 
Georgia. We emphasize the importance of breaking the current deadlock with 
regard to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. In this respect we – and in 
particular those of us who belong to the Friends of the United Nations Secretary-
General – are ready to work with the United Nations to prepare and submit a 
draft document addressing the distribution of constitutional competencies be-
tween the central authorities of Georgia and authorities of Abkhazia, Georgia. 
[…] We consider the so-called presidential elections and referendum in 
Abkhazia, Georgia, this year as unacceptable and illegitimate.33 
The coupling of the federalization process and the withdrawal of Russian 
bases and weaponry was tighter in the case of Moldova that with Georgia. 
The passage on the withdrawal of troops and ammunition from Moldova by 
the end of 2001 was supported by a special annex signed by Moldovan and 
Russian authorities, stating that Moldova renounced the right to receive a 
temporary deployment on its territory. The document did not specify how 
this ‘temporary deployment’ should be interpreted, however. It might mean 
either the deployment of a substitute peacekeeping mission, or simply be 
interpreted as Moldovan rejection of any temporary Russian deployment.  
The bilateral annex regulating Georgian–Russian relations was different. 
No specific dates were set for withdrawal of Russian bases and Treaty Lim-
ited Equipment (TLE), and there were only indirect references to this com-
mitment in the Istanbul Final Act itself. These were made conditional on 
progress in Georgian–Russian relations, and also meeting the deadlines of 
the revised CFE Agreement. According to the Final Act: ‘We welcome pro-
gress reached at this Summit Meeting in the Georgian–Russian negotiations 
on the reduction of Russian military equipment in Georgia’, without any 
specific references to deadlines.34 This reference was made in the Georgian–
Russian annex to the Final Act, where the first articles specified that Russia 
should meet the ceiling for CFE Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) by 31 De-
cember 2000, and withdraw all TLE from the bases of Vaziani and Gudauta 
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34 Ibid. 
Words and Deeds: Russian Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Separatist Conflicts 
 
19 
by that same date. Moreover, the Russian military bases of Vaziani and Gu-
dauta were to be abandoned by 1 July 2001. 
Although time limits were specified in the cases of Gudauta and Vaziani 
there were two more bases – Alkhalkalaki in Javakheti, a region with a sub-
stantial Armenian minority and Batumi in the semi-autonomous Adzharia – 
that were left to bilateral negotiations during the year 2000. In the Moldovan 
case, the conditionality process on federalization and withdrawal of Russian 
equipment was not primarily a bilateral issue, but a multilateral and institu-
tionalized one. However, the Russian–Georgian annex to the revised CFE 
Treaty placed it as a bilateral issue. On the other hand, the UN lead in the 
process of defining the status of Abkhazia was expected to provide a multi-
lateral framework for negotiations on the basis of Georgian territorial sover-
eignty. Facilitators to the process were the OSCE, which would provide fi-
nancial backing, the Group of Friends of the UNSG, and the UNSG special 
representative for Abkhazia and Head of the UNOMIG observer mission to 
Abkhazia, Dieter Boden. 
Even though the OSCE has been aware of the problems in the region, and 
has been operating in the conflict zones from the outset, this pan-European 
body has not been able to contribute substantially to permanent solutions, for 
various reasons. These include the OSCE’s consensus-based modus oper-
andi, which make it futile to attempt to propose measures not backed by at 
least one of its members. Moreover, Russia’s general view of the OSCE as a 
less important security organization has also limited the effect of OSCE me-
diation. After the 1999 OSCE summit, Russia began revising its security and 
defence doctrines, codifying its new approach to security questions. The is-
sue of separatism played a central role in this revision.  
2.2. Putin’s Russia and Separatism  
The Putin administration initially gave few indications on how it perceived 
the Western web of security institutions. In part, Putin has been keen to re-
activate foreign policies, regain positions and mark Russia’s interests in for-
eign relations. This has engendered a mixture of crisscrossing statements, 
initiatives and responses, all of which have had as their focal point the resur-
rection of Russia as a state. Still, when Putin reached the top of Russian poli-
tics in 1999 there were at least three reasons why the issue of separatism 
would occupy a prominent place on his political agenda. The first reason 
could be labelled the ‘imminent’ one. The first task Putin set out to deal with 
when being appointed prime minister, and then elected president, was to 
tackle what was defined as the existential threat stemming from Chechen 
separatism. Although the military intervention in the Northern Caucasus – 
first in Dagestan, then in Chechnya proper – was from the very beginning 
labelled a counter-terrorist operation, it was obvious that the main goal was 
to eradicate, once and for all, the source of the separatist threat in this vola-
tile and turbulent region, and thus in Russia itself.  
Putin’s policies focused on two semi-domestic arenas: the CIS and the 
transformation of the military so as to make it better prepared to meet the 
rising challenge of international terrorism and separatism. Putin’s presence 
at the CIS summit in January 2000 reinforced hopes that the CIS would be 
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transformed into an area for economic cooperation on the basis of several 
‘strategic partnerships’ – a buzzword for delaying what Moscow saw as 
processes of disintegration.35 But reviving economic and political relations 
within the CIS was not the sole priority. A parallel track in the integration 
processes was spun around the collective Security Pact of the CIS from 1992 
– the Tashkent Treaty, also known as the CST, or the Collective Security 
Treaty of the CIS. Towards Putin’s inauguration in May 2000, the argument 
of creating a common CIS footing for combating terrorism in the CIS space 
was heard with greater frequency. Russian officials began arguing for en-
hanced Russian military presence and the conversion of old residual bases to 
permanent, re-furbished and primarily Russian military bases in Central Asia 
and Caucasus.36 
The Transdniester–Moldova deadlock and the conflicts in Georgia were 
not an obvious focal point for the emerging presidential agenda.37 Russia 
had made a case for fighting ‘international terrorism’ in Chechnya, attempt-
ing to locate it within the realm of a rising terrorist agenda in the interna-
tional community. Separatism was ‘on the rise’, newspapers reported, refer-
ring to the growth of ‘religious extremism, attempts at mass hostage-taking, 
alteration of existing borders, and overthrow of state power’.38 Whereas 
Islamist insurgency emerged as a primary focus for presidential security 
policies, there was no readymade formula for dealing with separatist issues 
and the rise of quasi-states after the break-up of the USSR. Thus, addressing 
separatism seemed to comprise at least two separate phenomena – the 
Islamist challenge, and the residual conflicts in the post-Soviet space. The 
newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta (NeGa) captured the conceptual confusion 
by blending Islamism with broader questions of ‘war and peace in Trans-
dniester, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh’.39  
Actually, residual post-Soviet conflict resolution and combating interna-
tional terrorism had no evident overlaps other than the fact that states weak-
ened by festering conflicts could become transit territories for illegal arms 
transfers and smuggling. Russian experts seemed to realize that separatism 
and terrorism should not be confused with each other. Alexander Skakov, 
head of the Department of CIS Countries of the Russian Institute for Strate-
gic Studies, stated: ‘there are no grounds for resorting to a broadened defini-
tion of terrorism, for example, by identifying it with separatism.’ In his view, 
separatism should be described as ‘a political movement or regime whose 
goal is to separate a part from a state, create a new independent state in it and 
achieve diplomatic recognition of that state by the world community.’ He 
added that the problem of separatism ceases to exist when the international 
                                                 
35 ‘Strategicheskoe partnerstvo radi ekonomicheskogo razvitiya’, NeGa, 20 January, 2000. 
At: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2000-01-20/5_partners.html.  
36 For an extensive discussion of this, see Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, ‘Evidence of 
Russia’s Bush Doctrine in the CIS’.  
37 A search in the data-base of Putin’s major speeches and press interviews from 1999 to 
2005 gave 1 hit on the Transdniester conflict, 0 on Moldova, 4 on the OSCE, basically nega-
tive comments with regard to developments on the Balkans and 0 on separatism. Georgia had 
65 hits, however, and 59 hits were on terrorism. See Appendix 1 for a full list of Putin’s texts.  
38 ‘Antiterroristicheskiy vektor oborony’, NeGa, 17 March 2000. 
39 Ibid. 
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community recognizes the separatist regime, because ‘should these goals be 
achieved, then the separatist regime ceases to be exactly that.’40 
In the Chechen case, Skakov’s remark is definitely a misnomer, but is it 
relevant for how the Putin administration has read the ‘separatist’ challenge? 
Although the security documents hardly embody a coherent approach of to-
day’s administration to separatism, we can analyse statements and docu-
ments so as to identify whether separatism and terrorism are treated as two 
separate phenomena. Second, we would have to take into account also the 
fact of post-Soviet secessionism. The cases studied here were in fact ‘West-
ernized’ by an early involvement of the OSCE, and attempts to link them to 
Russian security interests would mean to re-launch the idea of a specific 
zone of influence for Russia. From a strategic point of view, this would im-
ply to make two claims: that Western involvement and mediation is a prob-
lem, and that Russia has a special political interest in the area.  
2.2.1. Putin’s approach to separatism and state integrity  
Vladimir Putin’s views on separatism are closely linked with the issue of the 
disintegration of the Russian state and the question of protection and safe-
guarding territorial integrity. When in November/December 1999 Putin pub-
lished his political manifesto Russia at the Turn of Millennium (RTM), the 
question of territorial and legal integrity of Russia was given a prominent 
place. He underlined that there were ‘more than a thousand federal laws and 
several thousand laws of the republics, territories, regions and autonomous 
areas’, and that not all of them were compatible with the main criterion on 
which Russia’s political system should be based – that of a strong state. He 
added that there was a possibility, at that stage of Russian history, that ‘the 
mass of questionable or simply unconstitutional laws’ could become critical 
and that ‘the constitutional security of the state, the federal center’s capabili-
ties, the country’s manageability and Russia’s integrity would be in jeop-
ardy’.41 Although he made no direct reference to territorial integrity and 
separatism as challenges facing Russia in Chechnya, he clearly indicated that 
there was a strong link between integrity of the country, the quality of its 
legal system and the strength of state as the main player.  
Similar claims are found in the Letter to Russian Voters (LTV) published 
in many Russian newspapers only weeks before the presidential elections. 
Also here, Putin made no mention of territorial integrity, but presented his 
views on the link between the quality of Russian legal system and law en-
forcement and the situation developing in Chechnya. The situation in 
Chechnya had nothing to do with separatism or with the Chechens’ struggle 
for self-determination, he wrote. At stake was whether the Russian state 
could gain the upper hand over banditry: ‘banditry was growing stronger’, 
and ‘an entire republic, a component of the Russian Federation – Chechnya – 
became occupied by the criminal world and turned by it into its fortress.’ He 
                                                 
40 Alexander  Skakov, ‘Separatism and terrorism in the Caucasus – The Russian position’, in 
Shaping an Environment for Peace, Stability & Confidence in South Caucasus, Conflict Stud-
ies Research Centre, Sandhurst, 2002, p.39. 
41 1999 Manifesto.See Appendix. 
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described what Russia was doing in Chechnya: ‘we had just to meet the ban-
dits in open confrontation and to rout them.’42 
The Chechen issue rose to prominence again after Putin’s inauguration as 
president. In his first of a series of State of the Nation speeches (SN) Putin 
elaborated on various issues related to the debate on separatism and territo-
rial state integrity. Putin effectively pinned the separatist issue as one having 
a considerable effect on domestic stability. He saw a direct link between the 
activities of those whom he described as international terrorists, and tensions 
and problems in Russia: the country was facing a new type of external ag-
gression, with international terrorists were attempting to influence the situa-
tion inside Russia. This forced Russia to face ‘a systematic challenge to its 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity’, to stand up against ‘forces seeking 
geopolitical reorganization of the world’. In order to deal with both these 
new challenges and with misinterpretations of Russia’s intentions, a further 
strengthening of the state was needed, in Putin’s view. He blamed the way 
federalism had been practised in Russia after 1993 for many of the problems 
Russia was now encountering. Putin described Chechnya as ‘an extreme ex-
ample of unsolved federal problems’; developments in that republic had re-
sulted in its territory becoming ‘a bridgehead for the expansion of interna-
tional terrorism in Russia’. Intervention was essential: ‘only a counter-
terrorist operation could remove the threat of Russia’s disintegration.’ It was 
thanks to the Russian professional military that ‘the dignity and integrity of 
the state’ could be preserved and the disintegration of the state caused by the 
actions of international terrorist prevented.43 
Putin retained this focus on the strengthening of the state structures as the 
best means to prevent its disintegration also in his next State of the Nation 
Speech, delivered in 2001 (SN 2001). The strengthening of the state was de-
scribed as the ‘the strategic objective of the past year’, the key to solving all 
the problems facing Russia. The aim was to turn the Russian state into a 
strong centralized federation. ’The period of disintegration of statehood is 
behind us,’ Putin stated.44A more detailed account of the importance of these 
issues was given at his press conference with leading American journalists 
held in June 2001. At this conference he described the worsening situation in 
Chechnya as the main source of the separatist threat to Russia, one that had 
ended in ‘a major attack by several thousand armed men on Dagestan under 
the slogan of separating additional territory from Russia and creating a new 
state from the Black Sea to the Caspian’. Putin described this attack as direct 
aggression, and added that Russia was forced to react.45 In that way he indi-
cated that halting the threat of disintegration and separatism was the main 
rationale for Russian intervention in Chechnya and that the threat of separa-
tism was a strategic one.  
The issue of building a strong state has returned regularly in Putin’s State 
of the Nation Speeches. In SN 2003, he reiterated: ‘our historical experience 
                                                 
42 2000LtV, published on the web on Putin’s campaign site at http://www.putin2000. 
ru/07/05.html and reprinted in many Russian newspapers in February 2000.  
43 2000 SNS.  
44 2001 SNS. 
45 2001 US PC.  
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bears witness to the fact that a country like Russia can live and develop 
within its existing boundaries only if it is a powerful state. Russia has always 
and inevitably been faced with the threat of disintegration in all periods 
when the country has been weakening, politically or economically.’46 He 
described all the efforts and achievements made by Russians in the course of 
the country’s history as ‘an exploit for the sake of the country's integrity’, 
while also acknowledging that the people ‘had to pay a high price for the 
restoration of Russia’s territorial integrity’.47  
But how did the strengthening of Russian statehood link into the need to 
recognize the statehood of neighbouring countries? Putin’s conceptualization 
of this was at first a balancing act – giving credit to the need for ‘acceptable 
solutions’, but few indications about security regime preferences. In 2003 
Putin held his traditional annual press conference during which he shared 
with the invited journalists his views on the issue of federal reform in Russia 
and also spoke about the issue of territorial integrity of another post-Soviet 
country, Georgia: ‘we assume that Georgia has its own legitimate demands 
and concerns regarding unity of the state and restoration of its territorial in-
tegrity.’ He added, however, that a solution to the separatist problem in 
Georgia would have to be achieved in a way ‘acceptable for all the parties 
involved in this conflict, including Abkhazia’.48 
The repeated focus on territorial integrity and the separatist-terrorism 
nexus received a new underpinning after the Beslan events in 2004. The in-
ternationalization of the struggle against terrorism evident in Putin’s earlier 
statements was supplanted by more dominant hints that Russia might ‘go it 
alone’ if necessary. Putin insisted, as at the summit of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Malaysia in 2003, that the threat to Russia 
was not separatism in Chechnya, but international fundamentalists and ter-
rorists. 49 In September 2004, however, Putin made two dramatic speeches in 
the wake of the tragic events in Beslan, where Chechen terrorists took more 
than one thousand hostages and over 300 were killed in the events that fol-
lowed. The terrorist ploy had become ‘internalized’, as Putin indicated that 
the goal of this terrorist raid was ‘to destroy and split Russia’. He also inter-
preted Beslan as a part of an international conspiracy aiming at weakening 
Russia, saying that Russia was in fact ‘dealing with direct intervention of 
international terrorism’ and ‘with a total, cruel and full-scale war in which 
our compatriots die again and again’, adding to this a statement about the 
Transdniester conflict as well. Russia’s concern for efficient security mecha-
nisms was also made clear. Putin called for the creation of ‘a more effective 
security system’ that would help Russia tackle the new threats, while Minis-
ter of Defence Sergey Ivanov indicated that Russia might apply appropriate 
military force against terrorists, even if they were on the territory of other 
states.50 Russian security interests were not ignored either. In his next speech 
in the wake of Beslan, Putin outlined his new policy for meeting the new 
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threats, identified the goals of the enemies of Russia and stressed that ‘the 
disintegration of the country’ and ‘the collapse of the state and the break-up 
of Russia’ were among their major aims.51 
Here it should be noted that Soviet nostalgia never has been an element in 
conceptualizing the post-Soviet Russian state. However, growing concerns 
for securing broad appeal internationally and in domestic policies may have 
introduced a revision of this aspect. In his 2005 State of the Nation speech 
Putin coupled post-Soviet challenges to the collapse of the Soviet state. He 
described this collapse as ‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’, add-
ing that ‘the epidemic of disintegration spread to Russia itself’ and that ‘the 
country’s integrity was disturbed by a terrorist intervention and the ensuing 
capitulation of Khasavyurt’ [meaning the 1996 Peace Accord].52 While this 
is in no way an indication of nostalgia, it does illustrate the prevailing secu-
rity worry about the ‘domino effect’ of this disintegration onto Russia 
proper. And once again, the solution is to strengthen Russia’s capacities to 
deal with these challenges. Moreover, it extends the argument of security to 
the post-Soviet space, thereby securitizing not only internal threats, but also 
external ones.  
Territorial integrity is a concern for all states, and Russia is hardly an ex-
ception. On the other hand, strategic concerns may change over time, as may 
strategic cultures. Russia’s concern with international terrorism has been 
codified as the major threat to its security, and the concept has also been 
wrested loose from traditional separatism. On the other hand, the above 
quoted statements on the importance of preserving territorial integrity and 
challenges posed by the threat of separatism certainly indicate that the issues 
of separatism and state integrity occupy a central place in the political 
agenda of Vladimir Putin. As Putin has set his personal stamp on Russian 
policy-formulation and policy-making over the past seven years, it is only to 
be expected that these views will also be reflected in official doctrines on 
security, defence and foreign policy. In the following section we therefore 
present a brief analysis of the place of these concepts in official documents 
adopted during Putin’s time in office.  
2.2.2. Separatism and territorial integrity in Russian doctrines 
Even before Putin’s team managed to take over Russia in 2000, the issue of 
separatism as a threat to the country’s integrity was noted in the 1997 Na-
tional Security Concept (1997 NSC). According to this document, a major 
goal of the nation’s security policy is to ensure its territorial integrity and to 
neutralize ‘factors and conditions that facilitate social and inter-ethnic con-
flicts, ethnic and regional separatism’. Furthermore, ‘negative economic 
processes serve to aggravate all kinds of centrifugal tendencies on the part of 
the Russian Federation’s constituent members’ – and this could result in dis-
ruption of the territorial and legal integrity of Russia.  
A similar assessment of the threat of separatism is found in the first offi-
cial doctrine signed in 2000 by the newly appointed president in spe, Vladi-
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mir Putin. Russia’s National Security Concept 2000 (NSC 2000) presents a 
list of national interests in the realm of national security. National and reli-
gious separatism is identified as one of the most important challenges facing 
the Russian state. The document lists various factors that promote ‘national-
ism, political and religious extremism and ethno-separatism’ and create 
breeding ground for conflicts. In addition to ethno-egoism, ethno-centrism 
and chauvinism, also uncontrolled migration is mentioned as an important 
factor. That helps to explain why a central aim of security policy was the 
creation of ‘mechanism for preventing the appearance of political parties and 
public associations that pursue separatist goals and for stopping their activi-
ties’. 
The new military doctrine made public and signed by President Putin in 
2000 (MD 2000) also addresses the issue of separatism. The rise in separa-
tism is defined as an important factor behind the formulation and implemen-
tation of the defence policy of the Russian state. The activities of extremist 
nationalist, religious, separatist and terrorist movements, organizations and 
structures are mentioned as having a destabilizing impact on the military-
political situation. High on the list of main internal threats facing the Russian 
state are what the document describes as ‘illegal activities by extremist na-
tionalist, religious, separatist and terrorist movements, organizations and 
structures aimed at violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian 
Federation and destabilizing the domestic political situation in the country’. 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, signed by President Putin in 2000 (FPC 
2000), lists various international factors and developments seen as having a 
direct impact on how Russian national interests in foreign policy could be 
formulated and defended. The growth of separatism and ethnic-national and 
religious extremism are mentioned among the many factors affecting Rus-
sian foreign policy. Among other important developments, the document 
notes the globalization of the world economy, Russia’s exposure to interna-
tional economic and information threats and what is described as ‘military-
political rivalry among regional powers’. 
A more recent semi-official document of doctrinal character addressing 
among many other issues also the issue of separatism is the ‘Ivanov Doc-
trine’ made public in October 2003 at a meeting in the Russian Ministry of 
Defence at which also President Putin was present. The document lists the 
six main internal threats that the country’s armed forces are assigned to neu-
tralize. One of these is ‘the operation of separatist and radical religious na-
tionalist movements in the Russian Federation’. Among the trans-border 
threats to Russian security, the document identifies ‘the operation of subver-
sive separatist, national or religious extremist groups (supported directly or 
indirectly by foreign sources) designed to undermine the constitutional re-
gime of Russia’. As to the peacetime tasks of the armed forces, the document 
specifies the struggle against international terrorism, political extremism and 
separatism and work on preventing subversive and terrorist acts on the terri-
tory of the Russian Federation.  
As to the international regimes designed to cope with security challenges, 
MD 2000 was relatively vague and defensive. The overarching concern for a 
unipolar world versus that of a multipolar one – and a subsequent emphasis 
on Russia as a major pole – has also coloured MD 2000. The OSCE is 
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clearly mentioned in only one context, not as an organization that should be 
strengthened, but one that should be prevented from being destroyed: ‘at-
tempts to weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding interna-
tional security (primarily, the United Nations and the Organization for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE])’ are held to be a major destabilizing 
element in international relations. Moreover, the Russian military peace-
keeping forces are highlighted as a near-sine qua non for the continued 
strength of the OSCE. Contrary to the Istanbul Declaration, MD 2000 states 
that peacekeeping missions had been ‘entrusted’ to Russian military peace-
keeping forces, and conducted in full compliance with international stan-
dards:  
The Russian Federation carries out rear and technical support, training and 
preparation of Russian contingents, the planning of their utilization, and opera-
tional command and control in line with the standards and procedures of the 
United Nations, the OSCE, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
MD 2000 does not provide any additional suggestions about other security 
organizations other that the CIS Collective Security Treaty, which is to be 
strengthened. Russian soldiers serving in the CIS structures, and also in so-
called CIS peacekeeping operations are to serve on contract. To be sure, 
there is in MD 2000 one reference to Russia’s multilateral treaties : 
Russian troop formations located on the territory of foreign states, irrespective of 
the conditions of deployment, form part of the Russian Federation armed forces 
and other troops and operate in accordance with the procedure there established, 
taking into account the requirements of the UN Charter, UN Security Council 
resolutions, and the Russian Federation's bilateral and multilateral treaties. 
However, MD 2000 makes no mention of the Istanbul Pact, thereby imply-
ing that this is not considered a ‘treaty’ in any sense of the word. The pre-
paredness to meet international peacekeeping tasks is made pending on UN 
mandate and CIS capacities. Symptomatically, the more recent MD 2003 
lists a total of four peacekeeping operations with Russian involvement: 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniester account for three of them, with a 
total of 3,000 men. Moreover, MD 2003 also proposes that a separate peace-
keeping brigade should be created by 2004, ready to operate on UN or CIS 
mandate – the latter reflecting the Russian quest for a regional security man-
date within the CIS area. However, there is in MD 2003 no mention whatso-
ever of the OSCE.  
The overarching concern about a withering OSCE was repeated in the 
NSC 2000, together with a clear warning against the challenges of unipolar-
ity. Hence, Russia’s doctrines indicated that the OSCE was by no means 
seen as an indispensable security organization. Moreover, what the Istanbul 
Pact had considered obligatory was in the Russian view not mandatory, but 
clearly conditional. Finally, the doctrines interpreted separatism and terror-
ism as two different challenges, but gave due attention to both. Subse-
quently, it might be expected that because Russian policy-makers paid so 
much attention to separatism in the Russian/post-Soviet context, they would 
be able to understand other countries’ concerns in the same area.  
What the doctrines failed to indicate is how Russia should handle the two 
cases in this study. Russia’s policies have certainly been forged through 
presidential authority – but does this fit into the framework of policy heri-
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tages from the Yeltsin administration, and the general challenge of separatist 
conflicts? This brings us to the question of Russian policy towards the seces-
sionist conflict between Moldova and Transdniester, and towards secession-
ist conflicts on the territory of Georgia.  

3.0 Moldova: The ‘Synchronization’ Strategy 
Putin’s policies in Moldova did not start with a clean slate. Firstly, Russia 
had inherited an institutionalized format from the Yeltsin period, the 3+2 
format under the auspices of the OSCE. It was conditionally – in Russian 
parlance – obliged by the OSCE Istanbul Pact’s emphasis on unconditional  
– in OSCE parlance – withdrawal of Russian hardware by the end of 2001 
(CFE), and Russian troops by the end of 2002. Russian officials had few 
tools at their disposal other than those provided by the OSCE’s emphasis on 
a single security space in Europe after Istanbul, and what was available in 
terms of 3+2 agreements from the mid-1990s.  
Secondly, while Russia refocused on the challenges stemming from in-
ternational terrorism and Islamism, the new foreign and security policy 
documents made no reference – implicit or direct – to the conflict between 
the unrecognized Dniestrian Moldovan Republic (DMR)53 administration 
and sovereign Moldova. As to the ‘Islamist challenge’, it did not in any clear 
way cover cases of ‘Soviet-style’ secessionism54 and economic shadow-
politics in the narrow strip of land between Ukraine and the Dniestr. Refer-
ences to economic crime seemed geared more to the prevailing agenda of 
fighting illegal economic transactions linked to terrorism, not to quasi-
statebuilding in the post-Soviet space.  
Russia had at any rate to ‘construe’ a new policy, taking into account 
both the international obligations and the semi-institutionalized policies left 
behind by the Yeltsin administration. Building on the competence of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) seemed the most feasible option. In 
January 2000 came news reports that Moscow was preparing a new initiative 
to meet the OSCE Istanbul commitments. The initiative was not new, how-
ever, but derived from the negotiations held in the mid-1990s. MFA officials 
had stated that the primary policy for Moscow would be ‘synchronization’ – 
working in parallel on withdrawal of Russian troops and a final settlement of 
the Transdniester conflict.55 The MFA statement reluctantly accepted the 
Istanbul terms of withdrawal by 2002, but suggested two things: firstly, that 
it was no easy task; secondly, that there should be talk of ‘two time-tables’ – 
one for withdrawal, and one for a final conflict settlement including the reso-
lution of statehood issues: 
Having taken on the by all means not too easy Istanbul commitments […] to 
withdraw Russian troops by the end of 2002, Russia takes as earlier as a point of 
                                                 
53 The Russian equivalent of this acronym is PMR (Pridnestrovskaya Moldovskaya Respub-
lika). The republic is alternately referred to as DMR, Transdniestria and Transdniester. We 
shall adopt the acronym from the ICG report ‘Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdni-
estria’, no. 157, 17 June, 2004. 
54 The initial separatist rationale was not to create a de facto state in itself, but to create one 
within the Soviet Union, in other words – to halt ‘disintegration’ of the Soviet space. This fact 
is central to understand why the conflict differs from other ‘separatist’ case studies, and also 
the primary ‘Soviet’ outlook of the entrenched elite in the DMR. See Oazu Nantoi, ‘Transnis-
trian Conflict: What Could the European Union and the US Do?’, Unpublished E-PINE paper, 
October, 2005.  
55 ‘Novyy vitok pridnestrovskogo uregulirovaniya’, NeGa, 12 January 2000, at: 
http://www.ng.ru/cis/2000-01-12/5_vitok.html.  
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departure that that the process of withdrawal, as it is legally enshrined in respec-
tive documents, should proceed synchronically with a political conflict resolu-
tion process. Thus, now there is for all purposes talk about a dual [dvuedinyy] 
time-table – the withdrawal of Russian troops and a final political settlement of 
the conflict.56 
This was a clear deviation from the OSCE summit conclusions.57 The 1999 
Istanbul Pact had not offered any alternative clause coupling Russian troop 
withdrawal with a final political settlement. Moreover, Russian media por-
trayed the OSCE’s position as unrealistic, and blamed the Western states for 
persistently trying to ‘disentangle’ the two processes, by focusing on 
Transdniestrian compliance and unilateral withdrawal of Russian troops. 
Hence, NeGa wrote: ‘[The participants in Istanbul] did not clarify whether 
the OGRV (Operativnaya gruppa rossiyskikh voysk) which among other 
things is fulfilling a peacekeeping mission is not entitled to leave until a final 
settlement is reached – at least until this function is not handed over to 
someone else, or changed fundamentally.’58 
In fact, the Istanbul declaration had been crystal-clear on the issue – uni-
lateral withdrawal within the specified time-table. Thus, Russia had already 
from the start interpreted the Istanbul Pact in a manner that hinted at a con-
tinued role for Russia’s armed forces in Transdniester. The argument of 
‘synchronization’ could be interpreted as a reversed conditionality scheme, 
with the point being not so much to synchronize resolution and withdrawal, 
as to put final resolution as a condition for troop withdrawal. Moreover, the 
‘synchronization argument’ implied that Russia definitely sought to have a 
decisive input in a resolution based on earlier agreements from 1994. What 
then was to be ‘synchronized’? Was it Russia’s international obligations in 
accordance with Istanbul? the foreign policy views of the Russian elite? the 
policies of the CIS? or the positions between the unrecognized DMR and 
Moldova? In other words, did the Putin administration see the OSCE criteria 
in the light of ‘socialization’, or in the light of non-compliance?  
As was to be expected, Russia’s new initiative failed to elicit a positive 
response from any negotiators other than from the unrecognized DMR. The 
DMR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Litskay, endorsed the fact that Russia had 
made references to earlier stages of the OSCE process not reflected in the 
Istanbul Pact – namely, earlier agreements on Russia having a leading posi-
tion as broker, and the 1994 document stipulating that the conflict should be 
resolved before withdrawal.59 The Moldovan MFA followed up swiftly, de-
claring that Russia had ‘interpreted the Istanbul agreement incorrectly’;60 
moreover, that Russia had ‘taken on obligation to withdraw unconditionally 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Vlad Socor, ‘Russia Dusts off Recipe for Keeping Troops in Moldova’, Jamestown Moni-
tor, 14 January, 2000. At: 
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?search=1&volume_id=23&issue_id=169
9&article_id=16725.  
58 ‘Novyy vitok pridnestrovskogo uregulirovaniya’. 
59 ‘SNG: NeGa soobshchaet’, NeGa, 21 January 2000. At: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2000-01-
21/5_nega.html.  
60 ‘SNG: NeGa soobshchaet’, NeGa, 13 January, 2000.  
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and completely by 2002’ and that ‘the principle of synchronization had been 
agreed upon only in bilateral agreements in October 1994.’61 
In other words, the ‘new initiative’ did little more than reinforce earlier 
disagreements between Moldova and the DMR, and the Russian broker ini-
tiative proved to be in discord with OSCE obligations. On the other hand, 
judging from the international community, the ball was now in Russia’s 
courtyard. Russian press outlets reported on a possible ‘room for action’ for 
Russia. Covering the visit of NATO General Secretary George Robertson to 
Chisinau, NeGa quoted Robertson as saying that NATO would not play any 
direct role in the Transdniester conflict, since this was within the realm of 
the OSCE, and since the ‘OSCE had succeeded in making Moscow concede 
to the obligations of Istanbul to withdraw’.62   
The synchronization argument did not reduce Moldova’s willingness to 
make new proposals preparing for the final withdrawal of Russia from 
Transdniester. In January 2000 Moldovan officials tried to reinvigorate dis-
cussions within the 1994 trilateral (Russia, Moldova, the DMR) Joint Con-
trol Commission on ‘peacekeeping’. Chisinau proposed the withdrawal of all 
technical military hardware from the security zone – 66 units in Moldova 
and 30 units in Transdniester.63 It also proposed to remove the current bilat-
eral and unilateral border crossings, retaining only the trilateral crossing 
points, and to replace the existing DMR border guard posts with civilian bi-
lateral police control points. The crux of the proposal was clear: if adopted, it 
would be possible to withdraw the peacekeeping contingency altogether and 
hand over border-control functions to a trilateral group of 50 persons capable 
of performing mobile border-control missions.64 In essence, this meant meet-
ing the OSCE criteria, and preparing for trilateral cooperation so that Russia 
could meet the deadlines. 
The ‘synchronization argument’ was aired also in interaction with the 
OSCE and promoted alongside signals that Russia might default on its CFE 
and Istanbul obligations. In April 2000, Head of the CIS Committee in the 
State Duma, Boris Pastukhov, argued that Russia would comply, in princi-
ple, with Istanbul, but that removing hardware in accordance with the CFE 
Treaty would be difficult technically. Pastukhov stated that maximum 10 
carriages could be sent at a time, and that removal of all hardware would 
exceed the OSCE time-table for removal of hardware by the end of 2001.65 
He also said that Russia would stick to the ‘synchronization strategy’ in or-
der to ‘avoid negative consequences’ of a sudden withdrawal.  
The OSCE response was an accommodating one. As reported in the Rus-
sian press, the head of the Moldova OSCE Mission, William Hill, stated that 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 ‘NATO ne budet zanimat’sya pridnestrovskim konfliktom’, NeGa, 17 February, 2000. 
63 ‘Novye predlozheniya Kishineva’, NeGa, 19 January 2000. Moldovan officials held that 
DMR figures omitted hardware that was not controlled by the DMR, and that the real number 
was about 150 units. At: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2000-01-19/5_kishinev.html  
64 Ibid. 
65 ‘Sobytiya i proisshedstviya: korotko’, NeGa, 29 April, 2000. At: 
http://www.ng.ru/events/2000-04-29/2_brief.html. See also Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘Growing 
Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Pan-European Expectations’, p. 378. 
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there were more political obstacles than technical ones due to the DMR’s 
failure of compliance, but added that a prolonged mission for Russia ‘could 
not be excluded’.66 Positive responses were aired again in May 2000, when 
Hill hailed Pastukhov’s statements that although it would be difficult to 
comply with Istanbul, Russia would make an effort. The OSCE Mission 
head once again signalled that the organization would provide funding for 
withdrawal.  
The ‘synchronization’ argument was coupled with a CIS integration 
strategy that had greater potential for exercising leverage on Moldovan au-
thorities – energy and gas deliverances. Since 2000, Gazprom has not only 
been central in providing gas for internal consumption to Moldova, but has 
also been able to exert considerable leverage over the Moldovan authorities. 
With its 50 per cent plus one share majority over the Moldova gas company, 
Gazprom employed halts in gas deliveries as a tool to get the Moldovan au-
thorities to consider a closer association with Russia and the CIS. In Febru-
ary 2000, Gazprom stopped gas deliveries to Moldova, on grounds of accu-
mulated debts by the Moldovan government.67 Gazprom officials noted that 
debts from 1999 stood at USD 190 million and that the Moldovan authorities 
had paid only 3.4 million in the first part of 2000 for deliveries amounting to 
17.6 million.68 The Moldovan officials were adamant that Russia was using 
gas deliverances as a means to increase its political standing. However, at-
tempts to renegotiate debts proved successful,69 and Gazprom resumed de-
liveries in March 2000 under agreement that Moldova would pay for uncov-
ered debts by the middle of that month. In April 2000, Moldovan officials 
announced that Russia and Moldova had agreed on a pay-back scheme of 
Moldova’s debt amounting to USD 122 million over five years and that a 
new intention agreement on fixed prices for gas deliveries was to be 
signed.70 
Russia’s importance as a gas deliverer to Moldova gave rise to specula-
tions that Russia would use this to demand a greater role as security provider 
for Moldova. Officially, Russia refuted such claims. In April 2000, Russia’s 
ambassador denied allegations that Russia had forced Moldovan officials 
into accepting a Russian base in Transdniester, and that Russia’s primary 
interest in its relations with Moldova were economic. Russian officials, it 
was reported, realized that Moldova was a neutral country and that the Con-
stitution did not allow foreign bases on Moldovan territory.71  
On the other hand, Pastukhov’s visit had been highly ambiguous as to 
compliance with the OSCE obligations. Indeed, he actually linked the valid-
ity of the Russian–Moldovan gas agreement to the question of recognition of 
the DMR. Visiting Tiraspol, Pastukhov torpedoed the announced basic treaty 
between Moldova and Russia by claiming that such an agreement could not 
be signed unless representatives from the Transdniester regime were in-
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 RFE/RL Newsline, 24 February 2000. 
68 RFE/RL Newsline, 23 February 2000.  
69 RFE/RL Newsline, 2 March 2000. 
70 RFE/RL Newsline, 10 April 2000. 
71 RFE/RL Newsline, 13 April 2000.  
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cluded in the process, and that any bilateral agreement between Russia and 
Moldova on gas prices would have to take into account the interests of the 
people in the breakaway region.72 Hence, Russia’s gas policies might pro-
vide leverage on Moldova in the event that Russia failed to gain acceptance 
as a major broker in the conflict. 
Putin’s visit to Moldova in June 2000 marked the peak of Russia’s ‘syn-
chronization approach’. In talks with Pyotr Luchinskiy, Putin said that Rus-
sia had no interest in keeping Moldova on a ‘short leash’ by maintaining 
Russian forces there. He also confirmed that Russia would respect its inter-
national obligations and the Moldovan Constitution, with its explicit ban on 
foreign bases on Moldovan territory.73 The main proposal made by Putin 
was to establish a new format for negotiations led by Yevgeniy Primakov  –
former Minister of Foreign Affairs and father of the ‘Primakov doctrine’ of 
great-power balancing between Russia and the West.74 The format was basi-
cally an advisory one: Primakov would act as a member of the State Duma, 
and not in the capacity of heading a state committee of any kind.  
Clearly, the Putin visit showed that the Russian presidency was prepared 
to identify Moldova as the primary interlocutor in resolving the conflict. On 
the other hand, Russia simultaneously dispatched Head of the Security 
Council, Sergey Ivanov and Minister of Defence, Igor Sergeyev, on a sepa-
rate visit to Smirnov in Transdniester, without successfully stalling attempts 
by Smirnov to meet with Putin separately in Chisinau. Russian diplomacy 
was obviously tangled up in a dual track designed to synchronize positions 
between the parts, if not OSCE policy at large.  
3.1. New Disclaimers against the OSCE and Deviation 
Although the Putin visit had opened the door for complying with OSCE ob-
ligations, Russian disaffection with the OSCE was on the rise. A delegation 
from the State Duma attended the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 
2000 but refrained from voting for the ‘Bucharest declaration’ due to pro-
posed resolutions against human rights violations in Chechnya and the po-
litical situation in Belarus. The Russian delegation also claimed to have 
blocked a sharp Moldovan-Romanian resolution on withdrawal of forces 
from the DMR.75  
The Russian delegation did not manage to get the OSCE to change its 
policies, however. The OSCE was on the contrary in line on the Trans-
dniester issue. The troika (Norway, Austria, and Romania) had in preparing 
for the Bucharest summit explicitly voiced concern as to the lack of progress 
in resolving the DMR–Moldova conflict, stressing the need for a rapid with-
                                                 
72 RFE/RL Newsline, 27 April 2000. 
73 ‘Primakov zaymetsya problemoy Pridnestrov’ya’, NeGa, 20 June 2000. 
74 For an assessment of the Primakov strategy, see Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, ‘Past and 
Present Meet: Aleksander Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 54, no. 3, 2002.  
75 ‘OBSE ne dolzhna dublirovat’ Strasburg’, NeGa, 12 July 2000. The declaration was ac-
cording to OSCE press releases adopted by the Romanian chairmanship in the PA. See: 
http://www.osce.org/item/5166.html.  
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drawal and a decoupling of the question of status from the Istanbul obliga-
tions.76 Nevertheless, Putin’s visit to Moldova brought some optimism. At a 
subsequent Permanent Council meeting on 17 July 2000, the OSCE received 
a document from Russia outlining the time-table for complying with the Is-
tanbul pact adopted by Putin on 13 July.77 Moreover, the Austrian chairman-
ship expressed hopes that the Primakov commission could bring new life 
into the process, meeting with Primakov on 26 July in Vienna,78 and wel-
comed Putin’s statements in Moldova in June that Russia would proceed in 
accordance with the Istanbul obligations. Finally, a UK proposal to provide a 
fund for financing Russian withdrawal also encouraged OSCE leaders to 
speak of a possible move out of the deadlock.79 
Russian ‘compliance’ was based on carving out space for a possible 
OSCE mandate to allow continued Russian presence in the DMR. The con-
tours of Primakov’s shuttle diplomacy were clear already in July 2000, and 
envisaged getting Ukraine and the OSCE to consider an OSCE mandate for 
Russia-Ukrainian peacekeeping forces. Moreover, Primakov stated in Vi-
enna, the basis for any resolution would be a ‘common state’ for Moldova.80 
This new impetus was made more manifest in September, when Russia ta-
bled a proposal to link ‘synchronization’ to a joint Ukraine-Russia proposal. 
A meeting in the Primakov Commission in Moscow was dedicated to a Rus-
sian-Ukrainian initiative, which seemed to be a compromise with the Istan-
bul Pact. Moscow coupled CIS-membership and the DMR status problem in 
a package and wrapped gas deliverances and debt reconstruction around it. 
Recognizing Moldova as the primary interlocutor, Moscow had accepted 
Chisinau as the prime broker of Transdniester’s USD 800 million debts to 
Gazprom in bilateral talks with Moscow.81 As a result, Moldovan officials 
came to see the joint Ukrainian-Russian proposal ‘On Transdniester’s status, 
guarantees, and the presence of military formations in the security zone’ as a 
positive contribution to settlement.82  
Moldova’s ‘one-on-one’ with Russia was paralleled by a freeze in the 
2+3 format for negotiations initiated by the DMR. The Tiraspol regime boy-
cotted talks within the five-party group from October 2000 and would re-
sume talks only after the Moldovan presidential elections slated for Decem-
ber that year.83 Hence, the Moldovan authorities were in a position to gain 
some benefits – but in a vulnerable position in negotiations with their larger 
                                                 
76 ‘Troika Ministers address pressing OSCE issues at Bucharest meeting’, OSCE Press Re-
lease, at: http://www.osce.org/item/5159.html.  
77 ‘Moldova Focus of OSCE CiO Meeting with Yevgeniy Primakov’, OSCE Press Release, 
at: http://www.osce.org/item/5207.html. ‘Putin approves time-table for troop withdrawal’, 
RFE/RL Newsline, 14 July, 2000. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Roland Eggleston, ‘Caucasus: OSCE Leader Optimistic over Karabakh, Transdniestr’, At: 
http://www.rferl.org/features/2000/07/f.ru.000721152949.asp.  
80 ‘Yevgeniy Primakov “zakryl” problemu Pridnestovya’, NeGa, 9 August, 2000. The article 
speculated about the ‘secrecy’ of the Primakov commission and that the solution provided 
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81 RFE/RL Newsline, 28 September 2000. 
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neighbours due to the standstill in the 2+3 process. Gazprom’s leverage re-
mained substantial throughout the process, and was targeted at making future 
Moldovan authorities more receptive to Russia’s ‘synchronization’ argu-
ment. In November 2000, Gazprom again warned in a letter to Moldovan 
parliamentarians that gas deliveries would be reduced, due to lack of pay-
ment.84  
3.2. The Primakov Initiative: ‘Synchronization’ and Default 
Positive expectations from the OSCE in the summer of 2000 notwithstand-
ing, the resumed talks between Russian officials and the DMR/Moldova in 
2001 proceeded along other lines than those of the Istanbul Declaration. Ap-
parently, part of the Russian strategy consisted in giving Duma representa-
tives a greater role in parallel talks with the DMR – a strategy with the char-
acter of being a two-edged sword. True, members of the conservative frac-
tions in the Duma could probably find a common language with the DMR. 
On the other hand, their presence could serve to legitimize the Tiraspol re-
gime as having been ‘elected by the people’. This was a status eagerly cov-
eted by the Smirnov clan – among other things through numerous Soviet-
style appeals made to the Russian president.85  
The spring of 2001 opened the arena for Duma diplomacy on status in 
accordance with the ‘synchronization’ scheme. Boris Pastukhov went to the 
DMR in March 2001 to prepare for the first visit of Primakov to the DMR in 
April, ostensibly eager to convey that Russia saw the victory of the Moldo-
van Communist Party in the February elections as an interesting event that 
might further the discussion of Moldova joining the Belarus–Russian  
Union.86 Pastukhov used the DMR stage to suggest that Communist leader 
Voronin should stick to his pre-election pledges, but rejected Voronin’s pro-
posal to start with a clean slate in negotiations, referring to the DMR demand 
that the 1997 Memorandum should serve as the basis for all negotiations.87  
This was more than an implicit reversal of the Istanbul Pact. In fact, Pri-
makov’s first trip to Moldova in April 2001 offered few indications that 
Russia would change any of its principled positions. Repeating the general 
outline of Russia’s ‘synchronization argument’, Primakov indicated a default 
on the CFE obligations included in the Istanbul Pact to remove hardware by 
the end of 2001. ‘No serious politician can claim that the conflict will be 
resolved by the end of 2001’, Primakov stated, and added that ‘sooner or 
later [sic] the Russian armed forces will be withdrawn, but this will be done 
                                                 
84 RFE/RL Newsline, 8 November 2000. 
85 These appeals were put on the web by the Olviya Press news agency in DMR. See ‘Uvaz-
haemyy Vladimir Vladimirovich!’, Olviya Press, 1 May, 2001. 
86 The Moldovan Communist Party increased its percentage share of the vote from 30% to 
50.2%, gaining a majority in Parliament to change the Constitution and elect a President. See 
Marius Vahl and Michael Emerson, ‘Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict’ in: Bruno Cop-
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68. See also ‘V Moldavii k vlasti prishli kommunisty’, NeGa, 27 February 2001, at: 
http://www.ng.ru/events/2001-02-27/1_authority.html, and ‘Smogut li kommunisty 
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only under certain conditions and on condition that the current delicate bal-
ance will not be distorted.’88  
The ‘delicate balance’ was linked to discussions on the status of the DMR 
and of Russian forces. Primakov ensured the parties that Russia would re-
main a guarantor of all agreements between the parties during the talks, and 
that Russia would also be a primary broker in talks on an agreement between 
the DMR and Moldova on the status for the DMR. But the Primakov balanc-
ing act failed to produce any agreements.  The highly biased virtual spin 
agency of the DMR, Olviya press, reported that Primakov was balancing 
between a unitary state (Moldova) and two federal subjects with equal status 
(the DMR), but nothing on Russian preferences. Concerning the future status 
of Russian forces, the Primakov plan facilitated two options: a joint Ukraine-
Russian mission under OSCE auspices, or a Russian peacekeeping mission 
operating ‘on agreement from the parties’.89 DMR representatives preferred 
the second option, and flatly rejected the first. 90  
Apparently, the DMR regime utilized the opportunity to table new pro-
posals. Russian guarantees during negotiations were not enough, as the 
DMR regime wanted social, economic, military and political guarantees 
from Russia – that is, everything short of being a constituent part of the fed-
eration.91 DMR representatives in the OKK were especially vigilant in insist-
ing that the format of trilateral ‘peacekeeping’ consisting of the DMR, 
Moldova and Russia should be retained. According to Olviya Press: ‘the 
most threatening factor today, which can spoil the development of the proc-
ess of resolution, is the plan to create a “stabilization force under the aus-
pices of OSCE”, an international peace-keeping mission.’92  
If the Primakov proposal had been designed to soften DMR demands, it 
certainly failed. Russia’s ‘guarantor role’ was strangled at birth. The DMR 
authorities resisted any and all alternative solutions to the ‘peacekeeping’ 
format, with reference to not allowing ‘blacks, mulattos, Frenchmen or Ger-
mans on the soil of the DMR’.93 Moreover, the geopolitical overlays of the 
Duma initiatives had begun to surface. At a press conference in Moscow on 
18 May, Duma representatives announced that Voronin and Smirnov had 
agreed to join the Union project between Belarus and Russia together, thus 
removing all discussions about international peacekeeping. According to 
Duma members, such a ‘solution’ would make ‘the participation of the 
OSCE in conflict resolution redundant’.94 Anonymous sources in the Rus-
sian MOD also circulated information that if and when Moldova joined the 
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Belarus-Russia Union, ‘Chisinau might agree to a preliminary stationing of 
Russian forces in the DMR.’95  
The second track of finding a political resolution also proved unsuccess-
ful. Visiting Russia shortly after the election, Voronin expressed hopes that 
the conflict could be resolved by the end of 2001, indicating that Russia’s 
policies had become ‘more concrete and more confiding’.96 The premise 
was, however, Putin’s guarantees that the one-state solution of a unified 
Moldova was benched, and that Russia would somewhat diffusely provide 
security for DMR. Voronin simultaneously rejected the ‘equal status’ con-
federative solution proposed by the DMR.97  
In April and May 2001, prospects for a brokered solution deteriorated 
rapidly. Russian newspapers started to criticize the ‘secretiveness’ of the 
Primakov Commission, claiming that Putin was prepared to ‘give away the 
DMR’ in exchange for an international peacekeeping mandate for Russia.98 
Moreover, DMR officials started a campaign against all steps taken in the 
discussions on a political solution to the status problem. On 13 May, a scan-
dal erupted when DMR ‘border guards’ at Bender refused Voronin entry to 
visit to Noul Neamt monastery in the DMR village of Kitskani – allegedly 
because they could not provide for his security, but also with claims that 
proper notification on the visit had not been submitted to the DMR authori-
ties. The DMR regime added fuel to the fire by demanding that Moldova 
should apologize for ‘aggression against the DMR in 1992’ and pay USD 70 
mill for ‘material damages’.99  
The refusal to let Voronin enter DMR territory sabotaged the progress 
made in the negotiations. Moldovan authorities claimed that the negotiations 
on 16 May had progressed on 20 different issues ranging from harmoniza-
tion of tax and customs, mutual recognition of the legality of documents, and 
the presence of both Moldovan and DMR press outlets on both sides of  
Dniestr.100 At the 20 June meeting in Chisinau, positions were again dead-
locked. The decision of the DMR authorities to introduce separate passports 
from 1 October 2001 was publicly condemned by Moldova, and the DMR 
authorities once more refused Voronin access to DMR territory to mark the 
anniversary of the military conflict of 1992 in Bender.101 The Moldovan side 
was taken by surprise, as this move was made after the decision to mutually 
recognize documents as having legal force and also followed by an appeal to 
Voronin on unilateral withdrawal from the Istanbul decision on withdrawal 
of Russian troops.102 Talks on a single state also stranded. Moldova’s pro-
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posal to grant wide autonomy to the DMR were rebuked by DMR demands 
that separate agreements should be made between two equal subjects within 
a confederative state.  
During the summer of 2001, Moldova abandoned all hopes of finding a 
compromise as long as Smirnov was at the helm. In July, Voronin stated that 
the republic had been turned into ‘a black hole of smuggling and crime’, and 
said he hoped that the December 2001 presidential elections in the DMR 
would bring a new and more constructive leadership.103 The response from 
Tiraspol was not very accommodating, however. A regime spokesman stated 
bluntly that the new government in Moldova had ‘ignored former agree-
ments and tried to solve the problem by exerting pressure on Tiraspol’.104  
The important point here is that Russian diplomacy had had no success 
whatsoever in getting the parties to meet. Moreover, all confidence building 
measures CBM efforts had failed utterly, as the DMR authorities denied 
Moldova’s president entry to DMR territory. Finally, talks on what to do 
with Russian military personnel were left pending, and the 2001 deadline for 
withdrawing military hardware was approaching. Primakov stated laconi-
cally that the major obstacles were ‘the inertia of the past’ and ‘lack of trust 
between the parties’.105 Russia had proposed a plan, he continued, but would 
not ‘force this on any of the parties’.106 The collapse in Russian public di-
plomacy and the defunct ‘synchronization strategy’ were not mentioned. 
3.3. Unsynchronized Withdrawal: Russia Starts CFE Process 
Despite the failure of the synchronization strategy, the process of meeting 
the Istanbul criteria for withdrawal of Russian CFE hardware from the DMR 
accelerated in the summer of 2001. In June 2001, a protocol on the creation 
of a bilateral Russian-DMR working group for conversion of hardware and 
ammunition was set up in the presence of OSCE representative and represen-
tatives from Russia’s MOD.107 In early July, a first public event was ar-
ranged to mark the start-up of a coordinated OSCE-Russia effort on dismant-
ling the CFE Treaty Limited Equipment. The event was organized around 
the destruction of the first of several T-64 battle tanks, and the process was 
to be repeated with other hardware.108  
Russian MOD officials were adamant that the bilateral protocol would 
secure sufficient financial compensation to the DMR to safeguard compli-
ance. The form of the compensation was, according to Izvestiya, yet to be 
‘decided upon’, but Russian authorities facilitated the write-off of gas debts, 
or the reimbursement of DMR authorities, pending on the sale of hardware 
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on the international market.109 The DMR’s virtual information agencies im-
mediately claimed that Russia was abrogating earlier agreements, and that 
good pieces of hardware were ‘being buried’.110 They also warned of mas-
sive protest actions, including demonstrations outside the site of the 14th 
Army.111  
Nevertheless, TLE destruction proceeded. By August 2001, Russian me-
dia started reporting about the total amount of hardware to be destroyed, and 
also about the relatively limited progress from 1999 and onwards. Izvestiya 
wrote that the Kolbasna site in the DMR had some 2,504 truckloads of am-
munition, 30,000 small arms, 119 tanks, 43 BMPs, 112 BTRs, 220 anti-
aircraft units, 33 combat vehicles (PTURS), 14 ‘Grad’ artillery units, 83 ar-
tillery units, 32 mortars, 42 reconnaissance vehicles, and 492 engineer ve-
hicles.112 The plan called for destruction or withdrawal of a total of 250 units 
of TLE by the end of 2001.113 Also the OSCE could report decisive progress 
in hardware removal in accordance with the scheme adopted in June. Wil-
liam Hill, head of the Moldova OSCE Mission, stated that Russia had al-
ready received USD 50,000 from the OSCE fund, and that Russia was coop-
erating with the OSCE in Moldova.114  
By November 2001, Russian press outlets reported that Russia had com-
pleted the first phase of TLE withdrawal by destroying or removing 108 T-
64 battle tanks and 125 ACVs even before the time-limit set by the Istan-
bul.115 What remained were basically small arms (50,000 barrels) and am-
munition (40,000 tons), according to Izvestiya. But Russia was ultimately 
unsuccessful in getting the DMR regime to comply or accept both with-
drawal and a political solution. In late August, Izvestiya stated that Tiraspol 
would be given an initial compensation of about USD 100 million, perhaps 
through writing off its USD 400 million debt to Russia for gas deliveries.116 
In December, the MOD repeated its intentions to cut gas debts in accordance 
with the June 2001 protocol, by 50% of the total value of equipment trans-
ferred to Russia. This was to no avail, however. By December 2001, a deal 
on the residuals of military hardware, ammunition and light arms had not 
been cut with the DMR.117  
Concerning the political solution, the stand-off from June 2001 worsened. 
Following the five-party meeting in August 2001, Voronin lamented that 
                                                 
109 ‘Prodannaya garantiya’, Izvestiya, 1 July, 2001. At: http://main.izvestia.ru/russia/article 
1929. 
110 Ibid. 
111 ‘Zharkoe leto generala Yevnevicha’, Olviya Press, 4 July, 2001. In a perhaps more amus-
ing report, Olviya Press characterized the disarmament process as a ‘barbarian cutting of 
combat-ready tanks and BTRs’. See: ‘Missiya OBSE v Moldove okonchatel’no isportila 
imidzh etoy organizatsii v glazakh pridnestrovtsev’, Olviya Press, 3 July 2001. 
112 Ibid. Numbers reported by NeGa amounted to 49,476 small arms, 805 artillery systems, 
655 armored combat vehicles (not specified) and 4,000 vehicles. ‘Kishinev soglasitsya na 
rossiyskuyu bazu?’, NeGa, 23 May, 2001. 
113 ‘Resheniya Stambul’skogo sammita vypolnyayutsya’, NeGa, 2 August 2001. 
114 Ibid. 
115 ‘Malen’kaya Rossiya’, Izvestiya, 18 November, 2001. At: http://main.izvestia.ru/russia/ 
article9745.  
116 ‘Blokadnye igry’, Izvestiya, 31 August 2001. At: http://main.izvestia.ru/russia/article4984.  
117 ‘Tanki pod nozhom’, and ‘Pozitsiya Minoborony Rossii’, NeGa, 21 December 2001. 
Geir Flikke and Jakub M. Godzimirski 
 
40 
there had been little progress concerning the status of Transdniester in nego-
tiations and that he had few expectations for future resolution. The parties 
continued to disagree on the issue of federalism or republic, and Tiraspol 
categorically refused to consider a common defence, as stipulated in the 
1999 Kiev document.118 Moreover, members of the Duma were increasingly 
deviating from the Kremlin line of compliance, and openly defending the 
DMR authorities not only against alleged ‘aggression’ from Moldova, but 
also from what was seen as a geopolitical grand plan to evict Russia from its 
primary sphere of interest. The Duma had on 4 July adopted a resolution 
calling on the presidents of Moldova, Belarus, Russia and the DMR to hold 
talks on bringing Moldova and the DMR into the Russia-Belarus Union. 
When the Duma Speaker, Gennadiy Seleznyov, and Yevgeniy Primakov 
tried to organize a repeat vote on the resolution, it failed. The resolution was 
passed with 300 votes.119 In September 2001, numerous resolutions surfaced 
in DMR virtual agencies, including appeals from parliamentarians of South 
Ossetia and also the deputy chair of the Duma Committee for ties to CIS 
compatriots, Georgiy Tikhonov. On 3 September, a Duma delegation visit-
ing Tiraspol also announced that since the Duma had not ratified the Istanbul 
Pact, Russia had ‘all reason not to comply with it’.120 Other members of the 
Duma delegation, basically former members of the radical patriotic Soyuz 
group, referred to the MOD’s decision to destroy and withdraw CFE hard-
ware as a ‘criminal act’. 121 
The activities of Duma lobbyists undermined prospects for a political so-
lution. In October, the Primakov Commission ended its work and the man-
date for conducting negotiations was transferred to the MFA and first deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Trubnikov.122 According to Trub-
nikov, the Russian government was prepared to move the issue forward, on 
condition that ‘the parties do not waste time on petty details, but take the bull 
by its horns.’ The MFA also proposed to open a consulate in Tiraspol.123 
Apparently, the MFA believed that this was a compromise with regard to 
recognition. Officially, Trubnikov announced that Moscow did not consider 
the future presidential elections in the DMR to be legitimate, since 
‘Transdniester is a self-proclaimed territory and elections there have no legal 
base. Thus an evaluation of them should be given from point of view of in-
ternational law and the international legitimacy of the Transdniester.’124 
But Moscow was in no hurry to recognize the DMR, let alone worry 
about the non-compliance of the DMR regime. Instead, the MFA continued 
to press for the ‘synchronization’ strategy. Meeting with his counterpart in 
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Chisinau, Igor Ivanov announced in November 2001 that Moldova and Rus-
sia had agreed to prepare an agreement on bilateral relations which included 
a proposed resolution of the DMR conflict in the preamble.125 This specifi-
cally Russian version of the Istanbul Pact was not coordinated with the 
OSCE, and was further underpinned by Russian gas-leverage on Moldova. 
The MFA also stressed that the DMR regime was ready to provide unhin-
dered transfer of ammunition to Russia. 
Direct contacts between the Moldovan and Russian presidents were also 
resumed. When Voronin met with Putin in November 2001, he stated explic-
itly to the Russian press that the main reason for Moldova to enter into what 
he termed as a ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia was that Russia had spo-
ken in favour of recognizing Moldova as a unified sovereign country. 
Moldova was – in return – prepared to give Transdniester and other federal 
subjects wide-ranging autonomy in federal affairs, he added, although imply-
ing that Chisinau did not accept the Smirnov regime as a partner for negotia-
tions. As for the OSCE commitments of Russia, Voronin stated: ‘The fate of 
the Russian contingency located on the territory of Transdniester, is reflected 
in the decisions from the Istanbul summit of the OSCE. Russia has clearly 
stated that it intends to withdraw its military equipment from the territory of 
Transdniester, in accordance with the decisions taken in that forum.’126 
Demands from the DMR that Russia should remain the major guarantor 
of conflict resolution did not abate, however. In November 2001, the Ti-
raspol regime was increasingly adamant that it had been outflanked by the 
bilateral rapprochement between Chisinau and Moscow.127 Smirnov told 
Russian press outlets that the Russian State Duma considered Transdniester 
a ‘zone of strategic interests’, adding that he – as a Russian Transdniesterian 
– would leave the details up to Russia, but that ‘the Russian forces would 
remain a guarantor against aggression from the other side of Dniestr.’128 
3.4. CIS ‘Socialization’: New Russian Proposals 
The ‘re-election’ of Smirnov as DMR president in December 2001 severely 
aggravated the situation. In early 2002, the Tiraspol regime started to hold 
back the withdrawal of ammunition, claiming that Russia had not met the 
conditions for compensation. On 22 January, Izvestiya reported that the Head 
of the 14th Army, Valeriy Yevnevich, was prevented from inspecting the 
ammunition depots. Tiraspol claimed that Russia, instead of aggregates from 
dismantled tanks, had given shovels and saws in exchange for ammunition. 
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Russia responded by simply withdrawing Yevnevich to Russia as deputy 
head of the Russian infantry peacekeeping forces.129  
Russia had officially not recognized the DMR elections, but had thrown a 
few spanners in the wheels for Smirnov’s re-election. Moreover, in January 
2002, it became clear that the MFA had not abandoned its intention of offer-
ing some sort of sovereignty guarantee to the DMR. Meeting with a delega-
tion from the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council, Trubnikov 
underlined that Russia’s position was to renew negotiations within the 5-
party format, and that any unification would have to be founded on a ‘viable 
guaranteed status’ for the DMR.130 This materialized during Trubnikov’s 
visit to Chisinau and Tiraspol on 30 January with claims that Russian pro-
posals would offer a new ‘vector’ in conflict resolution. The MFA suggested 
signing a bilateral agreement with Chisinau, which was to include a proposal 
on a ‘stabilization force’ together with Ukraine.131 The proposal was alleg-
edly supported by the DMR regime as one that offered ‘sufficient security 
guarantees’. Moreover, Russian media reports claimed that this would alter 
the impression that Russia was leaving the region forever. 
By now Moscow had received enough evidence that the DMR was bel-
ligerently refusing all international multilateral conflict resolution efforts and 
that it had even blackmailed Russia on this account. Nor could there be any 
doubt whatsoever that the plan would not be endorsed by Moldova. On the 
contrary, Voronin had clearly expressed his frustration with Russia’s hands-
off resolution by appealing to Putin to resolve the conflict by throwing in 
presidential authority and persuading the DMR president to leave office – a 
remark misquoted in the Russian press as being call to Russia to apply force 
against the DMR.132  
The timing of the presentation of the stabilization force proposal is also 
interesting. Apparently, Moscow was concerned about too close cooperation 
between Ukraine and Moldova on border issues. Voronin had sought to ad-
dress the DMR conflict directly with Ukraine,133 and to invite three Euro-
pean countries (Sweden, Germany and Austria) to assist in enforcing the 
August 2001 customs regime with the DMR.134 This ran contrary to Russian 
proposals, which amounted to reviving the 5-party format under OSCE aus-
pices by making Voronin agree to meet with Smirnov. Moreover, the Trub-
nikov visit clearly elaborated on the reversed conditionality scheme. Russia 
would fulfil the Istanbul Pact, NeGa reported, so that the ‘OSCE conse-
quently facilitated a status for the DMR that would “solve” the issue of Rus-
sian military presence.’135 
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Russia again coupled the conflict resolution agenda with revival of the 
CIS and energy issues. In March 2002, Putin announced that Russia would 
enter into a ‘strategic partnership’ with Ukraine, and succeeded in pursuing 
Kiev to join the Eurasian Economic Cooperation with Kazakhstan, Belarus, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Besides the usual public policy declara-
tions on free trade and low custom barriers, Putin explicitly identified energy 
as the major incentive for cooperation. Moscow wanted Ukraine to join the 
Central Asian–Russian energy cooperation with its gas pipelines. If so, ‘we 
can influence the European economy strongly, and they will have to take us 
into account.’136 
This may have been merely a declaration of intentions, however, as no 
documents were signed. Nevertheless, Moscow’s ambitions were now com-
ing to the surface. Moldova’s role in the puzzle was that of a possible appli-
cant country and an energy client. Moscow reiterated its dedication to sup-
port Moldovan sovereignty and considered Smirnov a ‘complicated cli-
ent’,137 or as Putin expressed it, one that could not be invited to the Odessa 
meeting of the CIS in March 2002: ‘it’s bad without him, and it’s bad to-
gether with him.’138 This did not alter the fact that Russia wanted to link its 
primary role as broker to its overall strengthened position in Central Asia 
and on the European energy market. Symptomatically, Moldova’s proposal 
to invite European custom officers was not put on the summit agenda as 
Moscow announced that a meeting between Moldovan, Ukrainian and Rus-
sian custom officials and border guards including ‘colleagues from the 
DMR’ would take place in Chisinau on the next week.139 
The trilateral effort yielded no results. The DMR regime refused to sign 
the agreement on joint customs control and demanded that it should be al-
lowed to export goods without clearance from Moldova.140 The Smirnov 
regime also elevated the DMR to the level of an independent state by ap-
pointing ambassadors to Belarus and Russia.141 Finally, the DMR regime 
also met with the leaders of other separatist territories of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, which prompted commentators to talk about the rise of a CIS-
2 of unrecognized ‘republics’.142 Meanwhile, the OSCE appeared to be side-
lined. Although the organization announced its readiness to go ahead with 
providing funding and equipment for the destruction of ammunition in the 
DMR, DMR officials blocked all attempts to transfer ammunition from the 
Kolbasna field to the destruction plant. The emerging political crisis in 
Moldova also put Voronin under decisive pressure. In March and April 
2002, pro-sovereignty movements staged numerous demonstrations against 
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Smirnov’s foreign policies, and the conflict reverberated in the Moldovan 
Parliament. 
Throughout the political crisis in Moldova, Moscow remained silent to a 
degree that one could wonder whether the Kremlin had a policy, or no policy 
at all. Status quo in conflict resolution definitely played into the hands of the 
Smirnov regime, and severely destabilized internal politics in Moldova. 
Moscow kept the 5 + 1 format relatively active, but at the same time it en-
gaged in a selective bargaining game, issuing regular reassurances that Rus-
sia would comply with the Istanbul Pact, an active strategic partnership with 
Ukraine and a policy of forgiving non-recognition of the DMR, allowing the 
DMR regime to engage in all sorts of belligerent blackmailing activities. 
More than keeping the 5 + 1 structure active, Russia had also watered down 
the content of the Istanbul Pact by placing its ‘fulfilment’ in the context of a 
revived CIS, with Russian energy resources as the major engine for integra-
tion. 
Despite Russia’s unwillingness to confront the DMR regime with an ul-
timatum, the OSCE continued to express hopes that Russia would comply 
with the Istanbul Pact. In the beginning of May, OSCE mission head in 
Moldova, David Schwartz, stated that Russia still had a chance to meet the 
obligations of Istanbul, and that the OSCE would make all efforts to assist in 
withdrawing ammunition from the DMR or destroying it on the site.143 The 
equipment provided by the OSCE was not put to use, however – a circum-
stance that Schwartz attributed not to Russia, but the refusal of the DMR to 
follow with the time-table. 
Despite a new US input in debates on the status of the DMR during the 
summer of 2002, by late 2002 Russia still showed all signs of not being able 
– or willing –  to comply with the time-table. With Russian ammunition 
withdrawals stalled throughout most of 2002, the MOD tried in October to 
secure compliance from the DMR regime by offering debt reduction in ex-
change for ammunition withdrawal. On 4 October, transport carrying ammu-
nition left, reportedly in line with a document signed in September, offering 
a USD 100 mill reduction in gas debts.144 After this, the process again 
halted. In November, Putin announced that Russia could not deliver on the 
time-table. He added that Russia wanted to comply, but that the DMR lead-
ership ‘is made up of people with whom it’s difficult to discuss issues of this 
kind’.145  
The OSCE had registered that Russia would not be able to withdraw all 
troops and ammunition. Debates started on whether a new time-table would 
have to be adopted, whether Russia should return funds or perhaps the Istan-
bul Pact should be changed.146 Such an ‘all-out’ discussion around the 
OSCE document clearly indicated uneasiness about Russia’s inability to 
pressure the DMR regime to comply. Moreover, Russian gas incentives for 
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the DMR were relatively unfavourably distributed onto Moldova. After 
Putin’s statement on not meeting the Istanbul deadline, Gazprom warned 
Moldova that the debt for 2002 had reached USD 272 million and that the 
country would have to reduce consumption.147 Finally, whether simply a 
‘muddling through’ strategy or not, Russia revealed a certain inventiveness 
in redefining the role of the Russian forces in the DMR, now indicating that 
they were kept there in order to ‘guard ammunition depots’.148 In November 
came a bilateral meeting between Voronin and the Russian MFA, where the 
formula of a ‘military guarantee’ first surfaced. According to Trubnikov:  
[…] the most important factor to complete the process of withdrawing technical 
equipment [CFE–equipment] and ammunition is further progress in the political 
settlement of the Transdniester conflict. […] In our view, this process can be 
completed by preparing a suitable document. This should imply the inclusion of 
a ‘position’ in this document that guarantees the completion of the process by 
means of a military-guarantee provision, although this is not the only way to se-
cure the fulfilment of the preliminary agreements that should be – and have to be 
– met between Moldova and Transdniester.149  
The document was not presented at the press conference, but evidently Mos-
cow seemed inclined to keep its forces in the DMR as leverage against a 
more Western-oriented foreign policy orientation on the part of Moldova. 
Since October, Voronin had spoken more openly about Moldova’s Western 
vector in foreign policies, and in November even hailed Romanian NATO 
membership arguing that ‘Moldova would have a messenger in the organiza-
tion’.150 NATO concerns over DMR intransigence had also surfaced, thus 
marking a break with the ‘hands-off’ policies of the first part of 2000. On 8 
November, Robertson called on Russia to comply with the Istanbul Pact and 
expressed concerns about DMR intransigence.   
Moscow’s repeated and renewed talks about security guarantees evi-
dently satisfied the DMR regime, but blurred the prospects for a political 
solution. Russia was at any rate in search of a new ‘mandate’ for maintaining 
forces in the DMR, and that made any progress in talks with Moldova im-
possible. In Moscow, Voronin reiterated that the question of the continued 
presence of Russian peacekeepers in Transdniester was subject to Russia’s 
meeting the OSCE criteria. Expressing an understanding of Russia’s prob-
lem with making the Tiraspol regime comply, Voronin stated: ‘from the po-
sition of Chisinau, we can only talk about the political resolution of the 
Transdniester problem as a factor that will resolve all other problems’, and, 
subsequently, that meeting the OSCE commitments was of utmost impor-
tance. Although a bilateral meeting, Tiraspol had sent reporters from the 
TSV television company, prompting Voronin to comment whether this was 
all a smokescreen for involving NATO. Voronin refuted the claims, and 
stated: 
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The thing is that the Transdniester problem has attained not only an internal 
Moldovan character. It is a threat to the stability and security of the whole re-
gion, and the policies of Transdniester is based not only on an anti-Moldovan 
position, but also on an anti-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-human position 
concerning the citizens of Transdniester. […] This is why we must think about 
this jointly, and here I first and foremost have the OSCE in mind. And when I 
talked about this [meaning his speech at the Prague NATO meeting], I had in 
mind the strengthening of the position of the OSCE in resolving the conflict.151 
The Porto summit held in December 2002 revealed the OSCE as a not very 
strong organization. Moreover, instead of offering solutions, Russia’s inputs 
seemed to indicate that the OSCE was a weak organization without real in-
fluence on Russian choices.152 
3.5. The CIS and Gas: Moscow’s ‘Federal’ Intermezzo 
Russia’s most visible success at Porto was achieving an extension of the 
time-limit for withdrawal. The report of the chairman in office made this 
clear: ‘we were very pleased with the language adopted at the Porto Ministe-
rial declaration and with the Russian commitment to withdraw and destroy 
all the equipment and ammunition stationed in Transdniester until the end of 
2003’.153 Moreover, the OSCE meeting conclusions also included a phrase 
that indicated an acceptance of Russia’s position that ‘necessary conditions’ 
had to be met before withdrawal. The Moldovan delegation thus added in an 
interpretive statement that ‘necessary conditions’ in no way should be inter-
preted as political, but as ‘technical arrangements’.154  
The OSCE also seemed set on renewing the old 5+1 format under a new 
mandate. Rather than the ‘unitary state’ proposal, the OSCE should facilitate 
talks on a federal structure for a unified Moldova. At Porto, the Russian ac-
tion-plan for the federalization of Moldova was supported by the OSCE, 
enabling Russia to raise the issue bilaterally with Moldova, while retaining 
the initiative as a major broker. William Hill, whose mandate was renewed 
in January, stated in February that negotiations would be reinvigorated and 
that talks would be held on a weekly basis. Moreover, the OSCE had decided 
to give priority to talks in 2003 by appointing a permanent representative for 
settlement.155 As for Russia’s ambition to seek an OSCE mandate for third-
party peacekeeping, the Porto meeting produced a decision that the Perma-
nent Council should review OSCE peacekeeping: however, as noted by 
Wolfgang Zellner, the major incentive for Russia to consider this an option 
was on the decline.156 
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Debates on the ‘orientation’ of Moldova continued. Moldova’s bilateral 
meeting with the USA and renewed US interest in supporting Moldova had 
led commentators to remark that Russia was losing out in defining the pa-
rameters of the Moldovan resolution.157 Moreover, the fact that Moldova 
would have the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in Council of 
Europe was interpreted as a move of Moldova toward Europe and a subse-
quent decline of Russia’s ability to secure its major concerns – a political 
resolution to the DMR conflict and the protection of economic interests.158 
The second pole of orientation was the CIS. In February 2003, the bilateral 
meeting between Voronin and Putin confirmed the contours of a competing 
agenda between the OSCE framework and the CIS integration model. The 
presidents had discussed economic cooperation, both bilaterally and within 
the Eurasian Economic Cooperation, and Putin announced that Russia would 
take part in the privatization of Moldovan companies as the ‘only logical 
step towards partners in the CIS’. As for the Transdniester conflict, Putin 
stated that the aim of Russia’s brokering position was to define ‘a guaranteed 
status for Transdniester while preserving the sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of Moldova’.159 This was not a declaration, but a principle, Putin 
stressed.  
As the single most powerful partner in the CIS, Russia had already used 
its privileged position as ‘broker’ to privatize the Rybnitskiy metallurgical 
factory, which generated half of the total income of the DMR budget. More-
over, there were Russian plans to take over the Dnestrovskiy GRES, which 
delivered energy to the region, and Gazprom had risen to prominence as a 
foreign policy tool.  Addressing the giant on its 10th anniversary, Putin stated 
that it would never be sold off in pieces, and that the company was a ‘power-
ful lever of political and economic influence in the world’.160 
Moscow’s increasing emphasis on economic leverage was paralleled by 
rising tensions around the conflict resolution plan. In February, Voronin had 
invited the DMR regime to co-author a new Constitution for Moldova, and 
stated that he would present a constitutional draft to the negotiating group.161 
The proposal was endorsed by the DMR regime, with the special twist that 
Smirnov believed Moldova to abandoned ‘former ambitions’ and finally ac-
cepted talks at the level of equals.162 When the parties met on 27–28 Febru-
ary 2002, the EU and the USA exerted leverage on the process, imposing a 
visa ban on the DMR regime for not having facilitated compliance.163 On 21 
March 2003, the DMR imposed a reverse travel ban on Moldova’s president 
and his government, causing an outrage in Chisinau.164 At the end of March, 
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Chisinau reported that the DMR had started preparations for war, and that to 
talk of progress in the constitutional process was futile.  
Russia’s reactions to the visa ban were highly ambiguous. The MFA at 
first stated that the imposed regime should be applied with caution. Towards 
the end of March, Trubnikov travelled to Tiraspol to talk to the ‘client’, and 
the MFA limited itself to noting that this would not help to bring ‘mutual 
understanding’ between the parties.165 But the DMR response did not 
prompt Moscow to reduce its claims to primacy. On the contrary, Izvestiya 
reported that Putin would take control over the process. Paraphrasing what 
Russia repeatedly interpreted as a deadlocked OSCE process, the newspaper 
reported that the preparation of a Constitution for a federal unitary had 
started and was to be adopted by the respective parliaments, after which a 
Constitutional Assembly should be established.166 Furthermore, the Tiraspol 
regime had sent a plan to the Russian MFA on a ‘military-guarantee opera-
tion’, which reportedly was an operation similar to earlier proposals – how-
ever, not ‘under the auspices of international organizations, but led by Rus-
sia’. The MFA had confirmed the information, but underscored that this was 
but one of several means to guarantee the interests of Tiraspol, and that it 
had to be discussed in the five-format. Finally, Izvestiya stated, the result 
was to be the presentation of an intentional agreement in the autumn of 
2003, with Putin as the ‘peacemaker’.167  
The Izvestiya article suggests that the stakes had been raised consider-
ably. The Moldovan president had started a balancing effort, drawing in-
creasingly on bilateral US support and political support from the EU to 
counter Russian endorsement of DMR positions. In April, Romania pushed 
for Moldovan inclusion in the EU Stability Pact for the Balkans, and NATO 
and EU endorsement of Moldova’s position in the DMR conflict was made 
clear.168 EU foreign policy spokesman, de Oyeda, stated that the EU would 
play a far more active role in resolving the conflict, and insisted on Russian 
compliance with Istanbul. Moreover, Romano Prodi endorsed a Moldovan 
proposal to set up a joint Ukrainian-Moldovan border mission to prevent 
smuggling from the DMR over Ukrainian territory.169 
In May, Russian officials again went public, flagging the idea that the 
Russian forces should simply be transformed into a post-settlement peace-
keeping unit or stabilization force. After also the OSCE had begun to talk 
about a peacekeeping mission, MFA official Yakovenko stated that Russia’s 
forces should ‘play a dominant role’ in any mission.170 Again, the backbone 
of this argument was the synchronization strategy – Russia’s peacekeeping 
forces should remain in Transdniester until the need for a military guarantee 
for post-conflict settlement had been recognized by all, and provided by 
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Russia.171 Apparently supported by the argument that the DMR was a de 
facto territorial unit, Moscow seemed to feel that Russia’s troops were al-
ready de facto OSCE peacekeepers. Yakovenko stated that Russia’s forces 
were indeed ‘highly valued’ by the OSCE, while also making it clear that 
Russia was not to blame for the delay.172 
As the Russians pushed their forces as de facto peacekeepers, the OSCE 
could again report about concerns in stalled negotiations. While the talks had 
made progress on the issue of federalization, they stalled in June on the joint 
commission for a future constitution of Moldova. Moreover, the OSCE now 
more readily rebuked Russia’s insistence to retain the forces there as ‘peace-
keepers’.173 On the other hand, the OSCE did not seem clear as to whether to 
insist on compliance with Istanbul, or to offer an OSCE-initiated alternative. 
On 8 July, OSCE chairman Jaap de Hoop Scheffer had, according to some 
reports, said that OSCE peacekeepers would have to be sent in the event of 
failure to find a solution, and that this should be a small, lightly armed 
peacekeeping force174 – not a ‘stabilization force’ to facilitate post-
resolution peacekeeping. These rumours later surfaced in Moldova as an EU 
force with an OSCE mandate, and were supported by the Voronin opposi-
tion. The Moldovan president countered that there was no such invitation, 
that the focus on the military aspects of the resolution was exaggerated, and 
that he would not be a ‘gravedigger of the CIS’.175 
To all appearances, the ‘OSCE force’ was a trial balloon. Mere mention 
of it was sufficient, however, to prompt sharp resistance from the DMR, 
which hung on to retaining the Russian force there as the sole guarantee not 
only of the political process, but also post-settlement.176 Moreover, Russian 
press outlets reported that Head of the Presidential Administration, Alek-
sandr Voloshin, had visited Chisinau and tried to talk Voronin into halting 
the withdrawal of Russian forces due to the precariousness of the conflict 
resolution efforts.177 The Russian MFA also countered the proposal of an EU 
force in Moldova/ the DMR. According to Yakovenko, talks about this could 
only ‘distract the attention of the participants from the more vital questions 
of conflict resolution’ – implying that for Moscow the major issue was to 
prolong the stationing of Russian forces while blocking all efforts at adopt-
ing new post-conflict parameters.178 Yakovenko reiterated the ‘synchroniza-
tion’ argument: ‘as long as the need for a military presence facilitating con-
flict settlement is not clearly defined, the present system of joint peacekeep-
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ing forces should continue to work’, and added that the acting peacekeeping 
mission in the DMR had been ‘highly valued in the Istanbul Pact’.179 
Again, this was a strictly Russian interpretation of the Istanbul Pact. 
Moreover, the OSCE had no leverage to deal with a possible Russian default 
on withdrawal. Even when Scheffer made this proposal official in September 
(this time speaking of a ‘post-conflict peacekeeping unit’) OSCE coordinator 
William Hill retorted that the issue was ‘still under consideration’.180 All 
discussions on any sort of post-conflict settlement were contingent on one 
single factor – a political solution to the federal issue. But the vagueness of 
the Porto conclusions had not added to the substance of what ‘necessary 
conditions’ should amount to. The only certain factor was that Russia was 
clearly not happy about being left out of the resolution, let alone accepting a 
US/ EU-led initiative in the OSCE process.  
Russia’s counter-balancing of NATO in the region was also obvious. 
Concerns that new NATO members were not parties to the CFE-2 had 
emerged already in August 2002; and in June 2003, Russia pinned delays in 
implementing the CFE-2 on Washington, arguing that the USA had jeopard-
ized the CFE-2 by linking its ratification to Russian compliance with Istan-
bul.181 The Russian representative to the Russia-NATO Council (RNAC) 
argued in July that non-ratification of the CFE-2 was fraught with threats of 
a new Cold War, and that Russia’s meeting the deadline for withdrawal from 
the DMR was ‘not connected to the CFE Treaty’.182 Although the EU had 
earlier served as an alternative to NATO-led security in this balancing act, 
there were few indications Russia would accept any EU alternative for the 
DMR/Moldova deadlock.  
Russia’s decoupling strategy might have sprung from the conviction that 
Moscow had complied in part with the CFE, but had been shut out of the 
political resolution process. In other words, Russia’s synchronization strat-
egy was starting to peel off in terms of cashing in credits for contributions. 
Moscow had yet to re-claim authorship of the political solution. As the De-
cember 2003 OSCE ministerial meeting in Maastricht approached, the 
Kremlin did just that  
3.6. The 2003 Watershed: The Kozak Memorandum 
By autumn 2003 there were considerable uncertainties as to whether the 
OSCE actually had ownership of the resolution of the DMR conflict. To be 
sure, the authority of the organization had been beefed up. US diplomats 
stated in August that the federalization plan would facilitate Moldova’s inte-
gration into European structures, solidify it as a unified federal state, and end 
a decade of divisions.183 The EU/US visa ban on the DMR regime had an 
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effect as well, defining the source of the deadlock as the DMR regime. 
Given Russia’s repeated calls to the OSCE that the DMR had halted Russia’s 
compliance, the EU/US visa ban should indeed be acceptable to Moscow. 
In August, the DMR and Moldovan authorities completed their joint 
work of drafting a constitution to be presented for the OSCE, Ukraine and 
Russia. The draft was not made public, but parts of it were published in 
Olviya Press, the notorious virtual spin-centre of the DMR.184 Success was 
turned into new disappointments in September, when William Hill warned 
that the talks had come down to the tricky issues of status, and balancing 
Moldovan proposals of an asymmetric federation with DMR demands for 
equal status.185 Hill also indicated that an OSCE mission consisting of 600–
800 military personnel from the member countries was taking shape. He de-
nied having said anything about an EU force, and made no secret of the 
stakes for the OSCE, making it look almost as an institutional beauty contest 
in Russian–OSCE cooperation. Russia needed a solution just as badly as did 
the OSCE, Hill stated, since:  ‘they continue to have this arc of unresolved 
conflicts on their southern and south-eastern flanks. It would also be a sig-
nificant success for the OSCE. The OSCE has had successes in the Baltics. It 
has had successes of different kinds in the Balkans. But in the conflicts in 
which we are involved in the former Soviet Union (…) this is the closest we 
have got to a resolution [of the crisis]’.186 
Russia had indeed continued to have such conflicts on its fringes, but 
wanted a stake also in solving them in accordance with its own interests. In 
fact, the efficiency and authority of the OSCE was also at stake, as Russia 
intensified its unilateral approach to the DMR resolution. As progress 
stalled, Voronin met with Putin in Yalta, reporting to him about the decisive 
phase of negotiations. Voronin stated that the first part of the constitution, on 
human rights, had been written, while the second part – on separation of 
powers – was still to be agreed upon.187 Putin linked on to the process by 
appointing yet another special envoy for conflict resolution, Dmitriy Kozak, 
who squarely defined his role as assisting the Russians in the DMR.188  
The details of the work around what became known as the Kozak Memo-
randum are not known, but the Kremlin started a shuttle diplomacy from 
September and onwards, accompanied only by a sharper tone from William 
Hill that Russia should abide by the new time-table from Porto and withdraw 
from the DMR. There are sufficient indications, however, that Russia mo-
nopolized the process of defining the status of the asymmetric federation, 
coupling this not only to a default on revised Istanbul time-tables, but also 
indefinite prolongation of the Russian troop presence in the DMR.189 Minis-
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ter of Defence, Sergey Ivanov, stated on 6 October that Russia again might 
ask the OSCE for a new time-table, adding that ‘the base in the DMR is a 
heritage from Soviet times, and the largest in Europe’.190  
Moscow had designed this as a Russian contribution to the OSCE feder-
alization process. When the Kozak Memorandum surfaced on 18 November, 
it was dedicated wholly to the federalization and status problem. It proposed 
that Moldova should become an asymmetric federation consisting of two 
subjects – Gaugazia and Transdniester. The federal centre should regulate 
currency exchange, have control over state property and foreign policy, 
while questions of custom regulations, electoral rights, law enforcement and 
the federal budget should be negotiated with the subjects.191  
However, Russia did not refrain from offering clauses clearly indicating a 
prolonged role for Russian forces. The republic should be completely demili-
tarized, with no military forces own. Finally, unification should take place 
gradually, through the adoption of a new constitution put to referendum. 
This referendum should be held by 31 October, elections to the Senate by 1 
February 2005, to the Council of Representatives by 30 April, and presiden-
tial elections by 31 May. The Moldovan language should be state language 
for the federation, with Russian having the status as official language.192 
Russian press outlets stated that the Memorandum was a preparation for 
the Maastricht summit, and a process coordinated by Russia, Ukraine and the 
OSCE with the parties of Moldova and Transdniester.193 The Memorandum 
was depicted as a breakthrough in settlement. Although it was not presented 
to Chisinau and Tiraspol, Izvestiya claimed that it had been ‘coordinated 
with them’. NeGa claimed that Russia had prepared a ‘real base for the uni-
fication of Moldova’, and that Moldova and Transdniester had practically 
accepted the plan.194  
The suggestion that it was coordinated with the OSCE proved unsubstan-
tiated. In fact, the clause on ‘demilitarization’ had, if not an annex, then at 
least a hidden premise: the Memorandum made not mention whatsoever of 
any obligation to pull out Russian forces.195 On the contrary –   Minister of 
Defence, Sergey Ivanov, raised the stakes again in November, announcing 
that Russia would not withdraw in 20 years, stating that this was in compli-
ance with the ‘transition period’ of the Kozak Memorandum.196  
                                                 
lution agenda, and that the OSCE numerous times urged to bring the two together, but with no 
result. ‘Ambassador Hill’s Response to Vlad Socor’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 August, 2005. 
At: http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370088.  
190 Press obozrenie, Internet gazeta, at: http://press.try.md/view.php?id=33598&iddb=Main  
191 ‘Kishinevu i Tiraspolyu predlozhen plan ob’’edineniya’, Izvestiya, 18 November 2003: 
http://main.izvestia.ru/russia/article41166.  
192 ‘Moskva pomirit Kishinev i Tiraspol’, NeGa, 19 November 2003. At: http://www.ng.ru/ 
cis/2003-11-19/5_moldova.html.  
193 Ibid. 
194 ‘Assimetrichnaya federatsiya’, NeGa, 20 November 2003. At: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2003-
11-20/5_opros.html.  
195 Ibid. 
196 ‘Chto stoit za neozhidannoy otmenoy vizita Vladimira Putina v Kishinev?’, NeGa, 26 
November 2003. At: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2003-11-26/5_kishinev.html. 
Words and Deeds: Russian Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Separatist Conflicts 
 
53 
The Kozak Memorandum may have been ‘millimetres from federaliza-
tion’, but it was certainly far from OSCE compliance.197 Even Russian me-
dia reported that preparations for Putin’s visit to Moldova on 25 November 
had been conducted in ‘complete secrecy’, which was hardly in line with 
Russia’s insistence on transparency in OSCE affairs.198 When the trip was 
cancelled due to Voronin’s reluctance to sign the Memorandum, Moscow 
presented another version. Russian newspapers quoted official sources as 
saying that a ‘normal bargaining process had taken place, but some Western 
politicians had interfered, also on behalf of the EU’.199 In fact, the bargain-
ing process had been far from normal. Russia had utilized its position as an 
interlocutor privilege in the OSCE-five format to inform the Tiraspol regime 
and Moldova of the special conditions implicit in the Memorandum. Hence, 
Kozak had – according to NeGa – secured support from Kiev for the plan 
and received backing from the DMR regime to keep Russian peacekeepers 
there for a longer time. Igor Smirnov had responded by pushing two condi-
tions for supporting the Kozak Memorandum: the Russian language should 
have official status as a state language for the whole federation, and that 
Russian troops should not be withdrawn for the next 30 years.200 
After the aborted signing of the Kozak Memorandum, Russian officials 
became increasingly more outspoken in lambasting the OSCE and Moldova 
for torpedoing Russian efforts. Igor Ivanov apparently did not interpret Vo-
ronin’s decision not to sign as that of a sovereign state pulling out of a Rus-
sian-initiated initiative that put the issue of withdrawal of Russian military 
forces from Transdniester on perpetual hold. In the view of the MFA, 
Moldova had ‘yielded to the pressure of some states and organizations’. 
Moreover, since the document had been ‘agreed upon by all parties’, it was 
clear that there had been ‘interference of some states in the internal affairs of 
the CIS’.201  
The Kozak Memorandum engendered a meeting between OSCE repre-
sentatives and the MFA in Moscow. MFA officials continued to state in the 
press that the Memorandum had created new opportunities. According to 
MFA official Yakovenko: ‘The adoption of the memorandum proposed by 
Russia on the basis principles of statehood for the unified Moldova republic 
has given a unique chance to reach a final and comprehensive resolution of 
the conflict in the near future’.202 Russian reinsurances notwithstanding, the 
December 2003 Maastricht meeting left Russia in practical isolation from 
the major outputs of the meeting, as also recorded in Russian press outlets. 
The fact that Russia did not sign the Final Document, or the statements on 
Georgia and Moldova, did not reverberate in Russian press outlets as a mat-
ter of grave concern, however. Izvestiya reported this as a matter-of-fact dis-
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agreement between Russia and the USA, and not ‘isolation’. Russia had 
simply not ‘had time to pull the forces out of Moldova’, the article stated, 
and quoted Ivanov as repeating that ‘we have been witnessing interventions 
in Georgia and Moldova not from the part of Russia, but from the part of 
other states’.203 Moreover, the minister once more reiterated that Russia in 
no way accepted the ‘conditionality’ clause of linking the ratification of the 
CFE 2 agreement to the ‘so-called commitments of the Istanbul pact’.204 
It may well be that Russia had calculated the costs of confronting the 
USA and the OSCE on this issue and found that it would not result in intol-
erable harm. Russia’s push/ pull moves prior to the Maastricht meeting were 
at any rate linked to what had been a dominant sentiment within the Russian 
elite since 2000 – the OSCE was a dispensable organization. Hence, the Iz-
vestiya article ended on a note that simply confirmed the prevalent elite view 
on the OSCE, quoting a leading expert from the Centre of Defence Informa-
tion, Ivan Safranchuk: ‘The OSCE is an extremely weak player on the Euro-
pean arena. […] It is a dying European institution with a very narrow spe-
cialization and without any influence whatsoever. Thus, the fact that we have 
ended up in some isolation in the OSCE should not worry us one bit.’205  
3.7. Maastricht and Beyond: Big Politics 
Clearly, the presentation of the Kozak Memorandum did not imply a radical 
shift in Russia’s perception of the Istanbul Pact. The specific conditionality 
introduced by Russia in the OSCE process has been evident ever since 2001. 
Russia has sought to gain political benefits from conflict resolution and in-
sisted on having a special role as mediator in the conflict. Moreover, Russia 
has ignored the blatant non-compliance of the DMR regime and done little to 
make it change its views, even though the OSCE has several times encour-
aged Moscow to use its influence on the DMR in a positive manner.  
This policy has been counterproductive with regard to finding a final  
settlement, but it has also enabled Russia to front further demands as to de-
fining the premises of European security policies. Russia’s ‘reverse condi-
tionality’ scheme has been present from the beginning of 2000, with several 
additional ‘rounds’ since then. Russia’s message to the international com-
munity – that it has been under pressure from the DMR and has thus failed to 
comply – has turned the resolution into a ‘crisis spiral’, sending it yet higher 
and higher on the international agenda. If there is such a thing as a ‘crisis 
spiral of disarmament’, the DMR conflict is surely a case study in point.  
Beyond Maastricht, Russia attempted to explain the origin of the Kozak 
initiative. The officially Moscow version was that Russia had been invited 
by Moldova in February 2003. According to deputy minister of foreign af-
fairs, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Russia had responded to ‘numerous calls from 
Moldova’s leader to assist in the work of a new constitution based on the 
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federalization principle’.206 The MFA emphasized that Russia had complied 
with the CFE Treaty in removing ammunition, and that 2003 had been a 
peak year in withdrawing from the DMR. Yet, the statement suggested a dif-
ferent format than that of the 3+2, namely that it was Russia that had taken 
the lead in work on the constitution, with the consent of the DMR Moldova.  
Russia then added further ‘conditionality clauses’ to the resolution.  
Symptomatically, attempts to start from scratch after Maastricht and coordi-
nate two separate plans produced few results. The five-party group resumed 
its work in early 2004, trying to sort out the federalization issue. At the Sofia 
meeting on 26 and 27 January 2004, some amendments – this time report-
edly building on the Kozak plan – were adopted, but the issue itself re-
mained in limbo. Russia repeated its intentions to withdraw ammunition, but 
not troops from the DMR.207 It added a new condition: opening a Russian 
Consulate in Tiraspol to safeguard the interests of 70,000 Russians in the 
DMR. The original invitation to co-author a joint constitution was also de-
railed. A new proposal suggested that the DMR was to become a ‘federal 
subject’, but that it should write its own constitution and have separate legis-
lation and separate budgets.208 
When the proposal was put on the table, the DMR regime denied OSCE 
inspectors access to the Kolbasna ammunition depot for as long as negotia-
tions continued between Russia and the separatist regime on the time-table 
for Russian troop withdrawal.209 This was unacceptable to by the OSCE 
mission, since it violated the right of the OSCE to verify withdrawals. More-
over, it clearly accentuated that Russia’s obligations were towards the DMR 
regime, and not towards the OSCE and the Istanbul Document. Finally, the 
very idea that the DMR regime should be in any position to ‘negotiate’ 
seemed to imply an element of quasi-sovereignty for the DMR regime that 
was quite out of tune with the federalization process itself.  
The OSCE chairmanship had a keen interest in repairing the impression 
of a crisis in Russia–OSCE relations. Bulgaria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Pasi, stated in connection with the visit of the new chairmanship to Russia in 
February 2004 that there was no ‘crisis in confidence’ between Russia and 
the OSCE, adding that the ‘OSCE would lose its meaning without Rus-
sia’.210 The major concern of the chairmanship seemed to get the tripartite 
negotiations back on track and to pick up the loose ends after the Kozak 
Memorandum and Russia’s subsequent ‘harsh criticism’ at the Maastricht 
meeting in December 2003.  
However, it was becoming more and more obvious that the OSCE pro-
cess was about to lose its meaning also with Russia. On 23 February, the 
DMR regime rebuked the Sofia document as not being in line with regional 
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interests, and inferior to the Kozak Memorandum. The DMR had apparently 
returned to demands that the DMR should be called a ‘state’, and not a fed-
eral subject. Moreover, the DMR reiterated the official Moscow view that 
Russian forces should remain in the DMR until the conflict was resolved.211 
During the spring of 2004, the Tiraspol regime was increasingly eager to 
tell Russia what it expected from a resolution, and Russia increasingly more 
eager to grant legitimacy to the regime. Before the planned reopening of the 
negotiations on 21 April 2004, Igor Smirnov made a trip to Russia, officially 
to receive the decoration of ‘Glorious Russia’ (Slava Rossii), but also for 
talks with Duma deputies from Rodina and officials in the MFA.212 Without 
clarifying in detail the extent and contents of talks, Smirnov announced that 
he expected no progress from the resumption of the negotiations, and that the 
Tiraspol regime would insist on holding parallel referendums in Moldova 
and Transdniester on a federal agreement. Smirnov also echoed Russian 
OSCE positions in claiming that the essence of Moldova failing to sign the 
Kozak Memorandum was that the ‘US is trying to push Russia out from the 
region’, which he supported by stating that US personnel had led the OSCE 
Moldova mission eight times.213 
During the spring of 2004 there were few signs that the OSCE process 
would lead to resolution of the conflict. Repeated announcement from the 
OSCE office that the 3+2 negotiations would resume did not solve the im-
posed deadlock. The group met in March and April 2004, and although the 
latter meeting brought the federalization issue back on the agenda, also these 
negotiations ended inconclusively.214 The fact that both the EU and the USA 
had tried to help by supporting the 3+2 format and expressing a will to facili-
tate resolution failed to provide new impetus to the process.215 True, Euro-
pean states tried to keep the bilateral talks with Russia warm. The EU had 
renewed the visa ban on the DMR regime in February 2004, while select 
states kept Russia in on talks. At a meeting with Dominique de Villepen in 
Paris on 5 March 2004, Villepen stated: ‘we understand the concerns of Rus-
sia with regard to CFE-2 and will find solutions’. 216 Launching a new EU–
Russia ‘permanent consulting mechanism’, France also spoke of adopting 
new rules for crisis management between Russia and the EU. Yet, Russia 
showed few regrets as to the declining status of the OSCE and the fate of the 
Istanbul Charter. Ivanov repeated earlier concerns about the ‘artificial link-
age between ratification of the CFE-2 and the fulfilment of the Istanbul 
Charter of withdrawal of forces from Transdniester and Georgia’.217 
The effect of EU declarations did not become apparent, however. During 
the summer of 2004, the DMR regime closed down Moldovan schools for 
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teaching in the Latin script, and Moldova’s authorities were becoming in-
creasingly concerned about the privatization of DMR companies by Russian 
investors.218 Russia’s response was that the DMR should take a ‘balanced 
approach’, and wait with administrative action until a political solution could 
be reached.219 The DMR in turn referred to separate ‘constitutional provi-
sions’ of the DMR, thus effectively ruling out any talk of a joint constitution, 
and eventually provoking Moldova to withdraw temporarily from the 3+2 
negotiation format.220 The EU fully agreed with the OSCE that the DMR’s 
actions were ‘provocative and irresponsible’,221 and took note of Russia’s 
announcement. Moscow responded by calling the Moldovan decision to halt 
negotiations a ‘cause for concern’, and urged the Moldovan authorities to 
refrain from escalating the conflict, lest it be ‘brought out of political con-
trol’.222 
The effect of the July stand-off led to a radical severance of ties between 
Moldova and Russia. By December 2004, Moldovan authorities had grown 
increasingly impatient with Russia’s failure to fulfil the 1999 OSCE. At the 
OSCE Sofia meeting on 6 and 7 December 2004, the Moldovan representa-
tive referred to Russia’s presence as a ‘foreign occupation’ of Moldova, 
prompting Moscow to issue a special statement on 15 December 2004.223 
The MFA statement is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it identified 
Moldova’s refusal to sign the unilateral ‘Kozak Memorandum’ as a prime 
reason for what the statement carefully framed as the severance of 
‘Moldova–Transdniester relations’. The presentation of the memorandum 
itself may have had the characteristics of a poorly coordinated unilateral ul-
timatum, but this was not reflected in official statements from Moscow. 
Rather than complying with multilateral institutionalized conditionality, the 
MFA created a reverse conditionality by stating: ‘the reason the withdrawal 
of Russian weapons [has been halted] is known: the deterioration of Chisi-
nau–Tiraspol relations after the refusal of the Moldovan authorities to sign 
the Kozak memorandum – a document which represented a real solution [to] 
the Transdniester conflict.’224  
Secondly, the MFA statement linked the Russian presence to a mission 
that did not comply with OSCE provisions and deadlines on withdrawal: ‘a 
group of Russian military still remains in Transdniester after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the 14th Army, and it has a unique 
mission: to guard the depots with Russian weapons, which are to be with-
drawn to Russia.’225 In other words, the MFA was insisting on a ‘peace-
keeping’ mandate, without specifying terms for withdrawal. This statement 
accorded poorly with the process itself, since Russia had failed to comply 
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with OSCE conditionality on the withdrawal of ammunition depots leading 
up to the 2003 Maastricht ministerial meeting.  
In sum, the Russian position must be understood as an unconditional de-
mand that Moldova should recognize the Transdniester authorities as legiti-
mate – thus the reference to the severance of relations between Tiraspol and 
Chisinau. Moscow showed less concern for the fact that the Moldovan au-
thorities responded immediately by renouncing the MFA statement as inter-
ference in internal Moldovan affairs and a deliberate stretching of the 
‘peace-keeping’ mandate from 1992. Moldovan authorities made clear refer-
ence to principles of sovereignty as echoed in the Istanbul Pact, arguing that 
they could not forcefully be pushed into signing the Kozak memorandum 
and that Russia’s repeated reverse conditionality was a blackmail process, 
and not an effort at conflict resolution.226 
3.8. Conclusions: Fewer Words, More Deeds 
If Russia’s policy from 2001 to 2004 had been one of repeated statements 
about its willingness to comply with Istanbul and the inability to make the 
DMR comply with anything involving a Russian solution and troop pres-
ence, the years 2003 to 2005 brought about a series of concrete actions from 
the Russian side. This was reinforced by the massive shift in Ukraine during 
the Ukrainian presidential elections in 2004. The engagement of EU and 
bordering states opened the door to a more active and westward policy for 
Ukraine, a factor that definitely challenged Russia’s efforts to solidify the 
CIS. Moreover, some held that Russia had now lost any opportunity to serve 
as a facilitator of the DMR conflict, and that Moscow had confused integra-
tion with dominance in the post-Soviet space.227  
Moreover, in early 2005, EU awareness of the conflict was on the rise. In 
February, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Solana, announced that a 
special EU representative for the DMR conflict would be appointed.228 As-
piring EU-member Romania also raised in talks with Putin the issue of be-
coming a party to conflict resolution, linking it to the wider security sphere 
of the Black Sea region. This was further boosted by strengthened bilateral 
ties between Ukraine and Moldova on solving the DMR conflict. Yush-
chenko announced renewed Ukrainian efforts to resolve the conflict, and 
focused explicitly on bilateral relations with Moldova, thereby creating a 
new mechanism that paralleled the original 3+2 format.  
After the March elections that gave to Voronin a second term, Moldova 
put new demands to Russia to withdraw its troops, while also calling for an 
enhanced negotiation format, to consist of EU and US observers and Roma-
nia.229 Also in March, Voronin launched the ‘three-D’ initiative (demilitari-
zation, decriminalization and democratization) in the EU, supported by 
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Ukraine and Romania. The Moldovan initiative came in response to a Rus-
sian Duma resolution of 18 February calling for sanctions against Moldova’s 
wine and tobacco products.230 After a government meeting on 16 March, it 
was announced that sanctions were in the pipeline; and Gazprom also de-
clared that it would raise the prices on gas exports to Moldova to European 
market prices. 
Moscow’s insistence on retaining the old format has also been challenged 
by a new reconfiguration of foreign policies led by Ukraine. The Ukrainian–
Moldovan rapprochement proved to be a viable track for introducing new 
options. In April, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Borys Tarasyuk, 
announced that his country would take decisive steps to enforce border con-
trol on the DMR–Ukraine border: ‘We don't want our national boundaries to 
be open to smugglers’, he stated.231  
The subsequent Yushchenko plan launched in May 2005 paved the way 
for making border issues a bilateral affair between Moldova and Ukraine, 
under the regional umbrella of GUAM, a regional alliance of democratizing 
states (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Azerbaijan). Moreover, the OSCE 
seemed inclined to include other parties in the 5+1 format. In 2005, the 
Slovenian chairmanship expressed some optimism as to resuming the talks 
on a settlement and welcomed the decision to expand the negotiation format 
to include observers from the EU and the USA. The OSCE has also ac-
knowledged Ukraine’s initiative of May 2005 as a new impetus. Visiting 
Kiev in October, the OSCE chairman, Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij 
Rupel, commended Ukraine’s president for the initiative and for giving the 
process a new push forward.232 At the meeting of the Group of Five in 
Ljubljana on 21 October, he welcomed the observers from the USA and the 
EU, saying that their presence would reinvigorate the OSCE’s work toward a 
lasting settlement.233 
The reconfiguration of multilateral initiatives notwithstanding, the issue 
of DMR status and Russian ‘peacekeepers’ is still pending. The DMR has 
continued its line of intransigence, criticizing the OSCE for applying ‘double 
standards’ in refusing to send observers to the 11 December 2005 elections 
in the breakaway republic.234 Moreover, in September 2006 a quasi-
referendum on independence was held in the DMR, which would indicate 
that the DMR has not been prepared to accept anything but statehood and 
Russian military presence. Russia’s ‘reverse conditionality scheme’ also 
seems intact, with a sharper edge against Moldova. The statements of Minis-
ter of MFA Sergei Lavrov in a bilateral meeting with Romania on 8 Novem-
ber 2005 confirmed at least that Russia still holds that Russian troops should 
remain in Transniester until a final settlement is reached. Lavrov noted that 
they are playing a ‘positive role’, ‘fulfilling their mandate’, and should be 
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considered as guarantors for guarding the ammunition depots, which he re-
ferred to as ‘one of the largest in Europe’.235 Elements of ‘reverse condition-
ality’ were also present in Lavrov’s explanation of previous failures. ‘We 
want the parties to follow the agreements reached within the OSCE through 
the mediation of Ukraine and Russia’, he said, adding that the process of 
withdrawing ammunition from Transdniester had been going well in 2003, 
until it was ‘blocked by the Chisinau leadership’.236 Lavrov also stated in an 
interview with Romanian press that Russia welcomed the parties’ support of 
the new format with EU and US observers, and seemed to imply that the 
Russian five-party process had always been ‘transparent for the international 
community and for European political structures’ and in coherence with the 
overall ambition of ensuring stability and security in the region.237 
In other words, Moscow’s MFA has kept reiterating that fulfilment of the 
Istanbul Pact of 1999 was not a commitment that Russia has taken on, but 
one that would be met only after final resolution had been achieved. An 
MFA statement issued in connection with the 15th anniversary of the CFE 
Treaty still rejected what it termed the ‘artificial conjunction’ between the 
CFE-2 Treaty and the ‘so-called Istanbul commitments’. Interestingly, the 
statement suggested that Russia had never seen the OSCE document in a 
security regime perspective. Russia’s MFA echoed numerous earlier state-
ments on CFE-2 by stating: ‘the Russian Georgian and Russian Moldovan 
agreements have a bilateral character and do not imply any commitments for 
Russia as regards third countries’ [sic].238 Hence, the future of the CFE-2 – a 
‘cornerstone of European security’ – would depend solely on the Western 
partners. 
What then of Russia’s commitment to multilateralism? The Kozak 
Memorandum sidetracked the issue of troop withdrawal, promoted a demili-
tarization scheme based on Russian troop presence, and put the issue of 
withdrawal on perpetual hold. Hence, some analysts hold that Russia has 
become more outspoken about its true intentions in the Transdniester case. 
In November 2005, MFA spokesman Vyacheslav Kovalenko stated that 
Russia increasingly – and perhaps throughout the whole process – viewed 
the westward orientation of Moldova as a source of concern. Russia’s quid 
pro quo argument that Moldova should remain a demilitarized and neutral 
state (Kozak) was linked to issues like ‘Moldova’s changing relations with 
NATO’, Moldova’s role in GUAM and ‘attitudes toward the OSCE’ – the 
latter hinting at displeasure at Moldova not having supported the Russian 
proposal to include CIS observers in the OSCE electoral observer mis-
sions.239  
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It should come as no surprise then, that Russia has made the lack of 
transparency an argument for a non-performing OSCE. At a meeting in Bel-
grade on 7 November, Lavrov spoke for a reform of the OSCE, citing ‘nu-
merous non-transparent procedures in OSCE monitoring’. In conducting 
missions, the OSCE should work together with the Council of Europe and 
NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, as well as with ‘observers from the CIS’, 
Lavrov noted. To Moscow, this is an argument underlining that Russia is not 
only against what it sees as the forced democratization of the post-Soviet 
space, but is also concerned that Russian-led ‘democratization efforts’ like 
the Kozak plan have been foiled. Hence, Lavrov emphasized: ‘one should 
not believe that the CIS observers pursued any other aims during the moni-
toring of electoral processes’.240  
In practice, Russia’s protection of the DMR regime has reduced the valid-
ity of this argument. The problem with the Kozak plan was that it defaulted 
on Istanbul commitments, while paying heed to the DMR regime’s intransi-
gence. Moreover, non-compliance has effectively hampered the political 
consolidation of Moldova, prompting many to label Moscow’s strategy as 
one of ‘managed instability’ in the post-Soviet space.  
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4.0. Russia, Georgia and Separatism 
This chapter analyses Moscow’s policy towards two separatist conflicts that 
have been haunting Georgia since the collapse of the Soviet Union and that 
still remain unresolved – the conflicts between the Georgian central authori-
ties and the ‘breakaway republics’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This 
chapter consists of five parts. The first presents a brief analysis of the his-
torical trajectory of these two conflicts, indicating their similarities and dif-
ferences and paying some attention to the attempts of Russia – and other ac-
tors – to influence the outcome. The second part outlines developments in 
these conflicts between 1999 and 2003. In the third part we look at develop-
ment in the conflict zones after the 2003 power shift in Georgia. The fourth 
part contains a detailed analysis of Russian official and non-official dis-
course on and action in conflict zones, while the fifth part offers our sum-
mary and conclusions.  
4.1. Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – pre-2000 Trajec-
tory  
Located in the western part of Georgia, Abkhazia is one of the two quasi-
states established on Georgian territory in the wake of a bloody conflict that 
broke out in the final years of Soviet rule. This conflict contributed indirectly 
to the demise of the Soviet project by unleashing a wave of Georgian nation-
alism that resulted in mass demonstrations, in the bloody confrontation with 
Soviet troops on 9 April 1989, and, eventually, in Georgia’s declaration of 
independence on 9 April 1991.  
Abkhazia (Apsny, or the Country of the Soul in Abkhaz, and Apchazeti 
in Georgian), is a de facto independent but not internationally recognized 
state. Located in northwestern Georgia on the Black Sea coast, it has a long 
land border with Russia and land border with the rest of Georgia following 
the Inguri River. The country occupies an area of 8.6 thousand square km, 
slightly more than 12 per cent of the territory of Georgia. The capital is  
Sukhumi (Sukhum in Abkhaz).  
According to most recent estimates there are approximately 300,000 peo-
ple living permanently on the territory controlled by the Abkhazian authori-
ties. According to the last Soviet census from 1989, the population of this 
region than was 525,000. Ethnic Georgians were the largest ethnic commu-
nity, accounting for 45.7 per cent of total, while the titular nation, 
Abkhazians, comprised 17.8 per cent of the population. Among other ethnic 
groups living on this territory, the most numerous were Armenians (14.6 per 
cent), ethnic Russians (14.3 per cent), and Greeks (2.3 per cent). It is esti-
mated that in the wake of the armed phase of the conflict, most ethnic Geor-
gians were forced or decided to leave, and likewise for almost half the Rus-
sians and Armenians living there.  
After many centuries of more or less independent statehood – sometimes 
in union with the Kingdom of Georgia – Abkhazia was formally incorpo-
rated into the Russian Empire by a manifesto of 17 February 1810. After the 
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February revolution of 1917, Abkhazia formed a part of the Mountainous 
Caucasian Republic. On 31 March 1921 an Abkhaz Socialist Soviet Repub-
lic was established; and in December that year a treaty was signed with 
Georgia and a federative Georgian Abkhaz state was created. This arrange-
ment lasted until 1931, when Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia as an 
autonomous republic. During 1970s and 1980s a wave of national revival 
swept over Abkhazia. The main demand was the secession from Georgia and 
incorporation into the Russian Federal Soviet Socialist Republic (RFSSR). 
This national revival culminated in the adoption on 25 August 1990 of the 
declaration on the sovereignty of Abkhazia.  
A similar wave of national revival swept over Georgia itself. On 31 
March 1991 Georgia held a referendum on restoring its independence. With 
the motion supported by 90.08% of those who voted, the Georgian parlia-
ment adopted a declaration of independence on 9 April 1991 restoring the 
Georgian state. On 26 May 1991 Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected President 
of Georgia. A turbulent period ensued, forcing the Georgian authorities to set 
aside the resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia. The apparent stalemate in 
relations between the Abkhaz leadership and the Georgian central authorities 
lasted until July 1992, when the latter sent troops intended to put an end to 
Abkhazia’s drive for independence. When the Abkhazia’s Supreme Soviet 
proclaimed the state’s sovereignty on 23 July 1992, the Georgian State 
Council responded two days later, declaring the Abkhaz independence decla-
ration null and void. To put an end to what the central authorities in Tbilisi 
saw as the Abkhaz mutiny, 3000 armed members of the Georgian National 
Guard were sent to Abkhazia in mid- August 1992 and armed clashes broke 
out. The first of the series of ceasefires was reached in direct talks between 
the Georgian and the Abkhaz side already on 15 August 1992; the second 
was finally brokered by Russia on 31 August 1992, but neither ceasefire 
proved lasting. On 3 September the parties met in Moscow, with the Russian 
side as a broker, and agreed that a new ceasefire should enter into force on 5 
September.  
After almost two months of bargaining and horse-trading a new round of 
talks was held in early December 1992 in Gudauta, Abkhazia. This resulted 
in the signing on 15 December of five agreements on ending military action 
and the withdrawal of all heavy arms and troops from the front.  
However, tensions remained acute and a long-term solution to the con-
flict was not in sight, so a new round of negotiations was arranged in Mos-
cow in May 1993. On 14 May Presidents Shevardnadze and Yeltsin agreed 
on a ceasefire that came into effect on 20 May. This agreement was also to 
result in the withdrawal of heavy weapons and artillery from the region and 
the resumption of tripartite Russian–Georgian–Abkhaz talks on solving the 
conflict.  
In July 1993 talks were held in Moscow, and on 27 July in the Russian 
resort of Sochi a provisional ceasefire was signed by Shevardnadze and the 
Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba. Russia would send peacekeeping troops 
to the conflict area, armed forces were to be withdrawn from the zone of 
conflict and the UN was to send a observer mission (UNOMIG) to monitor 
the agreed ceasefire. On 25 August 1993 Shevardnadze established a special 
commission to work on a final settlement of the conflict with Abkhazia. The 
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Georgian authorities withdrew all heavy equipment and some units from the 
frontline, as agreed in the Sochi Agreement. The Abkhaz side, however, de-
cided to use this opportunity and the changed balance of power to seize the 
military initiative, launching a massive offensive on 16 September that drove 
all the Georgian forces out of Abkhazia by the end of the month.  
This military success was ascribed to many factors. These include the 
parallel offensive launched by the supporters of the ousted Georgian presi-
dent Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the covert help given to the Abkhaz side by Rus-
sia – or certain Russian leaders – and Georgia’s compliance with the Sochi 
Agreement, which left the republic without heavy armaments and thus con-
tributed to the quick demoralization of the Georgian troops and their chaotic 
flight from Abkhazia. President Shervardnadze described the Georgian de-
feat as ‘a great moral and political blow’, and accused Russia of complic-
ity.241 Although Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev called on the 
Abkhaz to lay down their arms and observe the 27 July ceasefire and stated 
that Russia had imposed economic sanctions on Abkhazia,242 the situation 
on the ground did not change. The Abkhaz troops, supported by volunteers 
from the Caucasus and indirectly by Gamsakhurdia supporters, took effec-
tive control of the whole pre-war Abkhaz territory. Georgia had suffered a 
military and a political defeat. It had to accept, albeit unwillingly, Russian 
help and respond positively to Russia’s ‘invitation’ to join the CIS.  
The most acute and bloody phase of the conflict in Abkhazia reached a 
temporary solution when two days of negotiations in Geneva under UN aus-
pices ended on 1 December 1993 with the signing of an eight-point memo-
randum of understanding by Georgia and Abkhazia. The agreement, de-
scribed by Swiss mediator Edouard Brunner and by Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Boris Pastukhov as an important step toward a political settlement 
of the Abkhaz conflict, committed both sides to desist from using force dur-
ing negotiations, It further provided for the exchange of all prisoners, the 
return of refugees, the deployment of additional international observers, and 
the preparation by UN and CSCE experts of proposals on the future status of 
Abkhazia.243 
Work on finding a working solution to the conflict continued. On 14 May 
1994, the Abkhaz and Georgian sides signed in Moscow the Agreement on a 
Ceasefire and Separation of Forces. This agreement provided for the de-
ployment of a CIS peacekeeping force that was to separate the warring par-
ties and monitor compliance with the agreement, while UNOMIG was to 
monitor implementation of the agreement and observe the operation of the 
formally CIS but de facto Russian force. 
On 26 November 1994 Abkhazia adopted a new constitution that de-
scribed the country as independent state, and elected its first parliament and 
president – moves that put a heavy strain on the already tense relations be-
tween Georgia and Abkhazia. Georgia managed to get support for its policy 
towards Abkhazia at the CIS summit in Moscow in January 1996, and a de-
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cision was made by this body to impose economic blockade on the break-
away region until it recognized the territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Georgia. However, in November 1996 elections were held to the local par-
liament in Abkhazia, a step that was widely interpreted as Abkhazia’s con-
firmation of its drive towards full independence from Tbilisi.  
On 3 October 1999, 90 per cent of the population of Abkhazia voted to 
endorse the 1994 Constitution that defined Abkhazia as an independent re-
public. A full 99 per cent of voters supported the incumbent president, 
Vladislav Ardzinba, who was re-elected for a further five-year term.244  
The 1999 vote in Abkhazia put a temporary end to discussions on the fu-
ture status of the region. Abkhazia has established itself as a de facto but not 
a de jure independent state, not recognized by any other member of the in-
ternational community. This has come at a high human cost, especially to the 
non-Abkhaz population of the region. According to various sources, some 
2000 people died in connection with fighting in 1992 and 1993; and 
250 000, mostly ethnic Georgians, were forced to leave their homes. Taking 
into consideration these casualties and the human cost of the conflict, and 
bearing in mind that the conflict broke out in an area defined as strategically  
important by many regional and global actors, it is hardly surprising that 
many of them have become involved in hitherto futile attempts at finding a 
working solution to this confrontation between the Abkhaz minority de-
manding the right to self-determination, and Georgia seeking to protect its 
territorial integrity.  
The very same dilemma on which of the two rights should be given prior-
ity – the right of groups to self-determination, or the right of states to protect 
their territorial integrity – was also at the core of the second of the separatist 
conflicts that broke out in Georgia in early 1990s.  
South Ossetia (capital: Tskhinvali ) is located in the central part of Georgia. 
It is almost completely surrounded by Georgian territory, the small exception 
being the border area between South Ossetia and its sister republic in the 
Russian Federation, North Ossetia. With its territory of 3,900 square km 
South Ossetia occupies approximately 5.5 per cent of Georgia’s total terri-
tory of 69,700 square km. In 1990, the population of South Ossetia was ap-
proximately 100,000; Ossetians comprised 66 per cent and Georgians 29 per 
cent,  but half of the families in the region were in fact of mixed Georgian 
Ossetian descent.245 The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (AO) was de-
clared on 20 April 1922 on the territory of Soviet Georgia. Many Georgians 
hold that the South Ossetian AO was established by the Bolsheviks so as to 
create permanent sources of tension that would help Moscow to control 
Georgia more easily.246 
One reason for the outbreak of the conflict in the 1990s was the policy of 
local political elites, who launched national projects and refused to recognize 
the interests of the Georgian state in South Ossetia and of the ethnic minori-
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ties living in Georgia. The political phase of the conflict began in autumn 
1990, when the local authorities proclaimed the South Ossetian Soviet De-
mocratic Republic. This, they declared, was to form a part of the Soviet  
Union, and no longer be an autonomous region within the borders of Geor-
gia. Responding to this move, central authorities in Tbilisi decided to deprive 
the region of its autonomy and even changed its official name to ‘the 
Tshkinvali district’. Contrary to recommendation of the central Georgian 
authorities, South Ossetia took part in the March 1991 referendum on the 
preservation of the Soviet Union,247 while refusing to participate in the ref-
erendum on independence from the Soviet Union held in Georgia on 31 
March 1991248 and in presidential elections held in Georgia on 26 May 
1991.249 The conflict sharpened when, on 9 April 1991, the Georgian leader 
and the future president of the country said that the autonomy of South Os-
setia, abolished in December 1990, was not to be restored, although 9 April 
proclamation indirectly guaranteed the right to free development of all mi-
norities within Georgia. On 21 December 1991 – a mere four days before the 
formal dissolution of the Soviet Union – South Ossetia voted for independ-
ence from Georgia; this vote was confirmed by a popular referendum held 
on 19 January 1992. As the results of these two referenda were not recog-
nized by the central Georgian authorities, this declaration of independence 
was seen as an attempt to violate the principle of the territorial integrity of 
the newly independent Georgian state.    
The first clashes between Georgian police and military units and local 
militia broke out in late 1990. On 12 December, the Georgian Parliament 
declared a state of emergency in parts of South Ossetia, but that failed to end 
the violence – for instance, on 27 December, some 2,000 people stormed a 
police station in Tskhinvali and held a group of Georgian policemen hostage 
until a local man who had been arrested earlier was released.250 In January 
1991 the conflict intensified, with many casualties on both sides.251 On 21 
March TASS reported that a meeting of leaders of rival Georgian and Os-
setian armed groups had agreed on a ceasefire, but this agreement did not 
survive.252 The clashes continued throughout most of 1991, but in November 
that year the Georgian authorities lifted the state of emergency in South Os-
setia, hoping that this would ease tensions in the region. On the same day, 
however, there were reports that the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet had or-
dered the mobilization of all men aged 18 to 60 as rumours spread of immi-
nent attack by Georgians.253 Interethnic violence continued, culminating 
with the death of 28 people in Tskhinvali, which was shelled by Georgian 
units on the night of 8 June 1992.  
After this peak of violence and many unsuccessful attempts on the part of 
Georgian troops to defeat the South Ossetian militia, the new Georgian 
                                                 
247 RFE/RL Daily Digest, 18 March 1991.  
248 RFE/RL Daily Digest, 2 April 1991. 
249 RFE/RL Daily Digest, 27 May 1991. 
250 RFE/RL Daily Digest, 2 January 1991. 
251 Elisabeth Fuller, ‘South Ossetia: Analysis of a Permanent Crisis’, Report on the USSR. 
vol.3, no 7, 1991, pp.20–22. 
252 RFE/RL Daily Digest, 21 and 25 March 1991. 
253 RFE/RL Daily Digest, 27 November 1991.  
Geir Flikke and Jakub M. Godzimirski 
 
68 
leader, Eduard Shevardnadze, was forced to accept Russian mediation in the 
conflict. On 22 June 1992 he signed the so-called Dagomys Agreement bro-
kered by President Boris Yeltsin of Russia.  
The agreement stipulated the withdrawal of all armed forces from the re-
gion, the setting up of a 1500-strong tri-national peacekeeping force from 
Georgia, Russia and Ossetia, and the establishment of the Joint Control 
Commission that was to monitor and control the activity of the Joint Peace-
keeping Forces. The peacekeeping force, deployed on 14 July, consisted of 
700 Russian, 500 Ossetian – and only 33 Georgian soldiers.254 According to 
Shevardnadze, Georgia had no choice but to accept the terms of the agree-
ment because ‘the Georgians were not ready for war and they were de-
feated.’ He blamed the defeat on his predecessor, Zviad Gamskahurdia, and 
added that Georgia ‘couldn’t afford to be at war any longer’. In that situation 
a negotiated settlement, imperfect as it was, was the sole solution avail-
able.255 The Dagomys Agreement managed to put an end to the violent 
phase of the conflict, which, according to various estimates, had resulted in 
approximately 500 deaths, but it failed to solve any of the political issues 
that were – and still are – at the core of the problem. On 10 November 1996 
Ludvig Chibirov was elected president of South Ossetia, and in December 
1997 the local parliament voted to establish an independent South Ossetian 
republic which was to enter the CIS. In May 1999 parliamentary elections 
were held in South Ossetia, a move that led to further strengthening of de 
facto independence and to further isolation in Europe. The elections were 
recognized neither by the OSCE nor by Tbilisi, which saw them as a politi-
cal challenge to the country’s territorial integrity.  
4.2. Georgia and Separatist Conflicts – 1999–2003 Dynamics  
Since 1999, the situation in both conflict zones – in Abkhazia and in South 
Ossetia – has clearly deteriorated. In addition to the regular outbreaks of 
armed clashes between various groups in the conflict zones, there have been 
growing Russian/Georgian tensions: Russia accusing Georgia of harbouring 
terrorists, and Georgia accusing Russia of openly supporting separatist re-
gimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and undermining the territorial integ-
rity and security of Georgia.    
On 11 July 2000 Georgia and Abkhazia signed a protocol outlining 
measures to prevent new destabilization in southern Abkhazia. It was the 
fourth of that sort, the previous ones being signed in summer 1997, spring 
1998 and in January 2000. In all these documents, the parties agreed to re-
frain from the use of force for resolution of the conflict, to reduce the num-
ber of police and troops deployed by each side in the conflict region and to 
cooperate in fight against cross-border smuggling and crime.256   
                                                 
254 Carolyn Ekedahl, and Melvin A. Goodman, The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze, London: 
Hurst & Company, 1997, p.264. 
255 http://www.rferl.org/reports/caucasus-report/2006/03/8-030306.asp. 
256 RFE/RL Newsline, 12 July 2000.  
Words and Deeds: Russian Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Separatist Conflicts 
 
69 
This protocol did not, however, prevent hostilities from breaking out 
again in April 2001. When the Abkhaz security forces detained three Geor-
gian guerrillas in the Gali region, Georgians responded by kidnapping five 
Abkhazian soldiers, and the tensions rose again. It also seemed that the 
chances for finding a political solution to the conflict remained rather bleak. 
The Abkhaz president Ardzinba objected to the formulation that defined 
Abkhazia as an integral part of Georgia. He decided to reject the draft docu-
ment prepared by the UN special envoy for Abkhazia, Dieter Boden, on the 
division of responsibilities and powers between the central Georgian authori-
ties in Tbilisi and the Abkhaz government in Sukhumi within the framework 
of a federal Georgian state.257  
Fears that the conflict could escalate materialized in August–October 
2001. The fighting resumed between Abkhaz forces and armed irregulars, 
including a group of Chechen fighters (probably led by Ruslan Gelaev), in-
filtrating the region from the Georgian side (probably with the consent of the 
Georgian authorities).258Although the forces engaged in these renewed fight-
ing were later withdrawn – or rather were forced to withdraw in the face of 
stiff opposition from the Abkhaz units – the operation was seen as Georgia 
attempting to solve the Abkhaz question in a violent manner, and as a possi-
ble preparation for the next war with Abkhazia.259  
Again the Georgian authorities decided to play a political card: President 
Shevardnadze renewed his offer to Abkhazia, stating that the area would be 
given maximum autonomy within the borders of the Georgian state.260 This 
offer was promptly rejected when Abkhaz Foreign Minister, Sergei Shamba, 
said that accepting would mean violating the constitution of his republic, 
according to which Abkhazia was an independent country, and that relations 
with Georgia could be developed only as inter-state relations.261 On the other 
hand, Abkhazia would be willing to join Russia as an ‘associated state’, re-
taining its formal independence but becoming a part of the Russian eco-
nomic and legal space.262 
While fighting was still going on in the Kodori Valley, on 11 October 
2001 the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution calling for the with-
drawal of CIS peacekeeping forces from the region. Not until 17 January 
2002 was agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Georgian troops from 
the Kodori Valley; and on 31 January 2002, the Georgian authorities, despite 
their warnings from October 2001, agreed to extend the mandate of the CIS 
peacekeeping forces until the end of June 2002.  
In the meantime, the Abkhaz leadership rejected a new UN-drafted pro-
posal on the settlement of the conflict, presented by Shevardnadze as an ‘his-
torical compromise’. The document proposed that Abkhazia should ac-
knowledge that it was a constituent part of Georgia, recognize Georgia’s ter-
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ritorial integrity by recognizing its current borders, and allow the return of 
Georgian displaced persons to Abkhazia. In return, Georgia was to allow 
Abkhazia to preserve its constitution and state bodies for an unspecified pe-
riod of time. Also this proposal was turned down by the Abkhaz leadership, 
on the grounds that the country’s constitution defined the Republic of 
Abkhazia as an independent state, and that Abkhazia was not interested in 
becoming a part of a larger state.263  
Notwithstanding these solemn statements of principle on  independence, 
the Abkhaz authorities decided to ask Russia officially to grant Abkhazia 
special status as an ‘associated member’ of the Russian Federation. In their 
opinion, such a solution – which would mean closer political, economic and 
social ties with Russia – would not contradict the constitution: Abkhazia 
would formally remain a subject of international law and an independent 
country.264 One reason for this call for greater rapprochement between 
Abkhazia and Russia was the changing situation in the region, and especially 
what was seen as growing interest of the United States, as shown by the in-
creasing US military presence.265  
In March 2003 a Russian–Georgian agreement on solving the conflict in 
Abkhazia was reached in Sochi, after talks conducted by Vladimir Putin and 
Eduard Shevardnadze. The most important points in this agreement were as 
follows: Georgians who had been displaced following the conflict in 
Abkhazia in 1992–1993 were to return to their abandoned homes, first in 
Abkhazia’s southernmost Gali district and then elsewhere in the region; rail 
communications were to be re-established between Sochi and Tbilisi via 
Abkhazia; to protect the returning Georgians, a Georgian–Abkhaz–Russian 
police force was to be deployed in Gali, and the region was to have a similar 
multinational local administration. Further, the CIS/Russian peacekeeping 
force in the Abkhaz conflict zone was to remain until either the Georgian or 
the Abkhaz government should request its withdrawal, whereupon the 
peacekeepers’ duties were to be devolved to the multinational police force; 
and the Inguri Hydroelectric Power Station in Abkhazia was to be repaired 
in order to provide Abkhazia, western Georgia, and parts of southern Russia 
with electricity.266 
This Sochi Agreement proved to be but one of many, mostly futile, at-
tempts at finding a lasting solution to the conflict. In 2002 a similar plan was 
presented by the Adjar leader Aslan Abashidze, who was at that time 
Shevardnadze’s special envoy for the Abkhaz conflict. Only weeks before 
the Sochi Agreement was signed, another proposal had been presented dur-
ing a brain-storming session organized in Geneva by the five member states 
of the Friends of the UN Secretary General group – France, Germany, Great 
Britain, the United States and Russia. They proposed that three bodies be 
created – to focus on economic problems, the repatriation of displaced per-
sons, and political issues – as a step in the process of solving of the con-
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flict.267 All these proposals were rejected by the Abkhaz side, which also 
refused to take part in the talks on conflict resolution scheduled to take place 
under the UN aegis on 23 September 2003 in Tbilisi.268 
As to the dynamics in South Ossetia was concerned, the situation deterio-
rated for many reasons: political processes in South Ossetia itself, the policy 
of the Georgian leadership who attempted to destabilize the situation by us-
ing military force, and the policy of Russia, which, in the opinion of many 
observers, did not always behaved like an impartial actor but sided with 
South Ossetia. In December 2001, in the second round of presidential elec-
tions not recognized by Georgia or by the European institutions and boy-
cotted by the Georgian population of the region, Eduard Kokoev (Kokoity) 
was elected as the second president of the breakaway republic. In May 2002 
the South Ossetian authorities sought closer cooperation with Russia and 
Abkhazia as a way of dealing with what was seen as increased pressure from 
Georgia.269 In July 2002, South Ossetia warned Georgia that it would shoot 
down any Georgian aircraft violating its airspace.270 September 2002 saw 
many rumours that the South Ossetian authorities had decided to mobilize 
some local units to protect South Ossetia and Russia against ‘bands of inter-
national terrorists’ and Chechen separatists gathering in the border areas, 
seeking to infiltrate into South Ossetia.271 Then, in October 2002, President 
Shevardnadze ordered the Georgian Ministry of Interior to implement meas-
ures to combat organized crime on the territory of South Ossetia, to which 
the South Ossetian side reacted rather nervously, seeing this move as an at-
tempt to change the situation in the conflict zone.272 
On 1 July 2003 President Kokoity decided to dismiss several key political 
figures, among them the ministers of defence and of justice, heads of the 
country’s Security Council, Security Committee and of its custom service.273 
Only three days later, he openly expressed will to join the Russian Federa-
tion, saying that this decision was based on the results of the 1992 referen-
dum on that issue conducted in South Ossetia.274  In August 2003, the politi-
cal crisis in South Ossetia deepened further, and the president dismissed the 
whole government.275 In November 2003, in connection with destabilization 
of the political situation in Georgia proper, where President Shevardnadze 
was forced by the ‘Rose Revolution’to leave his post, the authorities of 
South Ossetia declared a state of emergency in the region. A similar step was 
taken by the authorities in another separatist state on the territory of Georgia, 
Abkhazia.276  
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It was clear that what had been taking place in Georgia would have great 
consequences for the future of relations between the separatist republics and 
Georgian central authorities. The events of November 2003 in Georgia 
marked an important watershed in many respects: new elites were ready to 
take over power, and these elites professed an integrationist approach to the 
West. Their outlook on the world and their views on the future of Georgia 
and its relations with the separatist regions, with Russia and with other local 
and global centres of power, were to change the political and the ideological 
framework for work on finding a solution to the country’s problems. 
4.2.1. OSCE and conflicts in Georgia 2000–2003  
The OSCE addressed the issue of the solution of the separatist conflicts in 
Georgia also in its official documents from the five meetings of the Ministe-
rial Council that have taken place since the 1999 Istanbul Summit. In its of-
ficial statement from the 2000 Vienna Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 
the OSCE Chairperson welcomed the increasing cooperation between Geor-
gia and the OSCE and again expressed the full support of the organization 
for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Also activities of the 
newly established monitoring operation on the Russian Georgian border 
were described as a success. On the other hand, the OSCE expressed concern 
with regard to the introduction of visa regime for Georgian citizens by Rus-
sia. The OSCE reconfirmed the UN’s leading role in Abkhazia, welcomed 
progress made within the ‘Geneva Process’ and reiterated its highly critical 
statement on ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia. Also the successful completion 
of the Joint Assessment Mission to Gali district in November 2000 and Rus-
sia’s support for its activities were lauded. As to the situation in South Os-
setia, the OSCE welcomed ‘the successful meeting of experts from the re-
gion within the framework of the Georgian–South Ossetian conflict settle-
ment process’ held in Baden (Vienna) between 10 and 13 July 2000. At this 
meeting status-related questions were discussed in a constructive manner, 
and for the first time. The OSCE urged Russia and Georgia to sign an eco-
nomic rehabilitation agreement for the area affected by the conflict, encour-
aged ‘the establishment of a legal framework for refugees’ and displaced 
persons’ housing and property restitution’ and expressed concern with regard 
to the criminality in the region ‘caused by the destabilizing accumulation of 
small weapons’.  The organization also noted progress in reducing Russian 
military equipment in Georgia and expressed hopes that Russia would to 
fulfil its Istanbul commitments in the area by completing the planned reduc-
tions by 31 December 2000 and withdrawing from Tbilisi/Vaziani and Gu-
dauta military bases by 1 July 2001. 277 
At the 2001 Bucharest Meeting of the Ministerial Council, the OSCE re-
affirmed its stance on the issue of separatist conflicts in Georgia and ex-
pressed its commitment to supporting the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Georgia. The organization welcomed developments in 
the peace process in South Ossetia, expressed appreciation for the efforts of 
various countries and bodies – including the European Commission and 
Russia – in the work on finding solutions to such problems as the issue of 
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small and light weapons in the region, or the schedule for the work of the 
Joint Control Commission and of experts. Also the financial support of the 
EU and the signing of the Georgian–Russian Agreement on economic reha-
bilitation were welcomed.  With regard to the situation in Abkhazia, the 
OSCE again confirmed the UN’s leading role in this process and the impor-
tance of the Geneva Process. The organization condemned the shooting 
down of the UNOMIG helicopter on 11 October 2001, urged the honest ful-
filment of all agreements, called ‘for the resumption of a constructive dia-
logue aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement, including defining the 
political status of Abkhazia as a sovereign entity within the state of Georgia’ 
and again expressed concern for human rights in Abkhazia.  The work of the 
OSCE Border Monitoring Operation was also acknowledged, and the closure 
of the Russian base at Vaziani and the withdrawal of equipment from the 
Russian base at Gudauta were described as important steps towards the im-
plementation of the 1999 Istanbul commitments.  At the same time, the 
OSCE called for resumption of Russian–Georgian negotiations on final clo-
sure of the base in Gudauta and legal transfer of its infrastructure, and ex-
pressed hope that the parties could reach agreement on the duration and mo-
dalities of the functioning of the remaining Russian military facilities in 
Georgia. The OSCE also welcomed the ‘the aspiration to good neighbourly 
relations and development of cooperation that was manifested at the meeting 
between the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and the President of Geor-
gia, Eduard Shevardnadze, on 30 November 2001, as well as the agreement 
to establish a joint commission to investigate the reported cases of bom-
bardments in the border areas of the territory of Georgia’.278  
At the 2002 meeting of the Ministerial Council in Porto, the OSCE had to 
‘state with regret that in recent months the positive dynamics of the peaceful 
process in the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia have been considerably dis-
turbed’. This forced the OSCE to ‘encourage the sides to promote dialogue 
and increase efforts at all levels to facilitate political negotiations and the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)’and to support 
‘the efforts of the Joint Control Commission on stabilization of the situa-
tion’. The OSCE saw also a greater role for the EU as a financial supporter 
of the negotiation process and provider of funding for ‘economic rehabilita-
tion, which is imperative in achieving progress towards a full scale settle-
ment’.  The OSCE commended the establishment of the Special Co-
ordination Centre on interaction between law enforcement bodies of the par-
ties, and the activities of the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) Command 
and the OSCE Rapid Reaction Programme addressing the basic needs of 
Georgian and Ossetian communities in exchange for arms and munitions 
voluntarily handed over to the JPKF. The organization also looked forward 
to further progress in work on defining the political status of the Tskhinvali 
region/South Ossetia within the State of Georgia.  
With regard to the situation in Abkhazia, the OSCE again reconfirmed 
the leading role of the UN in the work on settling this conflict. It noted with 
regret that ‘no substantial progress has been noted in overcoming the pre-
carious stalemate that remains on the core issue of the Georgian Abkhazian 
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conflict – the future status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia’, and 
called upon the parties to resume constructive dialogue and accept the 
document on the distribution of constitutional competencies between Tbilisi 
and Sukhumi that had been elaborated under UN auspices as the basis for 
future negotiations. In addition the OSCE welcomed the results of the joint 
UNOMIG-CISPKF patrolling of the Kodori Gorge, which had  helped to 
reduce tension and enhance stability in the region. The OSCE supported the 
UN efforts to open a branch office in the Gali District, the existing UN Hu-
man Rights Office in Sukhumi and ‘the desire of the parties to complete ne-
gotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the 
Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military 
facilities within the territory of Georgia’. Finally, the OSCE acknowledged 
‘the significant contribution to stability and confidence in the region made 
by the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation’.279  
4.3. The 2003 Watershed and Separatist Conflicts  
In November 2003, Shevardnadze was forced to leave; and his successor, 
Mikheil Saakashvili, was formally elected the country’s new president with 
overwhelming support in January 2004. These two events heralded the open-
ing of a new chapter not only in the recent history of Georgia and the post-
Soviet space, but also in the history of Georgia’s relations with Russia and 
Georgia’s attempts at solving the separatist problems that had haunted the 
country since it regained independence in 1991.  
In his recent study on Georgia, Dov Lynch identifies the main features of 
Saakashvili’s strategy of dealing with the separatist challenge in Georgia as a 
strategy based on ‘one premise and four policy lines’.280 The premise was 
that the existing status quo could not be accepted. The four policy lines were 
as follows: (1) the new president ‘sought to ensure greater coordination of 
policy in Tbilisi’; (2) he decided to strengthen the military component of the 
policy; (3) the new elite decided to make a differentiation between the sepa-
ratist authorities in the regions in question and their population, and to ap-
peal to the people by presenting future reunification with Georgia as benefi-
cial from an economic perspective; (4) the new Georgian authorities deter-
mined to give a greater say in solving these conflicts to other international 
actors, thereby further internationalizing the conflicts and turning them into a 
topic of multilateral policy involving a wide range of actors, and not an issue 
to be settled by means of a bilateral Russian–Georgian track. The new Geor-
gian authorities also decided that solving what was seen as a lesser chal-
lenge, the conflict in South Ossetia, should be prioritized, as this might also 
pave the way for a solution in Abkhazia. 
However, this new strategy encountered rather stiff opposition from those 
who were to be removed from power. Both the South Ossetian and the 
Abkhaz authorities were prepared to meet this new political and military 
challenge. They decided to take special measures when the political crisis in 
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Georgia climaxed in November 2003 with the ousting of Shevardnadze. In 
January 2004, the South Ossetian authorities warned that Georgia was mak-
ing preparations for a military solution of the conflict,281 while the Abkhaz 
authorities, fearing that launching of an offensive against the separatist re-
publics could be used to consolidate the newly won political power, rushed 
to propose signing of a treaty on peace and the non-resumption of hostilities 
with Georgia.282  
In May 2004, the Georgian authorities managed to get rid of Aslan Aba-
shidze, a regional leader who for many years had been challenging central 
authorities in Tbilisi in Adjaria and whose ouster could not be prevented by 
Moscow support. This success made other regional rebels nervous, with 
many wondering who was to be the next to follow in Abashidze’s foot-
steps.283 In May 2004, Georgia strengthened its military presence in the con-
flict zone in South Ossetia by sending in more troops to the region.284 Al-
though this move was interpreted by the South Ossetian side as preparation 
for a full-scale military operation against the non-recognized republic, both 
sides managed to reach agreement on easing of tensions in the region.285 
This agreement survived, however, for only a few months. A new armed 
confrontation – the gravest in the recent phase of the conflict – took place in 
July and August 2004, when new clashes erupted between the Georgian and 
Ossetian troops in the region.286 The conflict escalated even further when 
some unidentified troops (representing what was later described as ‘third 
force’) launched attacks on Georgian troops in the conflict zone.287 After 
many days of fire exchange in which 24 Georgian soldiers were killed and 
50 wounded, both sides managed to agree to a ceasefire and the withdrawal 
of all troops from the conflict area.288 In the wake of this new wave of hos-
tilities in South Ossetia, the Georgian president declared that his country was 
on the brink of war with Russia, pointing out that Moscow’s policy towards 
the conflict in South Ossetia and its open support for the separatists were the 
main causes of the new crisis in bilateral relations.289  
In Abkhazia the new Georgian leadership proposed a new peace plan ac-
cording to which a federal state made up of two units – Georgia and 
Abkhazia – was to be created, with Abkhazia granted all the rights of a sov-
ereign state except for the right to internationally recognized independence. 
This peace plan envisaged also the signing of agreements on the non-
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resumption of hostilities and on resolving future disagreements exclusively 
by peaceful means, through negotiations.290 
In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 21 September 2004, Mi-
kheil Saakashvili presented a new peace plan and a road map for resolving 
the conflicts with the breakaway regions. This three-stage plan for a peace-
ful, non-violent solution to the problems in relations between Tbilisi on the 
one hand, and Sukhumi and Tskhinvali on the other, proposed the introduc-
tion of a set of confidence-building measures, including demilitarization of 
the conflict zones and the deployment of impartial UN observers along the 
border between Abkhazia and Russia, and the granting of the fullest and 
broadest form of autonomy to both regions. This plan was, however, almost 
immediately rejected by both separatist republics. Abkhaz presidential aide 
Astamur Tania repeated that Abkhazia was an independent state and would 
not accept any plan that offered less than that, while foreign minister of the 
Republic of South Ossetia, Murat Djioev, declared that South Ossetia ‘will 
under no circumstances become part of a Georgian state’.291 
The rejection of the Georgian peace plan by the separatist leaders appar-
ently frustrated Saakashvili. In 2005 he seemed still to believe that the best 
solution would be to get Abkhazia and South Ossetia to rejoin Georgia by 
offering them economic benefits and by making them understand that ‘there 
is no point in holding out in the hope of eventual international recognition of 
their proclaimed but unrecognized independence, and voluntarily agree to 
autonomy or federal status within Georgia’.292 However, he did not com-
pletely rule out the possibility of a military solution to the conflict when, in 
January 2005, he declared that the international community would not con-
demn the use of military force if the South Ossetian leaders continued to re-
ject all offers of political compromise.293 In July 2005, at an international 
conference in Batumi, to which representatives of South Ossetia and Russia 
had been invited but did not attend, Saakashvili renewed his offer to South 
Ossetia. However, some of his other moves and statements – like the ap-
pointment of the more hawkish Irakli Okruashvili as defence minister in 
2004 or his remarks from January 2005 – could indicate that he might con-
sider a military action to put an end to the South Ossetian secession.294  
With respect to the situation in Abkhazia, there were some signs of rap-
prochement between Georgia and Abkhazia when their delegations dis-
cussed practical issues connected with stabilizing the situation in the region 
and implementing confidence-building measures in August 2005. However, 
it seemed that also the new Abkhaz leadership (elected after several rounds 
of elections in which Russia failed to insert its candidate and had to agree to 
a compromise solution) was not willing to grant to Georgia any concessions 
concerning Abkhaz independence. When asked to comment on the best solu-
tion to the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia, newly elected Abkhaz 
president Sergei Bagapsh replied:  ‘two neighbour states – Georgia and 
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Abkhazia’, and cited the Czech and Slovak example to underline that such a 
solution could be possible and accepted by the international community.295 
In September 2005 a series of events exacerbated tensions between South 
Ossetia and Georgia. First, on 18 September South Ossetia and North Os-
setia signed an agreement on ‘peace, neighbourhood and cooperation’. 
Commenting on that, the South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity stated that 
he saw the future of South Ossetia in union with North Ossetia and within 
the Russian Federation. Then, on 19 September, several official guests from 
Abkhazia, Russia, Transdniester and Nagorno Karabakh arrived in Tskhin-
vali to take part in 15th anniversary celebrations of South Ossetian inde-
pendence, and an agreement on economic and humanitarian cooperation was 
signed by Abkhaz and South Ossetian presidents. The day after, South Os-
setia celebrated the 15th anniversary of its non-recognized independence. On 
that occasion a military parade was organized in Tskhinkvali, with Russian 
military equipment put on display. On that very same day, Tskhinkvali was 
shelled – presumably by Georgians – and 11 persons were injured. The next 
day saw a similar attack directed against two Georgian villages in the region, 
this time from the South Ossetian side. The signing of an agreement with 
North Ossetia, the celebration of South Ossetian independence, the participa-
tion of the Russian delegation in this event and the shelling of Tskhinkvali 
and Georgian villages were all seen by the Georgian authorities as acts of 
provocation and as confirmation of Russia’s double role in the conflict. Es-
pecially the Russian presence in Tskhinvali and the failure of the Russian 
peacekeepers to prevent attacks were noted by the Georgian side. The 
Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, Nino Burdzjanadze, accused Russia of 
playing contradictory roles and said that ‘Russia has to make a choice – it 
can be either a peacekeeper and a civilized state or a state that supports sepa-
ratism and terrorism’. She also called on the Georgian Parliament to recon-
sider Russia’s role in the conflict zones and ask for withdrawal of Russian 
peacekeepers from their areas of dislocation on the territory of Georgia.296 
On 11 October 2005 the Georgian Parliament approved a resolution set-
ting a deadline of 10 February 2006 for the Russian peacekeepers to show 
that what they were doing was in compliance with their mandate. It stipu-
lated that Georgia would demand they be replaced by an international peace-
keeping force if they could not demonstrate their ability to act in a proper 
way by that deadline.297 On 15 February 2006, the Georgian Parliament, ap-
parently not satisfied with the performance of the Russian contingent, voted 
unanimously in favour of a motion on the withdrawal of the Russian peace-
keeping force from the conflict zone in South Ossetia and on the abjuring of 
the June 1992 Dagomys Agreement, which had provided the formal frame-
work for deployment of this peacekeeping force. The reasons for these dras-
tic moves were described as the extremely ‘negative performance’ of these 
troops and Russia’s permanent ‘attempt to annex South Ossetia’.298 Such 
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accusations against Russia were not the first ones. Both former president of 
Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze,299 and the incumbent president, Mikheil Sa-
akashvili,300 have many times accused Russia of playing a dirty game and of 
having a hidden agenda in Georgia. In order to judge to what extent these 
serious accusations are right or wrong, we need to examine the role played 
by Russia in the work on trying to settle these conflicts. This is the main sub-
ject of the next subchapter. 
4.3.1. The OSCE and conflicts in Georgia 2003–2005  
The OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Maastricht in 2003 also paid some 
attention to developments in Georgia. Most of the ministers taking part in 
this meeting welcomed the peaceful solution of the recent political crisis in 
Georgia, the ‘Rose Revolution’ – and expressed the opinion that this devel-
opment would contribute to peace and stability throughout the region. How-
ever, in their opinion, the peace process in South Ossetia remained without 
tangible progress, so they called upon all parties to intensify their work to-
wards a peace settlement and to continue efforts at confidence building and 
implementation of programmes to facilitate the return of refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons. The security situation in Abkhazia – especially in 
the Gali region – was described as fragile. The ministers declared that they 
were prepared to ‘actively support efforts to promote respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and to help promote an agreement on the 
return of refugees and IDPs’, and called ‘upon the parties to resume con-
structive dialogue on the basis of the document on the distribution of consti-
tutional competencies between Sukhumi and Tbilisi that has been elaborated 
under United Nations auspices.’ Most participants also expressed regret that 
‘no agreement could be reached on inclusion into the Ministerial Declaration 
of agreed language concerning the complete fulfilment of the Istanbul 
Commitments’.301  
In 2004, the OSCE Ministerial Council met in Sofia. On this occasion, 
most ministers expressed appreciation for OSCE efforts to defuse tensions in 
the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and welcomed the recent meeting of the 
parties’ high-level representatives in Sochi. In their opinion, ‘the agreement 
on a phased demilitarization of the region, to be carried under the active 
monitoring by the Joint Peacekeeping Force and the OSCE Mission in Geor-
gia, should be conducive to re-establishing confidence.’ They also expressed 
hope that ‘the agreement of the Joint Control Commission to conduct a high 
level meeting, with the assistance of the international community, will give a 
new impetus to a lasting peaceful resolution of this conflict in Georgia.’  As 
to the situation in Abkhazia, the ministers recommended ‘further cooperation 
between the OSCE and the United Nations on the UN-led conflict settlement 
process on Abkhazia’.302  
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The Thirteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council of the OSCE, held in 
December 2005 in Ljubljana, adopted a special statement on Georgia. The 
meeting once again expressed support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, for the ongoing democratic reforms in the country and for ef-
forts at peaceful settlement of the conflicts. While welcoming ‘the initiatives 
taken towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Tskhinvali re-
gion/South Ossetia, Georgia’, the meeting also expressed regret that ‘the 
positive dynamics of the peace process have been disrupted by violent ac-
tions’ in recent months, and called ‘for full implementation of agreed meas-
ures for stabilization of the situation in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia 
in Georgia, in particular the early and complete demilitarization of the zone 
of conflict’. Participants welcomed the steps taken by the Georgian side, in 
particular the Peace Plan based upon the initiatives of the President of Geor-
gia presented at the 59th UN General Assembly, to serve as a basis for 
peaceful settlement of the conflict. The meeting encouraged the leaders of 
Georgia and South Ossetia to meet in order to intensify the peace process, 
and pledged further support of the OSCE in that process. The OSCE ex-
pressed satisfaction with the quadrilateral cooperation (the OSCE, EU, 
UNHCR and UNDP) in the framework of the rehabilitation programme in 
the zone of conflict funded by the European Commission, aimed at creating 
the necessary conditions for the return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons. In its special statement on Georgia, the OSCE also reconfirmed the 
particular role to be played by the UN in settling the conflict in Abkhazia, 
and the will to increase its own activities in ‘in the human and economic and 
environmental dimensions’. The OSCE regretted that a joint UN OSCE hu-
man rights office in Gali district could not be opened, as this would, in the 
opinion of the meeting, ‘contribute to the improvement of the human rights 
situation in the region and thus promote the creation of conditions for the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons in safety and dignity’. 
The OSCE voiced support for deployment of the UN civilian police compo-
nent in Gali district and called on the Abkhaz side to allow it.  
The meeting also welcomed the Joint Statement issued by the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Georgia on 30 May 2005 in 
Moscow, and the results of the negotiations on the time-frame, mode of 
functioning and withdrawal of Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhal-
kalaki and Russian military facilities on the territory of Georgia. Hope was 
also expressed that further progress in the ongoing negotiation process could 
enable a multinational mission to Gudauta.303 
4.4. Russia’s Role in the Conflict Solution: Words and Deeds  
The report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Georgia and 
Abkhazia, issued on 16 March 2006, concluded that ‘without serious efforts 
to also address the core political issues of the conflict, prospects for a sus-
tainable solution to the conflict will remain distant’.304  
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On the eve of the 31 January 2004 Security Council meeting, a Western 
diplomat from one a member state of the ‘Friends of the UN Secretary Gen-
eral for Abkhazia’ group stated that Georgian concerns over Russian activi-
ties in Abkhazia were valid. However, he admitted that publicly antagoniz-
ing Russia would not help to improve relations, because ‘You won’t find a 
resolution to the Abkhaz conflict when you have bad relations with Rus-
sia’.305 
Commenting on the situation in Abkhazia and the attempt at his life in 
2005, Abkhaz Prime Minister Alexander Ankvab revealed details of the 
country’s economic dependence on Russia: in recent years the budget ex-
isted solely on paper, and the republic could not have survived without sub-
sidies from Moscow.306 His statement clearly indicated that Russia had been 
playing not only a military-political but also an important economic role in 
the conflict zones as an actor directly supporting the separatist regimes.    
In 1991 Elizabeth Fuller described the prospects for solving the conflict 
in South Ossetia as rather dim – ‘the current situation is in effect a deadlock, 
with full-scale fighting prevented only by the presence of USSR MVD 
troops’.307 Fifteen years later, the situation would appear to be as compli-
cated and volatile as in 1991 – the sole difference is that USSR MVD troops 
have been replaced by Russian peacekeepers whose impartiality is ques-
tioned by the Georgian authorities, who want them replaced by a more im-
partial contingent.  
The Russian presence in the conflict zone – not only military and political 
– is therefore seen, and not only by the Georgian authorities, as a part of 
problem. Dov Lynch308 describes this role in the following way:  
First, one should note that the ‘independence’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
depends heavily on Russia (…). For here, it is enough to say that the Russian in-
tervention played a key role in the conflicts in the early 1990s and has been in-
strumental in consolidating the status quo since then – a status quo that has been 
vital for the survival of the separatist ‘states’. The Russian role in these conflicts 
has been complex, combining peacekeeping operations with various forms of 
support to the separatist regions.  
That these regions view Russia not as a neutral peacekeeper but as support-
ing them in the fight against the central authorities in Tbilisi is also proven 
by the quest of these two regions for even closer cooperation with Russia. 
This could include the creation of a common state, by acquiring the status of 
an ‘associate member of the Russian Federation’, as mooted by Abkhazia, or 
even joining the Russian Federation through unification with North Ossetia, 
which is the strategy adopted by the South Ossetian elites.309  
 Therefore, in order to understand what role Russia has been playing in 
the regional separatist conflicts in Georgia, we need to understand what  po-
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litical and strategic goals Russia has been pursuing in the region, Further, we 
need to see what role in the pursuit of these goals has been assigned to the 
Russian military and political presence in the conflict zones.  
Here we will focus on two aspects of Russian policy – declarations and 
statements on conflicts in Georgia and Russian–Georgian relations made by 
major Russian policy-makers; and Russia’s actions in the conflict zones, ac-
tions not necessarily in accordance with these solemn statements. In focus is 
therefore the gap between words and deeds in Russian policy towards the 
conflict zones in the post-1999 Istanbul period.  
Any discussion of the Russian approach to and possible involvement in 
the two separatist conflicts haunting Georgia has to be based on a realistic 
assessment of the actual influence of various Russian actors on the process 
of decision- and policy-making in Russia. We start by presenting the official 
Russian reading of Georgia at the point when Vladimir Putin was taking 
over presidential duties from his older predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. We exam-
ine statements on these conflicts made by the real arbiter of the Russian po-
litical scene, Vladimir Putin, and his institutional co-players in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Igor Ivanov and Sergei Lavrov), the Ministry of Defence 
(Sergei Ivanov), the Security Council and the Russian State Duma. The 
combined approach of this group of actors can be taken to represent Russia’s 
official position on these two conflicts. In turn, we may expect this official 
approach to be translated into political action by the state institutions tasked 
with implementing the country’s official policy. By analysing statements 
made by representatives of the official Russia and examining the actual 
deeds of the institutions which they head, we hope to reconstruct some pat-
terns in Russian action and identify the discrepancy between stated goals and 
actual actions in two important separatist conflicts.  
This in turn will probably reveal some more general patterns of Russian 
handling of the separatist conflicts in an area that is defined as crucial for 
Russian foreign and security policy, an area where Russia is forced, often 
against its will, to interact with Western and pan-European institutions that 
are interested in helping the parties involved settle their disagreements in 
line with the generally accepted European standards of conflict solution. 
The fact that Russia has to interact with Western and pan-European insti-
tutions causes some problems not only for Russia itself and the countries in 
question, but also for the institutions Russia is expected to cooperate with. If 
these problems are to be overcome a better understanding of Russia’s policy 
is needed, and this is not possible unless we examine specific policies to-
wards settling the separatist conflicts in Russia’s direct neighbourhood. Al-
though we are mainly interested in interpreting and understanding the policy 
choices of official Russia and the incumbent Russian regime, it is important 
to present Russian mainstream views as well as views from elsewhere along 
the Russian political spectrum and forces that may impact on long-term Rus-
sian policy. Only by studying the views and the actions of official Russia 
against this broader background will we be able to identify actual and poten-
tial challenges that Western and pan-European institutions may face when 
interacting with Russia in areas of separatist conflict. 
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Relations with Georgia and the Russian approach to the separatist con-
flicts in Georgia are a part of Russian policy towards the whole region. In his 
essay on the Caucasian track in Russian  foreign policy published in 2000 
Stanislav Cherniavskiy, the head of section in the Fourth CIS Department of 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlines the goals of the Russian 
Federation in the region as follows:310   
Russia’s priorities in the Caucasus are to bring about reliable stability and help 
our friendly neighbour advance toward democracy and economic progress. At 
the same time we are trying to approach relations with the three countries in a 
balanced manner while this, of course, does not rule out having more advanced 
relations in this or that area with those of them which are ready to reciprocate.     
Cherniavskiy describes the situation in the conflict areas of the region as an 
‘explosive situation of neither peace nor war’.311  He underlines Russia’s 
efforts to bring peace to the region by pointing at the diplomatic activity and 
Russian military presence as the most important instruments in helping the 
countries of the region to ‘defuse enmity and mistrust that arose between the 
Caucasian states during the period of their nascent independence’. In his 
view, the best way of addressing the problems in the region would be to ‘ex-
pand dialogue between the sides’, although he also sees a role for interna-
tional organizations and even for other countries with interests in that region 
– including countries from outside the region.  
Later in the text this Russian diplomat writes of Russia’s interests in the 
region. These interests could be divided into two groups – intraregional in-
terests and extra-regional interests. For the first group, the main goals are 
stabilizing the situation, settling conflicts and eliminating their conse-
quences, building good-neighbourly relations and equal partnerships, nor-
malizing economic ties, unblocking transport routes and protecting the le-
gitimate interests of Russian communities.312 As central areas of regional 
cooperation, he mentions joint efforts at combating terrorism as the most 
important task, noting that ‘eradication of terrorism and banditry in the Cau-
casus would do much for local security and stability.’313 
As to the extra-regional dimension, Cherniavskiy is clear: Russia’s main 
goal in the entire region is ‘preserving the existing balance of forces there, 
preventing the appearance along our southern border of military structures 
from states outside the region’.314 Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s closer coop-
eration with NATO is presented in the next paragraphs as the main challenge 
for Russia, and military-political pressure from NATO is seen as ‘leading to 
a change in the existing pattern of interests and balance of forces in the Cau-
casus’.315 Thus there should be no doubt that it was the increasing presence 
of NATO in the region that most worried Russian policy-makers.  
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Despite what was seen as NATO incursion in a region that Russia saw as 
an important strategic area, Russia was still willing to honour its bilateral 
and multilateral commitments in disarmament and adhere to the CFE-related 
decisions of the 1999 Istanbul Summit on withdrawal of military hardware 
and bases from Georgia. It promised that, by the end of reduction process, 
the number of Russian heavy equipment would not exceed 153 tanks, 241 
armoured infantry vehicles and 140 artillery systems.316     
From the Russian perspective the best way to address the regional prob-
lems was, however, not working together with outside actors, who were to 
be given a limited role in the region, but instead what had been defined al-
ready in 1996 as ‘the Caucasian Four’ – an intra-CIS group of leaders com-
prising the presidents of Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which 
was to discuss solving regional problems within the CIS framework. Also 
increased economic cooperation, especially trade between the countries of 
the region, was seen as a way of addressing regional security problems.  
An important area where Russia had a central role to play was the settle-
ment of regional conflicts between the separatist movements and central au-
thorities. Two such conflicts had to be settled in Georgia, and Russia’s role 
in the work on solving these conflicts has become an important part of the 
Russian–Georgian bilateral agenda. How, then, did Russia read the situation 
in these protracted conflicts in the beginning of the Putin era, and what role 
did Russia see for itself in the settlement of these conflicts?   
As far as Abkhazia was concerned, in 2000 Russian policy-makers felt 
that the most important tasks were to reopen bilateral talks, move toward 
full-scale settlement of the conflict and definition of the status of Abkhazia, 
continue work on the delimitation of powers between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, 
sign a protocol on the return of refugees to Gali region, and reach agreement 
on the end of hostilities and lasting peace. In the Russian view there were, 
however, important obstacles impeding a peaceful and lasting solution of the 
Abkhaz question. These were provocations by some unidentified groups of 
Abkhaz and Georgian militants and criminals who gathered in the area, lead-
ing to further aggravation of the situation; and Georgian preparations for a 
military solution of the conflict and its further internationalization under 
what was described as the ‘West’s patronage’.317 
The situation in the Georgia–Ossetia conflict was described in a more op-
timistic way, as being ‘quite satisfactory’, not least due to the fact that the 
Russian peacekeeping battalion had ‘been maintaining stability in the region 
for several years now’ and that, thanks to high-level Russian mediation, bit-
terness in relations between Tbilisi and Tskhinkvali had been removed.318 
However, the final settlement of the conflict would have to wait until Tbilisi 
showed goodwill in economic matters.  
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Another official Russian analysis of relations between Russia and Geor-
gia from 2003319 lists the major elements of this relationship as follows: the 
issue of terrorism; the problem of Georgia’s geopolitical choice; domestic 
economic, political and social problems in Georgia; the America factor; Rus-
sian interests in the region; the issue of Georgians living in Russia and Rus-
sians living in Georgia; and regulation of bilateral relations by signing the 
‘Big Treaty’. Also noted were the issue of regional cooperation, the settle-
ment of the separatist conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and finally 
the question of Russian military presence in Georgia. 
Especially this last issue has been discussed not only between Georgia 
and Russia, but within the European multilateral framework as well. Rus-
sia’s military presence in the region has become an important element of its 
regional strategy and its policy in the conflict zones. This presence may take 
various forms, from military bases to peacekeeping forces deployed in con-
flict zones.  
The original goal of the Russian military presence was presented rather 
frankly by the then Russian Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev during his 
visit to Tbilisi in February 1994. On this occasion, he announced that Russia 
would maintain four military bases in Georgia and that the main task of the 
Russian forces in the region – and there were to be 23, 000 Russian soldiers 
deployed in the region – was to protect the region against outside threat, a 
task consistent with the CIS collective security treaty.320 This military pres-
ence was to be regulated by a Treaty on Russian Military Bases in Georgia 
signed on 15 September 1995 between Georgia and Russia, in a situation 
when Georgia found itself forced to accept the Russian conditions in return 
for what was seen as somewhat dubious Russian help in the wake of Geor-
gia’s military defeats in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – defeats for which 
Russia itself was partly blamed. The agreement on Russian bases in Georgia 
has, however, never been ratified by the Georgian Parliament. In 1999, at the 
OSCE Istanbul Summit, Russia and Georgia signed a joint declaration on the 
future of Russian military bases on Georgian territory. Both parties agreed 
that the Russian side was to undertake to reduce, by no later than 31 Decem-
ber 2000, the levels of its TLE located within the territory of Georgia in such 
a way that they will not exceed 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery sys-
tems and no later than 31 December 2000 to withdraw (dispose of) the TLE 
located at the Russian military bases at Vaziani and Gudauta and at the re-
pair facilities in Tbilisi. In addition the Russian military bases at Gudauta 
and Vaziani were to be disbanded and withdrawn by 1 July 2001. The Geor-
gian side was ‘to grant to the Russian Side the right to basic temporary de-
ployment of its TLE at facilities of the Russian military bases at Batumi and 
Akhalkalaki’ and to ‘facilitate the creation of the conditions necessary for 
reducing and withdrawing the Russian forces’ with financial support for this 
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process provided by some OSCE states. In addition ‘during the year 2000 the 
two Sides’ were to ‘complete negotiations regarding the duration and mo-
dalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Ak-
halkalaki and the Russian military facilities within the territory of Geor-
gia’.321 
At the same time, Russian military presence in the conflict zones was 
regulated by a CIS agreement on CIS peacekeeping forces to be deployed in 
the conflict zone in Abkhazia and by the 1992 trilateral Russian–Georgian–
South Ossetian agreement on peacekeeping force.322 Both peacekeeping op-
erations were faced with some grave problems. In the case of Abkhazia the 
most important feature was that only one country, Russia, was involved, and 
this country bordered on the area of conflict.  This has made the position of 
Russian peacekeepers ‘extremely vulnerable and leaves ill wishers free to 
interpret any of their actions to benefit the opposing party and accuse them 
of violating neutrality’.323 As far as the peacekeeping operation in South Os-
setia was concerned, the problem there was the presence of contingents  
resenting the parties to the conflict. This situation was seen as violating the 
principles of peacekeeping, and yet ‘it has proven itself not only acceptable, 
but sufficiently effective under the concrete conditions’.324  
In 2003 Pavel Baev described the role of Russian troops deployed in the 
region as follows: ‘Russian troops, still deployed in the region, have de facto 
become guardians of continuing existence of several breakaway quasi-states 
(Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia)’.325 In his view, an important 
reason was that Russia had uncertain motivations for resolving the frozen 
disputes, as resolution would reduce the need for Russian military presence 
in the region and could thus be detrimental to its ability to exert influence in 
an area still seen as geopolitically important.  
This may also explain why Russia was not able, or willing, to meet the 
deadlines set in the 1999 Istanbul statement on Russian military bases in 
Georgia. It was not until 2005, after many discussions in bilateral and multi-
lateral forums, and after being put under pressure by its important coopera-
tion partners, that Russia agreed (on 30 May 2005) to withdraw the last of its 
troops from Georgia by no later than 31 December 2007.326  
Russia’s reluctance to live up to its obligations from 1999 may be ex-
plained in many ways. This reluctance is also a good example of the gap be-
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tween what is stated and what is done by Russia in its relations with Georgia 
and in its policy towards the separatist conflicts.  
To illustrate how extensive this gap between words and deeds is, and to 
see whether there is any closing of this gap, let us start by tracing the evolu-
tion of President Putin’s views on the separatist conflicts in Georgia. We can 
then compare these views with the actual actions of his subordinates respon-
sible for implementing Russian policy in the region.  
4.4.1. Russian official discourse and action  
The Abkhaz and South Ossetian understandings of Putin’s possible role in 
conflict solving were based on the idea that both territories are important for 
Russia, as their very existence may help Russia to pursue its goals and inter-
ests in the post-Soviet space. It was evident that this policy line, with its fo-
cus on the overlapping interests of Russia and the quasi-states established in 
the post-Soviet space, would be used as the main argument for closer coop-
eration by the leaders of these non-recognized state formations.  
Even when Putin was appointed ‘acting president’ by Yeltsin, the leaders 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia expressed immediate interest in meeting him 
and involving him in the process. In April 2000, Ludvig Chibirov, president 
of the non-recognized Republic of South Ossetia, said that he intended to 
seek a meeting with Putin and to ask him to intensify Russia’s efforts in 
finding a solution to the conflict.327   
The Abkhaz leadership welcomed the request made by Putin to extend 
the mandate of the Russian peacekeepers until 30 June 2000 – a decision 
which Putin described as being in keeping with the interests of Russia. This 
move was welcomed by Astamur Tania, aide to Abkhaz President Vladislav 
Ardzinba, who spoke of the CIS peacekeepers as the sole guarantors of 
peace and security in the region.328 
When Putin was elected president, both South Ossetian and Abkhaz lead-
ers rushed to congratulate him, as well as expressing hopes that he would 
step up Russia’s involvement in seeking a solution to the conflicts in which 
they were involved. Ardzinba’s aide, Astamur Tania, said that in his opinion 
Putin viewed Abkhazia as an important part of Russia’s sphere of strategic 
interests. Ludvig Chibirov of South Ossetia expressed hope that Putin’s vic-
tory at the polls would result in more Russian involvement in the efforts to 
find a working solution to the conflict in South Ossetia. 329 
But how has Putin himself read the separatist conflicts in Georgia? As far 
as the origins of the conflicts are concerned, he puts the blame on the Geor-
gian authorities, saying that ‘they [the conflicts] arose following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s, when Georgia, which had 
gained its independence, announced that it was abolishing the autonomous 
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status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This was the foolish decision that ig-
nited these interethnic conflicts.’330  
On another occasion Putin elaborated on the matter by saying: ‘The situa-
tion in South Ossetia is tense and is a cause of concern for us. I think it 
makes no sense to dispute the decisions that were taken with regard to South 
Ossetia because the documents exist and we have copies of the documents 
that abolish South Ossetia’s autonomous status. They were signed by Gam-
sakhurdia. We can make them available to the press. As for Abkhazia, the 
decisions were taken de facto, without any legal confirmation. But the latest 
statements by the leaders of Abkhazia will, I think, confirm what happened 
in reality. And do we even need statements? Life itself provides the confir-
mation. The fact that a war took place and caused numerous victims points 
to mistakes having been made.’ 331 
How does Putin view the solution to the conflicts in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia? Here his views have undergone a certain evolution, one that may 
reveal – or at least herald – a change in Russian policy as well. In 2003 he 
was asked a direct question on whether Abkhazia and South Ossetia could 
some day join Russia and become part of the Russian Federation: would it be 
worth taking Abkhazia and also South Ossetia into the Russian Federation 
and thus prevent a new war? Putin’s response was clear: We have stability, 
peace and harmony in our region and we want it to stay this way because 
these are very valuable things. He added that Russia itself had been facing a 
similar challenge:  
Only recently, ensuring our territorial integrity was one of our most acute prob-
lems and pressing priorities. I think you would agree that this task has been re-
solved, overall. [Then he went on to say that] Russia could not use double stan-
dards by fighting separatism at home and supporting it abroad, and that the coun-
try was to respect the principle of territorial integrity as recognized by the UN as 
well as its international commitments. But we cannot follow these principles by 
applying them only to ourselves and not giving this right to our neighbours. This 
is why the principle of territorial integrity is recognized by international law, and 
as a member of the United Nations, we will respect our international commit-
ments.332  
The settlement of the conflicts in question should be based on the concept of 
preserving Georgia’s sovereignty and ‘restoration of its territorial integrity’. 
On the other hand, Putin has frequently underlined a need to find a solution 
that ‘that is acceptable for all the parties involved in this conflict’,333 ‘with 
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the interests of all the peoples living on that territory taken into account’334 
and ‘in such a way as not to harm the interests of the people living in these 
regions’.335 
Without going into details, we may note that this focus on what he termed 
the ‘interests of the people living in these regions’ provided Putin with a 
convenient rhetorical phrase he could use in the later stages of the debate on 
the future of these territories, in a situation when the worsening relations 
between Georgia and Russia had made Russia more inclined to follow a 
tougher line towards the Georgian authorities. Before moving on the analysis 
of these new tones in Russian official debate on separatist conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space in general, and in Georgia in particular, we should look at 
Putin’s views on how these conflicts should be solved and what role he has 
envisaged for Russia in this. 
According to Putin ‘there are no military means’ to solve these conflicts, 
as military means ‘will only lead to a further worsening of the situation and a 
widening of the divide between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia’. In his 
view, ‘both sides must acknowledge each others’ lawful interests and find a 
compromise’.336 He described a similar solution as the sole viable option in 
South Ossetia as well. In 2004 he said: ‘There can only be one way out and 
that is to sit down at the negotiating table’. He added that two other things 
had to be done in order to find a viable solution – the parties have to ‘come 
to an agreement’ and they have to ‘have the political will to implement the 
agreements reached’.337At the same time Putin ruled out the use of economic 
and military pressure as a way of solving such conflicts. In responding to a 
journalist’s question on conflicts in the CIS area at the press conference at 
the 2004 Astana Summit of CIS leaders he said: ‘We believe that economic 
pressure, and even more so military pressure, will not solve the problem. In 
other words, this is not the road that will lead us to peace.’338 
As to Russia’s role in the settlement of these conflicts, Putin’s view has 
been that Russia must act as a mediator and guarantor of the agreements. 
‘Russia is ready to act as mediator in settling any of the complex issues that 
we have inherited the empire that was the Soviet Union.’339 In another pub-
lic statement he elaborated further:  
 Russia, like the other CIS countries, is ready to make what contribution it can 
to settling these conflicts and restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity. But we 
are not going to take on functions that it is not our role to have and we are not 
going to take sides. We want to see these conflicts settled in such a way that 
all the people living on this territory will accept the decision and come to an 
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agreement amongst themselves. We are only willing to play the part of inter-
mediary and guarantor of the agreements reached, the agreements that can be 
reached if good will is shown.340 
What were, according to Putin, reasons why Russia should engage in try-
ing to solve these conflicts? For one thing, Russia knew much better than 
anyone else ‘what was the whole complexity of these problems’ and had ‘a 
sincere interest in settling of these conflicts’, and that it wanted ‘the region 
to be a region of stability’. Putin also underlined that Russia ‘does not want 
and will not take responsibility for completely settling these conflicts’. What 
Russia wanted was ‘to play a constructive part’ by serving as mediator.341 
Since Russia – at least according to the above-quoted official statements 
– was not interested in being the sole actor in the work of conflict settlement 
it is important to see who else (in addition to Russia itself and the conflicting 
parties), the official Russia was wiling to accept as partners in that work. 
From Putin’s statements we note that he envisaged an important role for the 
CIS; that he accepted, at least in the early period of his presidency, a role for 
the USA: and that he made no mention of either the OSCE nor the UN or the 
EU in the context of regulating the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
It is not to say that Russia as such has not been willing to work together with 
these multilateral organizations in solving problems in Georgia – it simply 
means that President Putin has not bothered to mention these organizations 
in official statements on Abkhazia and South Ossetia available on his official 
website. In light of what has been said earlier on Russia’s preferences as to 
the format of the group to address regional issues in the Southern Caucasus, 
this silence concerning the UN and OSCE may not be totally incidental. For 
instance, when Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov was speak-
ing, at the UN forum, on separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet space and 
ways of dealing with them, he made it clear that he considered peace en-
forcement on the basis of Article 7 of the UN Charter an inappropriate ap-
proach for trying to resolve conflicts in CIS states. He here also referred to 
the conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, and the Transdniester.342 
As for Putin’s attitude to the US role in conflict solution, he addressed 
this issue in two statements from 2002 – a period of huge expectations for 
the future Russian–US strategic partnership. In the Joint Declaration on the 
New Strategic Relationship between the Russian Federation and the United 
States signed in Moscow on 24 May 2002,  the leaders of the two countries 
stated: ‘In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common 
interest in promoting the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all 
the nations of this region’ and that Russia and the United States would ‘co-
operate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia and Na-
gorno Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova’.343 The Joint 
Statement on Counterterrorism Cooperation signed by Presidents Putin and 
George W. Bush stated that ‘as members of the Friends of the UN Secretary- 
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General on Georgia, the Russia and United States remain committed to ad-
vancing a peaceful, political resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.’ They pledged to ‘work closely with all relevant parties to 
these conflicts to reduce military tensions, address civilians’ security con-
cerns, and foster a lasting political settlement that preserves Georgia’s terri-
torial integrity and protects the rights of all of those involved in the con-
flicts’.344 
These solemn declarations notwithstanding, cooperation on settlement of 
the separatist conflicts has since halted. The growing US presence in the 
Caucasus has been seen by most Russian policy-makers as a challenge to 
Russia’s interests and not as an opportunity to be used for jointly addressing 
regional problems. This US growing presence and role as a force supporting 
the ‘colour revolutions’ in the region, combined with the ascent to power of 
a new generation of politicians in Georgia, have had huge impact on bilateral 
relations between Russia and Georgia. This in turn has backfired on the 
prospects for settling these conflicts. Today neither Georgia nor Russia seem 
willing to base their dealings on a sober assessment of their mutual relation-
ship, but have instead gradually embarked on a policy of insulting and an-
noying each other.  
In June 2001 at his meeting with US journalists, Putin said that ‘we (Rus-
sia) have a difficult relationship with Georgia exclusively on issues relating 
to the fight against terrorism.’ To this he added: ‘this is essentially the only 
problem that we have in interstate relations’ and that Russia was ‘doing  
everything to preserve stability in Georgia’.345 He also offered some hints as 
to what was causing some of the tensions in bilateral relations by pointing at 
talks on withdrawal of Russian forces and bases from Georgia, while under-
lining that Russia has been providing ‘real support to Georgia in the eco-
nomic sphere’. In discussing bilateral relations with Georgia, Putin also 
touched on the human dimension: he noted that there were between 600,000 
and 700,000 Georgians living and working in Russia who every month were 
sending between 150 and 200 million US dollars back to Georgia, and that 
Russia was ‘creating conditions for these people’.346 
Two years later, when asked by a Georgian journalist what Georgia could 
do to ease tensions with Russia, Putin repeated his opinion, saying that 
‘Georgia must ensure that its territory is not used as a base from which to 
launch attacks against Russia. That is all we ask for.’347 At the same time 
Putin denied that there was a growing crisis and even conflict in bilateral 
relations between Russia and Georgia, conflict that could be related to sepa-
ratist conflicts in Georgia: ‘At regular intervals we hear that the conflict is 
taking on a bilateral Russian–Georgian character. Nothing of the sort is the 
case and it cannot be the case.’348 In Putin’s opinion the separatist conflicts 
had emerged due to the policy of the Georgian authorities in the beginning of 
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the country’s independence, when they decided to deprive South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia of their autonomous status; what was happening in 2004 was ‘a 
relapse of what happened at the beginning of the 1990s’.349 This was also 
one reasons why Putin decided to reject the idea of going to Tbilisi in order 
to settle the bilateral Russian–Georgian disputes because, as he himself put 
it, ‘this visit would not be appropriate in the current situation.’350  In that 
manner Putin indirectly accused the new Georgian leadership of re-igniting 
the interethnic conflicts and making Russia react by abstaining from direct 
contacts with the Georgian leadership.  
One month later Putin had the chance to discuss these issues with his 
Georgian counterpart at the CIS Summit in Astana. At the press conference 
held after the summit on 16 September, the two leaders exchanged views on 
Russia’s role in Abkhazia. The Georgian authorities had been infuriated by 
Russia’s decision to reopen railway connection between Moscow and Su-
khumi, a move that was seen as contradicting the 1996 CIS decision on eco-
nomic blockade of the breakaway region. What was even worse, as seen 
from the Georgian side, was the fact that Russian Railways was at that time 
one of Russia’s four-state run ‘natural monopolies’. The decision to reopen 
this railroad connection had to be taken at the highest political level. More-
over, high-ranking Russian officials took part in the celebrations marking the 
reopening. Georgia decided therefore to put this issue on the CIS agenda. 
And indeed, the CIS countries – including Russia – reaffirmed ‘their com-
mitment to refrain from undertaking unilateral actions directed against the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia’.351 
When Putin was asked what impact reopening the railway connection be-
tween Russia and Abkhazia could have on relations with Georgia, he appar-
ently became annoyed. He answered that he did not believe that any eco-
nomic blockade could help settle the conflict, and that ‘all previous deci-
sions, today’s decisions, and the 1996 decision, do not impose restrictions on 
the commercial activities of non-state organizations’.352 The Georgian presi-
dent reacted to this statement by saying that he was glad to hear that the Rus-
sian president reiterated that the CIS agreements were still in force, but he 
also added that the Georgian authorities were ‘really surprised by the pres-
ence of the chief of the state-run railroad organization, Mr. Fadeev, in Su-
khumi and the demonstration of the fact that the chief of the state-run or-
ganization participates in direct contacts with the separatists, as this was 
formally prohibited by the CIS agreements’.353 Thereupon the two presidents 
decided to continue this discussion in other surroundings and not at a joint 
press conference. The meeting between Saakashvili and Putin lasted for sev-
eral hours, and no official comments were given on the outcome of discus-
sion. This meeting also probably marked the end of a period of high expecta-
tions on the possibility of fruitful cooperation between the two leaders, who 
both represented the new generation of post-Soviet politicians. Their meet-
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ing in Astana was the fourth one at which they could discuss various issues 
affecting relations between their countries. The first meeting had been held 
only weeks after Saakashvili’s election – they met in Moscow for four hours 
on 11 February 2004. President Saakashvili said that ‘he extended the hand 
of friendship to Russia and that this hand was not ignored.’ Their second 
meeting took place on 3 July 2004 within the framework of an informal CIS 
meeting in Moscow, and the next one on 27 August 2004 in Kazan, where 
both presidents attended the CIS meeting of heads of states. It was at this 
meeting that Saakashvili told Putin that after the withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Georgia, the country would not allow any other foreign troops to 
be stationed on its territory – a stance from which he later retreated under 
what Russia interpreted as US pressure. As a result of this decision to with-
draw from his offer given to Putin, the latter made some acidic comments on 
leaders who ‘do not meet their commitments’.  The climate of cooperation 
between Georgia and Russia was negatively affected by this souring of rela-
tions between the two leaders. What happened in Astana – and more gener-
ally in relations between Georgia and Russia – was therefore caused not only 
by conflicting interests but also, to a certain extent, by poor personal chemis-
try between the two leaders.354 
That this was definitely the case is proven by Putin’s remarks on the abil-
ity of Georgian leaders to pursue their political goals and on their depend-
ence on the West. In August 2004 Putin described the main problem in rela-
tions between Georgia and Russia – and in work on settling the separatist 
conflicts – as the problem of reliability of the partners involved in this pro-
cess and their ability to coordinate their policies:  
If things are going to continue as they have been of late with a commission in-
cluding government officials reaching an agreement in the morning, only to be 
then disavowed by other government officials come evening, it will be impossi-
ble to get any work done and there will be no results at all. We very much hope 
that all the participants in this process will show political maturity and respon-
sibility, above all in the interests of their own peoples.355     
At Putin’s annual press conference in December 2004 a Georgian jour-
nalist asked Putin why Russia directly interfered in political processes in 
Abkhazia in connection with presidential elections there, and said that that 
this interference evoked ‘the anger of not only the Georgian leadership but 
also of the whole West’. Putin responded angrily by asking in return whether 
the link between Georgian leadership’s anger and that of the West was due 
to the fact that the Georgian leadership ‘gets its salary from Soros’. He 
warned Georgia that any ‘desire to use some levers of power to solve the 
problem’ would antagonize Russia.356  
Putin went even further when he addressed the issue of Georgian Russian 
relations at his annual press conference in January 2006. Replying to a ques-
tion on the reasons for the worsening relations between Georgia and Russia, 
the Russian president identified ‘the inability of individual politicians in 
Georgia to make a proper assessment of the situation in relations with Rus-
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sia’ as the main reason. He then accused the Georgian side of insulting Rus-
sia, warning that ‘such a policy towards Russia will not improve the situation 
of the Georgian public’ and that ‘the responsibility for this lies with the 
Georgian authorities’.357  
In May/June 2006 tensions in Georgian–Russian relations increased even 
further. Georgia accused Russia of boosting its military presence in the con-
flicts zones and Russian peacekeepers in the region of behaving in an illegal 
way. In turn, Russia accused Georgia of preparing for a military solution of 
the problems in South Ossetia.358 Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei 
Ivanov, specifically linked Russia’s military presence in Georgia with the 
process of implementation of the CFE Treaty.359 He said the presence of 
Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zone was the only factor preventing an 
outbreak of war, and that they would therefore ‘implement their mandate to 
the end, until all political agreements are in existence’.360 This was not the 
first time that Ivanov linked the situation in the conflict zones with the with-
drawal of Russian forces. In August 2002 he had announced that Russia 
would to withdraw military personnel and equipment from the Gudauta mili-
tary base in Abkhazia only if the Georgian leadership could manage to create 
the necessary security conditions. Commenting on protests by local residents 
who feared that Russian withdrawal could lead to a new Georgian attack on 
Abkhazia, Ivanov had said that Russia ‘will not leave over their bodies’ – 
meaning that their interests would be taken into account when preparing for 
the planned withdrawal.361 These remarks underlined the importance of the 
military component of Russia’s policy towards Georgia and the separatist 
conflicts on its territory.  
Russia has also other instruments it can use to pursue and achieve its 
goals in that region. Destabilizing the political situation in Georgia by sup-
porting the forces opposed to the current regime can be one such tool. The 
re-emergence in Moscow of Igor Gieorgadze (former top Georgian security 
official accused by Georgia of conspiring against the country’s elites and 
organizing attempts on the lives of Georgian leaders), and the talk of grant-
ing him political asylum in Russia has been widely interpreted as an attempt 
by Moscow to strengthen the anti-Saakashvili opposition in Georgia.362  
Moscow has also used economic instruments to influence the situation in 
Georgia and in conflict zones. Although the then Russian Minister of For-
eign Affairs Igor Ivanov said in 2002 that imposing economic sanctions on 
Georgia was not planned – because ‘sanctions are not a tool of Russian di-
plomacy’ and because they would primarily affect the population at large, 
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who ‘are not responsible for some of the actions of their leaders’363 – such 
sanctions were indeed introduced in 2006: the Russian authorities first 
warned364 and then banned the import of Georgian wine and mineral water 
to Russia.365 Also what happened to Russian energy supplies – gas and elec-
tricity – in January 2006, when two pipelines and the electricity line were 
blown up in a well-coordinated operation on Russian territory was widely 
interpreted as a warning to Georgia, a country almost totally dependent on 
energy supplies from Russia. Although it is still unclear who stood behind 
these actions, and Russia’s reputation as a reliable supplier of energy suf-
fered considerably in connection with this event, the action and the disrup-
tion of energy supplies sent shock waves through Georgia and  reminded the 
Georgian leadership of Russia’s dominant position in the region. This im-
pression was further strengthened when Georgia was forced to accept higher 
prices for Russian gas. This affects the Georgian economy and daily life of 
thousands of people, as well as making it more difficult for Saakashvili’s 
team to deliver in the economic arena, which has been an important element 
of the Georgian president’s strategy for dealing with the political, economic, 
social and separatist problems of his country.   
Putin and other Russian politicians have mentioned the Georgian dia-
spora living and working in Russia – and the importance of remittances sent 
by this diaspora to Georgia. This could offer a hint as to what Russia might 
do in order to harm the Georgian economy. Introducing a visa regime for 
Georgian citizens – but not for those living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia – 
could be interpreted as the use of legal means justified by the fight against 
international terrorism to limit the number of Georgians citizens allowed to 
stay and work in Russia. This in turn – especially in combination with other 
measures – could have a devastating impact on the Georgian economy.  
On the other hand, Russia seems to be giving direct and indirect support 
to the economies of the separatist regions in Georgia. It has opened its bor-
ders to products from these regions, has allowed Russian companies – also 
state-owned ones, like the railways – to operate in these regions, and has 
decided not to work together with the Georgian authorities in their fight 
against organized crime and shadow economy on the territory of the separa-
tist units. This seems to be the stated goal of Russian policy, at least if we 
are to believe Vladimir Putin, who already in 2004 stated, with respect to 
Abkhazia: ‘the territory is small, and so is the population, and they have a 
very vulnerable economy. We are prepared to be close and support the de-
velopment of that economy.’366 Further proof that Russia has been pursuing 
a double track in its economic policy was provided on 8 July 2005: the State 
Duma adopted a non-binding resolution calling on the cabinet of Prime Min-
ister Mikhail Fradkov to impose new and higher prices on Russian natural 
gas exported to the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, but ex-
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cluded from that policy the breakaway regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Transdniester.367  
Developing and maintaining good contacts with the leaders of the separa-
tist regions provides Russia with effective tools for influencing situation in 
the conflict zones, and indirectly in Georgia and throughout the region. 
Vladimir Putin has been asked many questions on Moscow’s official policy 
towards Russian officials’ contacts with these leaders. In 2004 he had to an-
swer a question on the visit to Abkhazia of an official Russian delegation in 
connection with the stalemate in the local presidential elections. Raul Kha-
djimba, the candidate supported by Moscow, was confronted by an ‘inde-
pendent’ Sergei Bagapsh, and both of them claimed victory. Putin answered 
by saying that he would not pretend ‘that they were there solely as private 
individuals. But all our actions were designed to settle the internal political 
conflict on that territory.’368 But, one might add, this was a conflict caused 
by direct interference in the political process in that unrecognized state: 
Moscow, having first given direct support to one of the candidates, was 
forced to accept his defeat and work together with his rival to find a solution 
to a political crisis brought about partly by its own policy.   
In 2006, at a joint press conference with Saakashvili, Putin was asked a 
direct question on whether Russia was not supporting separatism by receiv-
ing separatist leaders in Moscow as if they were the presidents of independ-
ent states. He replied: ‘I don’t think so, because Russia is one of the partici-
pants in the settlement process and how can we work towards a settlement if 
we can’t meet with the parties to the conflict?’369 
However, it seems that Putin was not completely frank on this. Only five 
months earlier he had issued a statement that could indicate a substantial 
shift in Russian policy towards separatist conflicts and preparation for the 
use of the most powerful – though dangerous and two-edged – tool of deal-
ing with the separatist challenge in the post-Soviet space: namely, recogni-
tion of the separatist regimes and their potential close cooperation with Rus-
sia in the future. At his annual press conference held in Moscow on 31 Janu-
ary 2006 Putin warned that Russia might reconsider its stance and policy 
towards the separatist conflicts in Georgia. This new Russian approach to 
solving the problems in Abkhazia and Georgia could be based on what Putin 
described as principles that ‘have to be universal’ and on ‘precedents (that) 
exist in international life’.370 What Putin was referring to was the discussion 
on the future status of Kosovo. In this connection he asked a question that 
was not solely theoretical: ‘If someone believes that Kosovo can be granted 
full state independence, then why should we refuse the same to the Abkhaz 
or the South Ossetians?’371 Although he immediately added that this did not 
mean ‘that Russia will also immediately recognize Abkhazia or South Os-
setia as independent states’, Putin underscored that such precedents exist and 
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that ‘we need commonly recognized, universal principles for resolving these 
problems’.372 
On the one hand, this approach was not completely new. Many Russian 
politicians, especially those representing more radical views, had already 
called for recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. How-
ever, it marked an important new tone in the official debate on the future of 
territories wanting separation from their respective states. Therefore, Putin’s 
statement probably signalled not only a shift in rhetoric, but also a shift in 
the way of handling these two conflicts. He made this statement even 
though, as one Russian analyst has put it, ‘To support foreign separatism 
means to throw stones at your neighbours while living in a glass house’.373    
Four months later, and a scant two weeks prior to the Georgian–Russian 
summit in St. Petersburg at which the two presidents were to discuss issues 
of importance for their bilateral relations, the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs followed on the path opened by Putin and issued an official state-
ment on the situation in the conflict zones. The statement sowed doubt about 
the Georgian authorities’ ability to control their own territory, and opened 
for recognition of South Ossetian independence based on the principle of 
self-determination rather than that of territorial integrity. The statement read: 
‘We respect and honour the principle of territorial integrity. As things stand, 
however, for Georgia this integrity is a possibility rather than a reality. South 
Ossetia’s position is based on the right to self-determination, another princi-
ple recognized by the international community’.374 Moreover, on the very 
same day another official MFA statement supported the principle of treating 
the will of the people as the ultimate source for political decisions: ‘The 
people’s will is the ultimate authority for whoever populates any given terri-
tory. At least, this is how international laws treat referendums.’ Surely, then, 
this must indicate a modification of Moscow’s approach to the question of 
post-Soviet separatism.375 
4.4.2 Russian alternative discourses and actions 
This approach is representative not only of the highest echelon of Moscow 
politics but also of the ‘average Russian’. That is proven by statements of 
members of the State Duma from various factions, and by the results of pub-
lic opinion polls mapping the views of the general public on these issues.  
When some Russian politicians were asked to present their opinions on 
the results of the meeting between Saakashvili and Putin held in St. Peters-
burg on 13 May 2006, many of them emphasized that Georgia’s claims on 
the separatist territories lacked historical legitimacy. Some, like Unity’s 
Gadzhimet Safaraliev (first deputy head of the State Duma Committee for 
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Local self-government) held that Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s inclusion 
in Georgia was the result of arbitrary decisions taken by the Soviet authori-
ties – including Stalin, who was of Georgian origin and who used his power 
to make Georgia greater – and that the will of the peoples in question should 
be decisive in solving these territorial disputes. Safaraliev added that Russia 
should not forget that some 80 per cent of the population of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia are Russian citizens; they have little in common with ethnic 
Georgians, whereas they have many ‘relatives’ in Russia.376  
Member of the State Duma Committee on Security, Aleksei Volkov of 
Unity, also stated that the will of the peoples in question should determine 
where they want to belong politically. According to Volkov, the position of 
South Ossetia, which could document the country’s belonging to Russia, was 
more legitimate than that of Georgia; moreover, he said, Russia should take 
into consideration that 90 per cent of those living in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia are ‘our Russian co-citizens’.377 Nikolai Ezerskii, representing the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the State Duma Security 
Committee, presented a different view. He maintained that the inclusion of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia should be treated as legitimate be-
cause it was based on the expressed will of these nations. He added that all 
the problems in relations between Russia and Georgia are caused by the fact 
the Georgia pursues not its own goals and policies, but those of the United 
States: ‘every positive step will be actively countered by a strong power that 
does not like the Georgian–Russian rapprochement.’378 Yurii Shararandin, 
head of the Committee for Constitutional Law of the Federation Council, 
commented on the MFA statement on Georgia: ‘the people of South Ossetia 
have the right to raise the question of self-determination’ – especially in a 
situation when similar problems have been solved in similar ways in the 
former Yugoslavia. Head of the Committee for CIS Affairs of the Federation 
Council, Vadim Gustov, was more reluctant when asked to comment on the 
MFA statement on Georgia. Everything was possible, he said, but one thing 
was the statement and another thing was that it would be impossible to real-
ize this policy, because ‘neighbours should have at least some feeling of tact’ 
when interacting one with one another.379       
What then of popular views on these conflicts? In March 2006, members 
of the general public were asked what Russia should do with respect to these 
conflicts. According to the results published by VTsIOM, 40 per cent of 
those surveyed believed that Russia should help South Ossetia, Abkhazia, 
Nagorno Karabakh and Transdniester to become independent states, 23 per 
cent agreed that peoples should have the right to self-determination, while 26 
per cent opined that Russia should pursue a policy aimed at securing the re-
turn of these regions to their respective states.380 Here we should note that 
many Russians in fact support the wish for independence expressed by peo-
ple in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, they see Georgia as one of the 
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least Russia-friendly countries, placing Georgia firmly on the ‘enemy’ side 
of the popular Russian friend–foe map. According to a 2005 survey, 38 per 
cent of Russians felt that Georgia was Russia’s foe – only Latvia (with 49 
per cent of the ‘negative vote’) and Lithuania (with 42 per cent) came out 
higher on that 2005 ranking of Russia’s enemies.381  
Whether Russia will decide to recognize the results of possible referen-
dums and separatist states themselves will depend on many factors. The 
main question is whether Moscow needs to take this drastic step in order to 
influence the situation in the region, or whether it may decide to employ 
other measures without risking confrontation with the West and criticism of 
various international bodies.  
The path Russia seems to have been pursuing in its relations with the 
separatist regions in Georgia can be best described as a policy of soft incor-
poration by way of Rossianization. By that term, we understand here the ef-
fects of the policy of granting Russian citizenship to the population of the 
two regions in question. Those ethnic South Ossetians and Abkhaz who are 
granted Russian citizenship become Rossiane – citizens of the Russian Fed-
eration. As members of the community of Russian citizens, their interests 
and security are, as stipulated in various official documents on foreign, secu-
rity and defence policy, to be protected by the Russian state. Both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia have sought a sort of unification with Russia. South Os-
setia plans a reunification with North Ossetia and wants  to become a federal 
subject of the Russian Federation.382 Abkhazia has been seeking the status of 
an ‘associate member’ of the Russian Federation,383 calling on Russia to pro-
tect it against Georgia by referring to the fact that 80 per cent of its inhabi-
tants are Russian citizens.384 
Russia started issuing Russian citizenship to inhabitants of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia in 2001. Although the regulations were tightened with the in-
troduction of the Bill on Citizenship in Russia and rejection of the Commu-
nist proposal on almost automatic granting of Russian citizenship to inhabi-
tants of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniester,385 by 2002, half of the 
population in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had Russian citizenship.386 By 
2005 this figure had risen to more than 84 for Abkhazia387 and to 90388 or 
even 98 per cent389 in South Ossetia. At his press conference in 2003 Presi-
dent Putin tried to present the granting of the Russian citizenship as a gesture 
of good will: ‘having granted Russian citizenship to some 650,000 former 
citizens of Georgia who have settled permanently in Russia, Moscow could 
not then deny citizenship to those Abkhaz – also citizens of Georgia – who 
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requested it.’390 In fact, however, this explanation does not hold water. That 
the Russian authorities – most probably (given the way the political system 
works) acting on the orders of top politicians – have provided between 80 
and 90 per cent of the population of Abkhazia and South  Ossetia391 with 
Russian citizenship has created a qualitatively new situation in the region. It 
has angered the Georgian authorities, who accuse Russia of double stan-
dards.392  
Having granted citizenship to so much of the population of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, Russia may assume yet another role. It may now act not only 
as a third part in the conflicts between Tbilisi and its rebellious regions, but 
also as an actual party in the conflict. What Russia may choose to define as 
the interests and security of its citizens could be at stake, for instance in the 
case of renewed fighting in the conflict zones.  
Thus far, Russia has opted not to play this citizenship card – but even a 
superficial analysis of official documents on foreign, security and defence 
policy reveals that Russia may be compelled or willing to play this card in 
the future. As an unidentified Russian military source claimed in 2004, Mos-
cow could ‘have a moral obligation to intervene in the event of Georgian 
military aggression that led to the death of Russian citizens’.393 With so 
many citizens to be defended against Georgia, Russia could have more than 
enough pretexts to intervene – to act against ‘the suppression of rights of 
citizens of Russian Federation abroad’ as stated in Russia’s Military Doc-
trine 2000; or to prevent or put an end to ‘infringement on the rights and in-
terests of Russian citizens in foreign states’ and ‘ensure the security of Rus-
sian citizens in armed conflicts and situations of instability’ as stated in the 
2003 ‘Ivanov doctrine’;394 or ‘to  protect the rights and interests of Russian 
citizens and compatriots abroad on the basis of international law and opera-
tive bilateral agreements’, as stated in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept 
2000; or to ‘defend the legal rights and interests of Russian citizens resident 
abroad’, as stated in the National Security Concept 2000.   
This does not necessarily mean that Russia will employ any of these for-
mal pretexts to intervene to defend the separatist regimes, under the guise of 
defending its own citizens. To what extent Moscow is likely to be interested 
in playing this card will depend on many factors, domestic and external. 
Among domestic factors the decisive ones may be the need to further con-
solidate the regime by launching a new small victorious war, like that 
launched in 1999 to promote Putin. Or we might witness a nationalistic turn, 
with the post-Putin regime developing in  a more Eurasian direction, with 
greater focus on strengthening Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space. The 
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issue of protecting Russian citizens might be used to launch a post-Soviet 
reunification project, with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and perhaps Trans-
dniester and Belarus as the first chunks to be reincorporated into ‘the Post-
Soviet Union – Light’. This Eurasian Motherland Russia project, today pro-
moted by Motherland Party (Rodina), could become an attractive alternative 
to the Kremlin, especially if relations with the West should take a turn for 
the worse and Russia began looking to the East.   
A Russia that embarks on a more assertive line in relations with the West, 
rejecting the Western model of political and economic development, a Rus-
sia no longer constrained by its economic weakness but flexing its energy 
muscle in order to achieve its goals in the post-Soviet space and elsewhere – 
such a Russia might have a far lower threshold for intervening in Georgia 
and perhaps incorporating some Georgian territories. After all, Georgia is 
seen as a Western outpost in the Caucasus, a thorn in Russia’s CIS flesh. 
This would be a different Russia from the one following the path of West-
ernization and paying more than lip-service to democracy and cooperation, 
while continuing to adopt democratic and market reforms of its own choos-
ing.  
In order to understand this possible anti-Western turn and its effects on 
Moscow’s policy towards Georgia, towards the separatist conflicts and to-
wards Russia’s commitment to withdraw its military forces from bases in 
Georgia, we need only to look at what policy would have been pursued to-
wards the separatist conflicts and towards Georgia, if Russia had been ruled 
by more nationalistically-inclined political forces.  
A good indication is provided by an analysis of statements and actions of 
two political figures representing the nationalistic wing of Russian politics. 
In 2004, Dmitrii Rogozin, the then head of Motherland (Rodina) party, 
sought to get the Russian State Duma pass a bill on the incorporation of the 
separatist regions in Russia. In proposing this bill, Rogozin said that it 
should apply to territories with an ambiguous international status. He added 
that passing of the bill and its ensuing implementation would solve most of 
the separatist problems in the post-Soviet space: ‘if the bill is adopted, we 
will eliminate the problems of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniesic’. 
Under the bill, citizens in the republics would be allowed to decide in refer-
endums whether they want to be unified with Russia. In turn, Russia would 
not require any international treaty, as the vote would need to be approved 
only by both chambers of parliament and the president in order to be 
valid.395 Rogozin has repeatedly shown that he meant what he was talking 
about. In February 2002, when chairman of the State Duma International 
Relations Committee, he said Russia should react to the planned deployment 
of US troops in Georgia by recognizing the self-declared Abkhaz republic 
and South Ossetia.396 In July 2003, during his visit to Abkhazia, Rogozin 
stated that Russia would not allow that ‘a single drop more blood is spilled 
in Abkhazia’, and added that Russia was drafting a response to the Abkhaz 
parliament’s appeal to grant Abkhazia associate membership of the Russian 
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Federation.397 In June 2004, Rogozin again visited Abkhazia and again 
promised his hosts that Russia would protect Abkhazia against what he de-
scribed as Georgian aggression; further, that he would work for Russian re-
cognition of Abkhaz independence and lifting of the economic sanctions im-
posed by the CIS in 1996.398 
Another notorious Russian nationalist is Vladimir Zhirinovskii, leader of 
the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and twice presidential candidate. 
Also Zhirinovskii has pursued an active policy towards the separatist con-
flicts in Georgia. In 2004 he went on a political show to Abkhazia together 
with a group of Russian tourists and 40 State Duma deputies, and said that 
Russia should think about integrating Abkhazia.399 In a later interview he 
advocated recognition of Abkhaz independence, stating that Abkhazia had 
‘separated from Georgia forever’ and that the country was interesting for 
Russia ‘simply because it wants to be with us, because it is ready to be an 
associate member or a member of the CIS or to join the Russia–Belarus  
Union, or to form any alliance except being a part of Georgia’.400  
By noting that Abkhazia was willing to cooperate more closely with Rus-
sia, Zhirinovskii made a clear reference to the question of reciprocity – 
which, according to Russian officials, should be the main guiding line for 
Russia’s policy in the region. In line with this idea Russia, should develop 
relations with those who are interested in developing relations with Russia. 
Since Georgia has been causing trouble by accusing Russia of foul play in 
the region and inviting even Russia’s geopolitical rivals to become a part in 
the Caucasian equation, Zhirinovskii’s call for closer cooperation with 
Abkhazia is not so far from what could be described as the official – or at 
least mainstream – line of Russian policy towards Georgia and separatist 
states. For instance, on 6 March 2002 the overwhelming majority – 364 for,  
3 against – in the State Duma voted for a non-binding resolution on the US 
military presence in Georgia which stated that this presence might compli-
cate the already difficult situation in the region, and expressed hope that this 
would not lead to a military solution of the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.401 The same resolution warned that if the peace talks be-
tween Tbilisi and Abkhazia and South Ossetia were to take a negative turn, 
the Duma was prepared to consider other ways of dealing with the issue of 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, and that this approach would be 
based on these two regions’ ‘expressions of free choice’. This move has been 
interpreted as the Duma’s warning that it could consider recognition of 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence and even their admission into 
the Russian Federation.402  
A further example of how more conservative political players link Rus-
sian policy in the Caucasus with the Western presence in the region and 
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Georgia’s pro-Western turn as being against the reciprocity principle was 
provided in May 2005 by the former head of the International Cooperation 
Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence, General Leonid Ivashov. 
Asked how Russia should react to developments in Georgia, he said that 
Russia should deploy its military units in Abkhazia and South Ossetia be-
cause ‘the Caucasus has already been incorporated into the NATO zone of 
responsibility, and we need a military political response in that direction.’403 
Three years earlier, when the Russian authorities were considering military 
action against what they described terrorist bases in Georgia, the same Gen-
eral Ivashov had advocated a more nuanced policy approach. At that time he 
had claimed that seeking closer cooperation with separatist leaders in 
Abkhazia, Adjaria, and South Ossetia, developing direct economic ties with 
separatist regions and activating the Russian diaspora in Georgia would 
serve Russia’s interests in the region and harm Georgia more than a military 
operation, which might undermine Russia’s international position.404 
These statements clearly show that the Russian reading has seen the 
situation in Georgia in purely realist terms – especially when the USA de-
cided to strengthen its presence in the region and give Georgia substantial 
support in its fight against international terrorism and separatism. The 
emerging US military presence resulting from the growing US interest in 
stabilizing the situation in this strategically important area has provoked 
nervous reactions and playing of Russia’s separatist card in Georgia, espe-
cially by those less pragmatically inclined to the US presence than President 
Putin and his close advisers.405 Commenting on that issue, Gleb Pavlovskii 
had said on 28 February 2002 that the presence of US troops in Georgia 
should not be seen as a threat but rather as an opportunity: ‘with every 
American blow on our enemies we are increasing our security, saving the 
lives of our soldiers, and gaining time for our own rearmament.’ He added: 
‘this advantage should be used and instantly converted into adequate foreign 
and domestic polices’, and went on to accuse ‘retired Moscow generals and 
experts’ of ‘making noise each time they see Americans’.406 
This pragmatic approach to the US presence and influence changed when 
Washington decided to play a more substantial role in re-configuring the 
political landscape of the post-Soviet space. The role of the USA – and more 
generally that of the West – in the democratization of the post-Soviet repub-
lics, as symbolized by their support to the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia 
and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, has made Moscow recon-
sider its policy. These Western moves were widely interpreted as infringing 
on vital Russian interests in the post-Soviet space. They contributed to 
changing Russia’s policies towards the West, towards those seen as Western 
‘agents’ in the post-Soviet space and even towards the solution of post-
Soviet conflicts. The shift in official policy towards these conflicts should be 
therefore understood within the broader context of the development of Rus-
sia’s relations with the post-Soviet space and with the West – and not solely 
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or necessarily as an issue in bilateral relations between Russia and countries 
with a separatist problem.  
4.5. Russia and Separatist Conflicts in Georgia: Summing up 
Problems in relations between Georgia and Russia have continued. In May 
2006 there were serious concerns as to what the foreseeable future could 
bring. A list of the issues contributing to this souring of relations and rising 
tensions was presented by Izvestiya on the eve of the planned meeting of the 
two countries’ leaders in St. Petersburg on 13 June 2006.407 Georgian com-
plaints against Russia included Moscow’s support to separatists in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, the ban on importing Georgian wine and mineral water to 
Russia, increasing prices for Russian energy supplies (gas), introduction of a 
visa regime for Georgian citizens, and Russia’s refusal to hand over Igor 
Gieorgadze, former Georgian security chief accused by Georgia of terrorism 
and organizing attempts at Georgian politicians. On the Russian list of com-
plaints were Georgia’s aggressive policy in the post-Soviet space and the 
export of ‘colour revolutions’, Tbilisi’s attempt to join NATO as soon as 
possible,  Tbilisi’s threat of use of force for settling the Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian conflicts, provocations against Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia and the anti-Russian insults hurled by leading Georgian 
politicians.408 
When the two leaders agreed to meet in St Petersburg it was in order to 
address these concerns and discuss ways of settling their disputes. The most 
recent chapter in the debate on the future of Georgian–Russian relations was 
therefore written on 13 June 2006, when Russian President Vladimir Putin 
met with his Georgian counterpart Mikheil Saakashvili to discuss problems 
in bilateral relations. In their remarks at the end of the meeting, both leaders 
paid considerable attention to the issues that have been influencing their bi-
lateral relations, including the situation around the separatist conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space. President Putin focused on growing economic cooperation 
between Russia and Georgia, while President Saakashvili pointed to prob-
lems linked with the issue of ‘aggressive separatism’: this he described as 
the main regional challenge and, in his words ‘not in the interest of any 
party’.409  
However, the Russian public was highly sceptical to the possibility of 
improving relations with Georgia. When asked by Izvestia what would be 
the impact of the Putin–Saakashvili meeting, 91 per cent said that as long as 
Saakashvili remained at the helm of Georgian politics, there would be no 
improvement. Only 6 per cent opined that the meeting could contribute to 
opening a new and serious dialogue between Russia and Georgia.410  
This pessimistic assessment of the future of Georgian–Russian relations – 
and thereby the prospects for solving the separatist conflicts in Georgia – can 
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be explained in many ways. In order to understand Russian attitudes towards 
Georgia and its separatist problems we need to grasp the Russian worldview 
and the Russian reading of that world out there.  
Moscow’s policy can be interpreted as a result of Russia’s realist reading 
of the international scene where a zero-sum power game is being played. 
When separatist conflicts are addressed from that angle, the most important 
issue becomes the question of power relations and ability to influence other 
countries, to prevent the situation from developing in a direction detrimental 
to national interests. The separatist movements are seen as manifestations of 
anarchy on the international stage, but they can also provide an opportunity 
to influence the situation in the countries concerned. Russia’s realist power 
has  been on decline since 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed in what 
was recently branded by Vladimir Putin as a ‘the greatest geopolitical cata-
strophe of the 20th century’. For that reason, Russia may fear that any change 
in its international environment – especially one involving the traditional 
geopolitical rival, the USA – could prove detrimental to Russia’s position.  
In 2003, Pavel Baev411summed up his assessment of Russian policies in that 
region by pointing out that Russia was a status quo power that worked to-
wards further stabilization of existing power balances and the preservation of 
deadlocks in local conflicts. Three years later, most of Baev’s conclusions 
still seem valid. Indeed, Russia has even decided to go further and reconsider 
its policy towards the separatist regimes, opening for their formal recogni-
tion in a situation when relations with the West are deteriorating and Russia 
can flex its energy muscle to pursue its international goals without taking 
into account the Western logic of appropriateness. In that context both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are read as ‘geopolitical assets’ that can be used 
to weaken Georgia and undermine the US presence and influence, in what is 
seen as a new chapter of the geopolitical Great Game. This geopolitical ap-
proach was presented in its pure form by Valeri Batuev, expert commentator 
with Vremya MN, when he described the issue of Abkhazia as a territorial 
one: ‘it represents a further exit to the Black Sea’ and for that reason ‘it isn’t 
advantageous for Russia to give Abkhazia to Georgia.’412   
Others, like Vladimir Lukin, then State Duma Deputy Speaker from the 
liberal Yabloko party, held that Moscow’s policy towards the separatist re-
gimes was mostly caused by the lack of coordination and an overly geopo-
litical reading of the situation. This policy could therefore be interpreted as a 
result of the Russian political culture, characterized by the departmentaliza-
tion of policy-making and implementation413 and a focus on geopolitical and 
realist reading of international relations.414   
Interpreting Russia’s policy towards Georgia before the Rose Revolution, 
Lukin said that this policy was being driven by an influential group within 
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the Russian establishment. This was, he said, a group that ‘considers Georgia 
unreliable’, and ‘for that reason Russia must try to hold on to its influence 
wherever it is possible to do so, which means in those regions that are not 
controlled by Georgia.’ Although Lukin himself had opined in 2003 that this 
policy was ‘strategically incorrect’, because Russia needed ‘close and spe-
cial ties not just with Abkhazia, but with a Georgia that has the same sort of 
relations with Abkhazia’ and needed ‘to ensure that those ties are comfort-
able for Abkhazia, and for Georgia, and for Russia’,415 as of the year 2006 it 
seems that Russian policy towards Georgia and its separatist conflicts is still 
driven by the same feelings of insecurity concerning Georgia. It is now evi-
dent that the change brought about by the Rose Revolution did not transform 
Georgia into a more reliable partner of Russia – rather the contrary. Mos-
cow’s policy towards Georgia is to even greater degree driven by fears of 
Georgia loosening its ties with Russia and the post-Soviet space, fears that 
Georgia might permanently leave the Russian sphere of exclusive influence. 
In that context, Russian policy towards separatist conflicts in Georgia could 
be interpreted as a policy of not letting Georgia go over, to the West. This 
policy can be compared to that adopted by Russia towards the Baltic states 
on the eve of the EU and NATO enlargement decision, when Moscow hoped 
that the fact that the border treaties with the three Baltic countries had not 
been ratified by Russia would make it impossible for the three to meet the 
1993 EU Copenhagen and 1995 NATO entry criteria.  
By directly and indirectly supporting separatist regimes in Georgia and 
thereby destabilizing the situation in Georgia itself, Russia may be hoping 
that Georgia’s way towards Western institutions – the EU and NATO – may 
be either much bumpier, or even closed off. Russia may expect that neither 
organization would be willing to accept a new member with unresolved 
separatist conflicts on its own territory, conflicts in which Russia – which is 
defined by both organisations as a strategic partner – may have its own 
stakes and agendas. In that sense, then, Russia’s policy towards separatist 
conflicts in Georgia has an institutional dimension. The goal of this policy is 
not to promote Russian rapprochement with these two Western institutions 
(which probably would have been the case if Russia had continued on its 
Westernization path), but to prevent another state actor from joining these 
institutions by making it impossible for this actor to meet the formal entry 
criteria. 
Russian policy towards separatist conflicts in Georgia has also a ‘con-
structivist dimension’, as it is result of specific mental and political categori-
zation moves made by Russian political elites. Once Georgia had defined 
itself as an actor seeking closer cooperation with the West, that is Russia’s 
most important constituting Other, Georgia – whether Shevardnadze’s Geor-
gia or Saakashvili’s Georgia – was placed on the same side of the Russian 
friend/foe mental divide as the West. Moscow’s policy towards the separatist 
conflicts in Georgia is therefore also a function of the Russian attitude to-
wards the West and the norms and values represented by the West.  
On the other hand, the forces behind the separatist  movements in Geor-
gia represent the ‘Soviet element’, clearly interested in restoring a sort of a 
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‘post-Soviet Union Light’. They seek closer cooperation with Russia as the 
natural core of the post-Soviet restoration project, a project to be based not 
on Western norms and values but on a synthesis of Soviet and post-Soviet 
norms and values, all with  a clear post-Soviet, Russian or Eurasian flavour. 
That reading defines Georgia as a pro-Western and Westernizing Other. By 
contrast, it defines the separatists as those who are becoming more and more 
like ‘Us’, not least through the policy of Rossianization – an institutional and 
formal application of the purely constructivist approach of turning Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian separatists into ‘Us’ and not ‘Them’ – Rossians, citizens 
of Russia.  
5.0. Conclusion  
A single case study cannot provide full-scale information about the priorities 
of a state’s foreign policy. Nor can it yield exhaustive information about the 
international system at large. Seeing security in a ‘grain of sand’ can, how-
ever, reveal how these grains continue to affect the machinery of interna-
tional relations and how states frame their primary security interests. More-
over, it may offer some interesting and revealing conclusions about Interna-
tional Relations theory in general.  
This study began with the assumption that we should understand Russia’s 
priorities as a process of socialization, but not necessarily as one ending on 
that note. That Russia has wanted to play by institutional and liberal rules 
could be explained in various ways. It could be the result of Russia socializ-
ing and internalizing European norms and rules of political behaviour, im-
plying that Russia sought to change its political identity. Moreover, since 
these conflicts were residual ones, one could also argue that Russia did not 
actually have any vital interests in these conflict zones. Subsequently, the 
Russian presence in these areas did not necessarily serve the interests of 
Russia, but those of the local separatists. To the extent that the Putin admini-
stration realized this, it would seek to socialize the Russian elites into OSCE 
conflict resolution processes, and meet the CFE withdrawal criteria. Any 
hesitation here could subsequently be interpreted as a fear of security voids 
in Russia’s perimeter – thus Russia’s argument in Transdniester that the 
forces should remain until the conflict was settled. As for Georgia, the US 
presence and training could also help to alleviate Russian fears of a sudden 
security void in the secessionist areas, combined with the presence of resid-
ual troops with a ‘CIS’ mandate. 
Our case studies do not confirm this, however. As observed by Keohane 
and Martin, ‘the functioning of institutions depends heavily on the operation 
of reciprocity, both specific and diffuse’.416 It seems clear from the 
Transdniester case that reciprocity has not worked. Russia blames the ‘bi-
ased’ focus of the OSCE, and accuses the organization of having a hidden 
agenda. The other OSCE countries, however, have increasingly recognized 
that Russia has, from the very start, employed a ‘reversed conditionality 
scheme’ (the synchronization argument) – not based on the Kremlin’s lack 
of leverage on internal political processes, but aimed at excluding multilat-
eral organizations from playing prominent roles in conflict resolution in the 
post-Soviet space. The lack of reciprocity has produced confrontational 
rhetoric over the viability of the organization itself, also at the inter-state 
level.  
Moreover, if socialization of elites was a strategy, then this would put 
Russia’s outright dissatisfaction with the OSCE in a strange light. What Rus-
sia has expressed great displeasure with is the OSCE’s role as a watchdog 
and promoter of democracy, seeing the Western use of the OSCE as a tool of 
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‘forced democratization’. Although official OSCE documents published in 
the post-Istanbul period have reiterated that the organization, together with 
the UN, should have a leading role in work on solving frozen conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space, the current debate on the OSCE indicates that the organi-
zation seems to be in a deep trouble. This crisis within the OSCE has been 
recognized in many recent studies.417 Since the adoption of the Istanbul 
Charter on European Security (1999), the single most inclusive security or-
ganization in Europe has been said to be experiencing ‘growing pains’.418  
The OSCE has failed to reach a consensus on a final document in three of its 
five last ministerial meetings.419 From January to May 2005, the organiza-
tion was left without a working budget, due to Russia’s opposition to the 
allegedly biased political profile of the OSCE. It would not be difficult, then, 
to attribute this to a covert realist strategy. What seems to be at stake, at least 
from the Russian point of view, is the future of the post-Soviet space. By 
reducing the importance of the OSCE, Russia seeks to retain a dominant po-
sition from which it can confront and deter other great powers. The deliber-
ate Russian citizenship policy in the secessionist areas of Georgia testifies to 
this. Russia sees this space as a civilizational project where it a holds a spe-
cial position as the sole power. 
The issue of reciprocity is also a problem. Reciprocity implies, to a cer-
tain extent, compliance in the OSCE context. For its part, Russia has been 
reluctant to view the Istanbul Pact as a regime, or even an obligation. To the 
extent that it has, the culture of grand bargains seems to have been an under-
lying condition. Russia has singled out the EU as a major partner, often link-
ing issues about compliance with a more effective and interest-based dia-
logue with the EU on security issues. The problem here is of course that the 
OSCE is the single most inclusive organization for EU norms. Rejecting 
OSCE norms means disqualifying as a ‘European’ power. Moreover, if this 
rejection is accompanied with an active foreign policy based on sticks and 
carrots towards countries with festering secessionist conflicts, any rap-
prochement with the EU becomes even less feasible. Russia’s decoupling of 
the Adapted CFE Treaty and the Istanbul Pact has served as a quid pro quo 
for what Moscow sees as lack of OCSE reciprocity. This argument has been 
slower in coming, but has definitely been  designed to make a statement that 
can challenge the web of institutions argument. It is not necessarily so that 
the Western web is tight enough to ensure compliance from Russia. On the 
contrary, Moscow’s policies in this web have induced uncertainty among 
smaller states as to the intentions of Russia.  
This said, Russia has complied in part in the withdrawal of CFE equip-
ment, but feels that it has not been properly rewarded by the European states 
and the West at large. It could be argued that this is a core problem. Russian 
perceptions of ‘reciprocity’ are pinned not on institutions, but on grand bar-
gains. Thus, Russia’s explicit conditionality in OSCE affairs has hinged on 
recognition as a European power, not merely as one among 55 members in 
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the OSCE. Some hold that, although Russia has not complied fully with the 
Istanbul Pact, Moscow has been ‘inching toward full compliance’,420 and we 
should clearly assume that a ‘European’ power should be able to exercise 
sufficient pressure on an unrecognized quasi-state to secure compliance with 
its own international obligations. The Russian ‘inability’ argument appears 
very strange in this respect. As for reluctance, it seems pinned on one factor 
alone – the granting of the status as ‘peacekeeping’ power in post-Soviet 
conflicts. 
We have not wished to make this study a study of the OSCE as such. On 
the other hand, we would agree that a substantial element in the crisis of con-
fidence within the OSCE is the fact that all the organization’s efforts to make 
a difference in the resolution of post-Soviet secessionist conflicts have been 
effectively derailed. As the conflict resolution process has halted, and the 
institutional crisis within the OSCE has deepened, analysts have come to ask 
whether there is any way to unfreeze both the conflicts and ‘counter Russian 
manipulation of secessionist regimes in Georgia and Moldova – Abkhazia, 
Southern Ossetia and Transnistria’.421 This would be difficult, due to Rus-
sia’s lack of interest in making norms a prerequisite for multilateral foreign 
policies. In fact, the crisis within the OSCE seems to have received little 
resonance in Russia. The organization is generally dismissed as one that 
matters only on the margins of Russia’s national interests, and has an inher-
ently biased focus when it comes to the post-Soviet space.422  
In sum, ever since the early 1990s Russia has pursued an inconsistent and 
incoherent policy towards the separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet space. 
Although Russian elites have clearly and early recognized separatism as a 
security challenge and threat within Russia and within the post-Soviet space, 
they have not managed to translate this into a viable and coherent policy to-
wards these conflicts, a policy of unambiguous support for the territorial in-
tegrity of the states haunted by the separatist spectre. Instead Moscow has 
adopted a policy of playing the separatist card for its own purposes. It has 
sought to maximize its geopolitical gains and retain some control in the areas 
that it defines as important for realization of the country’s partly outdated 
strategy, which has remained rooted in an overly realist and geopolitical out-
look on the ‘outside world’. In the short term, this policy may yield some 
rather dubious geopolitical gains.  In the longer term, however, it may well 
serve to undermine Russia’s credibility as a predictable and serious interna-
tional partner, as a ‘normal’ great power seeking its own new place on the 
recently redrawn global power map.  
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Appendix 1.  
Corpus of Putin’s texts used in the analysis of his discourse 
 
Date Full Name Reference 
1999 12 31  Russia at the Turn of Millennium Manifesto 1999 Manifesto 
2000 02 24 Putin’s Letter to Russian Voters 2000 LtV  
2000 05 07 Putin’s Inauguration Speech 2000 Inauguration 
2000 07 08 State of the Nation Speech 2000 SNS 
2001 06 16 Ljubljana Press Conference 2001 Ljubljana 
2001 06 18 Press Conference with US journalists 2001 US PC 
2001 04 03 State of the Nation Speech 2001 SNS 
2001 12 25 National Phone-in with Putin 2001 Phone-in 
2002 04 18 State of the Nation Speech 2002 SNS 
2002 06 23  Annual Press Conference 2002 APC 
2002 10 26 Post-Dubrovka Speech 2002 Post-Dubrovka 
2003 05 16 State of the Nation Speech 2003 SNS 
2003 06 20 Annual Press Conference 2003 APC 
2004 05 07 Inauguration Ceremony 2004 Inauguration 
2004 05 26 State of the Nation Speech 2004 SNS 
2004 09 04 Post-Beslan  2004 Post-Beslan 
2004 09 14 Post-Beslan Reform Speech 2004 Post-Beslan Reform 
2004 12 23 Annual Press Conference 2004 APC 
2005  04 25 State of the Nation Speech 2005 SNS 
2006 01 31 Annual Press Conference 2006 APC 
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Appendix 2. 
Abbreviations 
 
BMO – Border Monitoring Operation 
BSEC – Black Sea Economic Co-operation 
CACO – Central Asian Co-operation Organization 
CFE – Treaty Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States 
CISPKF – Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping 
Forces 
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization 
EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
EU – European Union 
G8 – Group of the seven leading industrial nations and Russia 
GRU – Russian Military Intelligence 
GUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova 
GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova 
HCMN – High Commissioner on National Minorities 
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDPs – internally displaced persons 
JCC – Joint Control Commission 
JPKF – Joint Peacekeeping Forces 
MVD – Ministry of Interior (Russia) 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
ODIHR – Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PMR – Transdniester Moldovan Republic 
SCO – Shanghai Co-operation Organization 
UN – United Nations 
UNDP – UN Development Programme 
UNHCHR – UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
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UNOHCHR – UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
UNOMIG – United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
VTsIOM – All-Russian Institute for the Study of Public Opinion 
 
 
 
 
 
